TRANSCENDENCE AND LOVE FOR A NEW GLOBAL SOCIETY

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE II INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS
TRANSCENDENCE AND LOVE FOR A NEW GLOBAL SOCIETY
(WARSAW, AUGUST 1-2, 2016)
CO-ORGANIZED BY:

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR
PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
(WASHINGTON, D.C., USA)

CENTRE FOR THE THOUGHT OF JOHN
PAUL II (WARSAW, POLAND)

LEONARDO POLO INSTITUTE OF
PHILOSOPHY (CHICAGO, IL, USA)

Cuadernos de Pensamiento Español

ISBN: 978-84-8081-526-0
Depósito Legal: NA 0252-2017
Pamplona

Nº 64: Alberto I. Vargas / Gonzalo Alonso-Bastarreche / Daan Van Schalkwijk
(eds.), *Transcendence and Love for a New Global Society*
2017

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THE TRANSCENDENTAL FLOURISHMENT OF HUMAN LOVE:
FACING MODERN COMPLEXITY

Alberto I. Vargas
Gonzalo Alonso-Bastarreche
Daan van Schalkwijk

Even though the themes of transcendence and love have a long tradition in philosophical inquiry, over the last centuries the interest in these themes has gradually diminished. The reasons for this lessened interest are diverse and complex, but its results are clear: the majority of philosophers think that love and transcendence are marginal themes of little interest, that lack scientific rigor. Still, in society, the philosophical study of these themes is currently of great interest, because, as one of us (Vargas, 2015) argued recently, we are witnessing an anthropological crisis, which manifests itself as a lack of hope, not only on the social, political, and economical level, but above all intimately, in people's interior. Recovering the philosophical study of transcendence and human love means searching for alternatives that are able to open human intimacy to existential hope.

This book is the result of an international effort in this direction. It contains the academic communications of the II International Congress of Philosophical Anthropology "*Transcendence and Love for a New Global Society*" in Warsaw, Poland, the 1st and 2nd of August 2016. Twenty-seven presentations were given by participants from ten different nationalities. On this occasion we proposed two great contemporary thinkers as references to address these relevant themes: Leonardo Polo and John Paul II. Transcendence and love are central themes in their philosophical investigation.

Next to being important contemporary thinkers, John Paul II and Leonardo Polo also have a personal significance to many people, including many of the participants in the conference. As one of us (van Schalkwijk) said in the opening speech, they were two father figures to him and many others, people that inspire hope:

> "St John Paul II became that father figure because he 'sought out' young people, for instance through initiating the World Youth Days. The World Youth Days in Rome put me on the path from being an agnostic 'culture catholic', to becoming a convinced Christian. So I am very grateful to him,

and very moved to have been standing on the St Peter's square, at his last Angelus appearance, where he was no longer able to speak. The events subsequent to his death, his beatification and canonization showed just how many people share that gratefulness for his holy life. Weigel's biography of St. John Paul II points out just how important also his thought leadership has been to his pontificate. Through his thought, St. John Paul II was able to enter in dialogue with the contemporary world, and propose the Christian vocation to different peoples in terms that they could understand. Even though I am sure many of us have read at least some of his texts, there is certainly much more to be learned here, and this conference will be a privileged opportunity to learn, by interacting with experts on his thought.

Leonardo Polo is another father figure. Biology is a wonderful field to study, but working there one encounters many contradictions. People are investigating the DNA that informs our bodies, they look for continuous progress and innovation, but the fact that people are persons, and have their intimacy and freedom, does not seem to enter into their mind. Still, a bit of classical philosophy, or common sense, quickly shows that there is more to the human being than meets the biological eye. Many different fields of study, like political science, law, and business, are in a similar situation. Still, who will take you by the hand and say: look, the things these disciplines are studying are good and valuable; the things philosophers have said through the ages are valuable and partially true, but to understand them correctly they need to be placed in a deeper perspective. This deeper perspective will require sweat and hard study on your part, but it is there for the taking. You can do it, I'll show you the way. And who goes on to actually do it: relate all philosophical history, and fields as diverse as biology, business and law, to a very deep Christian conception of man. This, for me, is Leonardo Polo. I am very far from understanding him completely, but all the time I have spent studying his work has been marvelously enriching. Hopefully, this conference will repeat this experience for all of us.

This conference is a conference of hope. John Paul II invited people to 'cross the threshold of hope' and Leonardo Polo is known as the philosopher of hope; the hope fathers give to their children by accepting their weaknesses, supporting them, and pointing out what they can become. It is also meant to be a sign of hope for the discipline of philosophical anthropology, which in the English speaking world has largely been replaced by the 'philosophy of mind', leaving untreated a whole range of essential questions in the process. It is because of this situation that we have decided to start the 'International Association of Philosophical Anthropology', which, incredibly, did not exist yet. We hope to give further shape to this association while talking to the people present at this conference".

Finally, we want to thank Professor Alejandra Vanney, Head of Research of the Centre for the Thought of John Paul II, Professor Grzegorz Blicharz from the Jagiellonian University, and Andrzej Bulezca from the University of Amsterdam for all the organizational work they have done to make this Congress possible.

From the twenty-seven presentations, after a double-blind peer review process, the editorial council has selected ten articles and various notes which we currently present to the public in this book. This edition has, just like the International Congress, resulted from the collaboration between the *International Association for Philosophical Anthropology* (Washington D.C.), the *Leonardo Polo Institute of Philosophy* (South Bend, IN), and the *Centre for the Thought of John Paul II* (Warsawa, Poland).

We have organized the articles into five sections: 1) Philosophical anthropology (Adrian Reimers and Ana Isabel Mocoso); 2) The Mind – Body Problem (Beatriz Byrne, and José Victor Orón / Gonzalo Alonso-Bastarreche); 3) Law and political Philosophy (Daniel Castañeda, Grzegorz Blicharz, and Rafael Hurtado); 4) Management (Silvia Martino, and Claudio Rivera); 5) Education (Agata Muszyńska). We have also included some academic notes.

Two years after establishing the *International Association for Philosophical Anthropology* we celebrate the presentation of this book, with the objective of promoting the rigorous study of Philosophical Anthropology. We hope that this publication will be the first of many more in future.

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ARTICLES

LOVE, SELF-FULFILLMENT, AND A PASSION FOR INVESTING

Adrian J. Reimers

ABSTRACT: Contemporary popular discourse encourages people, especially the young, to find personal fulfillment by finding their passion, to which they can devote all their energies and talents. Beginning with the "passion for investing", claimed by a financial services firm in its advertisements, the article examines what kind of object is a suitable object for one's life passion. As suggested by the famous text from Gaudium et Spes 24, "man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself", well-developed skills in fields such as financial management, satisfying as they may be, do not suffice for true personal fulfilment. Because the person is a spiritual being who lives from her interior, the attainment of material objectives alone cannot constitute the adequate object of human passion. The very structure of the human capacity to know, which cannot be reduced to calculative mental procedures, requires that the person transcend himself toward truth. This transcendence requires that the person direct herself in love toward the true good. This love cannot but be personal and ultimately directed toward the good that is another person. Paradoxically, to attain such a love it is necessary to transcend oneself, to go out toward the good and not merely to grasp it.

> **"I**ndeed, the Lord Jesus, when He prayed to the Father, "that all may be one… as we are one"[1] opened up vistas closed to human reason, for He implied a certain likeness between the union of the divine Persons, and the unity of God's sons in truth and charity. This likeness reveals that man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself [plene seipsum invenire non posse nisi per sincerum sui ipsius donum]".[2]

This text from Vatican II's Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, *Gaudium et Spes*, is one of St. John Paul II's favorites, which he quotes, cites, or alludes to repeatedly in his teachings. My purpose in this talk is to explore the implications especially of the clause "man […] cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself", focusing especially on the concepts, *finding oneself* and *gift of self*.

Find your passion

A common and rather popular challenge to young people today is "find your passion". Steven Jobs, founder of Apple, Inc. encouraged young people to find something they love and pursue it with passion.[3] Since it is, presumably, by finding his passion that the enterprising young person can attain personal fulfillment, let us look at a passion that one might pursue. In its advertising one financial services company in the United States boasts of its "passion for investing". Of course, one might have instead a passion for sports, science, music, or even for some other person. But for our purposes here, let us confine ourselves to this "passion for investing". What might this passion be like?

It is not the same as a passion for money. Someone with a passion for investing can identify patterns in financial markets and can predict changes with reasonable accuracy so that his or her client will benefit, and he enjoys doing that. His expertise goes beyond simply the analysis of numbers to an awareness of human psychology, knowing how market traders might respond to Brexit or a terror attack in Europe, whether it might be significant if Vladimir Putin frowns or Angela Merkel sneezes. Our investment counsellor takes especial pleasure when her client's children have the funds needed to enter the university or when aging clients can retire in comfort. The passion for investing, then, is based on

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[1]   John 17:21-22.

[2]   Vatican Council II, Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern World *Gaudium et Spes*, §24.

[3]   "Jobs: 'Find what you love'", *The Wall Street Journal*, October 6, 2011. Downloaded August 22, 2016, from http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203388804576613572842080-228

specialized knowledge, the ability to apply it well to practical situations, and the possibility of helping others. A person with a genuine passion for investing is good at doing something useful that help others. It is worthwhile to note that this particular company's advertisements represent its agents in happy, friendly relationships with their clients. So, the passion for investing gives meaning to the life of the financial counsellor and produces good for those who depend on him.

Finding one's passion means finding something that he can do well, that he enjoys doing, and that benefits others. Because what a person loves shapes his life, this counsel, 'find your passion', urges young persons to find something worth loving and to pursue it. How did our financial advisor discover her passion for investing? Let us first note that this is not a universal, natural passion. Financial management is not a universal human activity, nor does it meet a fundamental human need like the food or hydration. The love for finance is not 'written into' human nature as a constituent aspect. Our financial analyst doubtless acquired her interest in finance as a student in the university, where she discovered that she could understand something interesting and arcane but also useful. And this capacity to understand, to use intelligence to make sense of things, *does* belong to human nature. This passion for investing does help to satisfy other human needs, too. The good analyst is rewarded for her work by the gratitude of clients, as well as the esteem of colleagues and superiors. By her work she takes up a respected place within the community. Of course, a good investment counselor also enriches herself, providing for her own needs and wants.

The person as spiritual

According to Pope John Paul II that the human being is the image and likeness of God is the immutable basis of Christian anthropology[4]. Indeed, John Paul II makes his own the Christocentric teaching of Vatican II that "The truth is that only in the mystery of the incarnate Word does the mystery of man take on light. For Adam, the first man, was a figure of Him Who was to come, namely Christ the Lord. Christ, the final Adam, by the revelation of the mystery of the Father and His love, fully reveals man to man himself and makes his supreme calling clear."[5] We shall return to this later. Philosophically the concept that man is the image of God is best, if not perfectly, expressed by this formula, "man is a person". We turn now to this concept.

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[4]   John Paul II, *Mulieris dignitatem*, §6.

[5]   *Gaudium et Spes*, §22.

Karol Wojtyła accepts Boethius's definition of the person as an "individual substance of a rational nature". In virtue of his rationality, the person is a spiritual being, that is, one whose life is focused on truth and goodness.[6] Although the person is ultimately ordered to the highest truth, he is also ordered to every truth as true and in virtue of this the person makes contact with the world through his rational powers. The person's relationship with his environment is always mediated through his reason and will. In virtue of his intellect, his cognition always transcends his perceptual contact with the material world. Because he is endowed with the power of conscience, which is seated in the will, he is capable of self-determination and is not governed by the values presented by natural desires.[7] Concerning any value that sense presents to him–be it the satisfaction of hunger, sexual contact with another, aggression against some perceived attacker–he can evaluate this value in terms of some higher, governing good. He must come to know the truth about this good, because it does not suffice to entrust oneself to the leadings of sense desire. Therefore the person needs to pursue another value, specifically truth. What this means, of course, is that the fulfillment of the person cannot depend only on satisfaction of his physical needs. The person must needs be a spiritual being.

Materialism and exteriority

To grasp the implications of this argument, let us consider an important alternative account. Charles Darwin argued cogently that the human species arose by a process of evolution, by the mechanism of natural selection operating upon chance genetic variations occurring in individual members. Variations that provide an individual with increased likelihood of survival are retained and passed on to future generations, while those that decrease survivability are lost to the species. Of course, this is only a rough description of Darwinian evolution. Two points are worth noting. First, this process is unguided by any higher intelligence; it serves no ulterior purpose or good. Second and more pertinent to our subject, the governing value of the Darwinian account is survival. Nature rewards whatever enhances survivability and punishes whatever reduces it. Within Darwin's model survival of both the individual and the species constitutes the human good. Addressing (albeit briefly) the question of the foundations of morality, Darwin endorses utilitarianism. Taking into account the human social

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6   Karol Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, Pauline Books and Media, Boston, 2013, 4-5

7   Karol Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, 5-6. See also Karol Wojtyła, *Person and Community: Selected Essays,* New York: Peter Lang, 1993, "The Problem of Experience in Ethics", 107-127; "The Problem of the Theory of Morality", 139; Thomistic Personalism", 172, and especially *Persona e atto*, Milano: Bompiani, 2003, 1003-1005.

instincts, by which human communities and their members are preserved, Darwin argues that the human good turns out to be that which serves the greatest good of the greatest number. Whatever promotes the survival and pleasure of human beings is good.[8] Whatever causes suffering and pain is evil. As if to accentuate the importance of survival of the species, Darwin himself argued:

> "The advancement of the welfare of mankind is a most intricate problem: all ought to refrain from marriage who cannot avoid abject poverty for their children; for poverty is not only a great evil, but tends to its own increase by leading to recklessness in marriage. On the other hand, … if the prudent avoid marriage, whilst the reckless many marry, the inferior members will tend to supplant the better members of society".[9]

Although much could be said about the relationship between Darwinism and Mill's utilitarianism, for our purposes here the key notion is that the good for human beings reduces to survival and, for want of a better word, pleasure. The human being is fulfilled when he has survived–and played his part for the survival of the human race–and has done so in as agreeable a manner as possible. In particular, for Darwin this pleasure is constituted in large part by one's acceptance by and praise from his fellows. We can say that these goods are essentially external, because their source is from outside the person; they *happen to* him. Neither survival nor comfort can be attained solely or even principally by a person's interiority. Relatively good fortune is necessary to acquire them. Let us note here that this contrasts with the position of Thomas Aquinas, who writes that "man is ordained to happiness through principles that are in him; since he is ordained thereto naturally."[10] By contrast, within the parameters of a scientific materialism, such as Darwin's, the good for the human being, in terms of which he attains his fulfillment, is material or physical.

Let us pass on from goodness to truth. According to the Boëthian definition, the person is an individual substance of a *rational* nature. Precisely here is a particularly neuralgic point for contemporary thought. What does "rational" mean? For Darwin, the intellectual powers of man are "the same in kind" as those of the animals, although human powers of ratiocination are much more developed than those of other species, "enabling him to use language, to invent and make weapons, tools, traps, &c.; by which means, in combination with his

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[8]   Ch. Darwin, *The Descent of Man: and selection in relation to sex*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1981, 393.

[9]   Ibid., 404.

[10]   Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Great Books of the Western World, Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, vols. 19-20, Encyclopedia Britannica, Chicago, London, Toronto, 1952, I-II, q. 2, a. 4.

social habits, he long ago became the most dominant of all living creatures".[11] For Darwin, the superiority of human intellect is to be attributed to the comparatively large size of the human brain, along with his capacity for language. Daniel Dennett carries this line of reasoning forward with his account of the brain as an "anticipation machine" designed to assure the survival and success of the organism by anticipating dangers and opportunities.[12] So, like other living organisms, the human being is provided with sensors (the five senses) by which it detects environmental features relevant to its survival. The task of the brain is to organize and interpret the data received through these sensors in such a way that the chance of survival is maximized. In Dennett's own notorious comparison,

> "The juvenile sea squirt wanders through the sea searching for a suitable rock or hunk of coral to cling to and make its home for life. For this task, it has a rudimentary nervous system. When it finds its spot and takes root, it doesn't need its brain anymore, so it eats it! It's rather like getting tenure."[13]

The assistant professor's activities of teaching, research, writing, and conference-going are all dictated by the same need to survive that governs the simple activities of the sea squirt. The only difference is that their respective survival needs involve different degrees of complexity.

Such a materialist account–and it matters little what form of materialism may be at work–entails two important conclusions concerning reason and truth respectively. Concerning *reason*: under a materialist model, the human intellectual power is essentially calculative. The work of reason is to process, categorize, and store information, functions that can be and are performed by machines. The standard for good thinking becomes that specified by William James: the discovery of useful 'leadings' for life.[14] Reason so conceived has no transcendent function. It is simply the effective processing of data.

Concerning *truth*: the concept of truth reduces to utility. Again citing James, the true is the useful and the useful is true[15]. To be sure, some truths may in practice prove to be useless –the nature of 'dark matter', the extinction of the dinosaurs, the presence of water on Juno–, but in principle they relate to useful truths. Whatever dark matter may be, it stands in some relation to matter and

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[11]   Ibid., 390.

[12]   D. Dennett, *Consciousness Explained,* Little Brown and Company, Boston, New York, 1991, 177.

[13]   Ibid.

[14]   W. James, *Essays in Pragmatism*, Hafner Publishing Co., New York, 1948, 162.

[15]   Ibid.

energy as we know them. The theoretical convertibility of matter and energy expressed by Einstein's famous equation, $E=mc^2$, led to the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, whatever may lie beyond the scope of some conceivable experimental test by the senses or some physical machine is inaccessible to the human mind. More precisely, for the materialist philosopher, the mind is limited by matter and material conditions. In a very real and meaningful sense, for materialism man is the measure of all things. This is why contemporary philosophers resist and warn against the danger of anthropomorphism in metaphysics, understood as our common propensity to see reality in terms of our own categories of understanding, which are necessarily formed by our own survival needs. It becomes impossible–indeed, inconceivable– for the human mind to know reality as it really it. Just as the jaguar is constitutionally blind to the pollination of alfalfa, because it does not impinge upon his life, the human being can know reality only according to what he needs to survive. We might remark at this point that precisely here do we find warrant for contemporary philosophy's concern about speciesism.

At this point, let us briefly turn to the passionate financial analyst who knows finance, manages financial matters effectively, and enjoys doing so. Clearly she is intelligent and knowledgeable. She needed a university degree even to enter into this field. In the quickly shifting relationships of value among stocks, bonds, and futures, within the broader contexts of technological development, political changes, international relationships, and even natural disasters–it is well known that all such events can affect the markets–our analyst had to learn to recognize new patterns and directions. Last year's safe and dependable securities may yield very little or even become dangerously volatile this year. If our passionate analyst is to succeed, her mind must flow, as it were, with the markets, so that she knows them almost instinctively. She is sensitive to subtle shifts that may signal opportunity–or danger. She has a 'feel', a 'sense' for the markets. We might say that she has internalized the world of finance in such a way that she can grasp clearly what is bewildering and incomprehensible to the rest of us. If, as Aristotle said, "the mind is, in a way, all things"[16], her mind has become finance. Just as the cowman is mentally 'at home' with the cattle on his ranch, so that he knows 'by second nature' how animals behave, and the attorney recognizes almost instinctively the shifting mood of the jury, she knows finance. Finance forms her mind, and precisely this self-formation manifests that she is a spiritual being.

To attain her goal of maximizing financial return, our passionate investor responds to market data and conditions. In her professional activities she behaves in an exterior way. Nevertheless, we can also discover here an important ele-

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[16]   Aristotle, *On The Soul*, Bk. 3, Ch 8 431 b21.

ment of interiority, for by her study and discipline she has formed herself according to a conception of the good about which she seeks to know the truth. She wants to foster in herself an understanding of things as they are. She is not governed by emotions and impulses. If the Euro should suddenly sink, she does not panic, because she also keeps close watch on the yuan and the Brazilian real. By what she has done to herself, forming her mind and desires, our passionate investor has undertaken a spiritual project. Though she may not realize it, she has, to an extent, formed her soul.

Love and passion for the good

By "passion" we understand the readiness and susceptibility to be moved strongly toward some good, which stands as dominant over most other goods. Simply put, a passion is a very strong and overarching love. Some passions, such as sexual passion, anger, or fear arise from some natural need, from nature's own requirements for survival and organic well-being. In general, however, this correspondence between the passion for some good and the state or condition of the subject obtains also in the case of acquired desires. Our passionate investor has in fact transformed her soul by fostering her passion. This reflects the general truth that love transforms the lover according to the image of the beloved. Let us consider how this occurs, starting with our passionate investor.

A passion for investing is acquired late in adolescence or early adulthood, characteristically during one's university studies. Having encountered the academic discipline of finance, the potential investor discovers that she has a talent for it, enjoys it, and can probably have a successful career in it. So, she chooses to pursue it more deeply. In school she studied finance and eventually became a knowledgeable professional, understanding the arcane patterns and rules of investing, creatively applying them, and fitting well into the community of financial experts. Of course people experience other kinds of love. A young man at a party may look across the room and see a lovely girl who "doth teach the torches to burn bright". He is not content merely to admire her beauty from afar, but like a pilgrim seeks her out, choosing that night to risk his own life to win her love. Indeed, when she complains that his name is Romeo, he offers to renounce even his own identity[17]. The lover, whether Romeo, Don José in Bizet's *Carmen*, or someone you or I may know, remakes himself to please the beloved. He or she transforms himself in such a way as to become a value to the one who is loved. This transformation may be good or bad. Don José became a criminal for Carmen. We teach our children the lives of the saints so that they may imitate them in loving Christ.

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[17]   William Shakespeare, *Romeo and Juliet*, Act I, scene 5, Act II, scene 2.

It follows, therefore, that this passion of love is not purely passive; it is also active. If on the one hand the lover is moved toward some good, he must also choose to move toward that good by giving himself to that good, whether this means the dedication of his efforts to scientific study or to changing his goals and priorities for the sake of winning another's love. It follows, therefore, that the object of a person's love cannot simply be taken and passively possessed. To love is to go out to a person or valuable thing and to give oneself to it, by this very act conforming one's own self to an implicit standard of goodness. By the self-transformation of his life, the lover implicitly accepts a criterion of the good, according to which he desires the goods he loves and becomes good himself. No longer will Don José be the good soldier of whom his mother was so proud. He will become a smuggler for Carmen.

Self-fulfillment

It is by one's attaining the good he loves that the person hopes to fulfill himself. We may speak meaningfully, of course, of varying levels of self-fulfillment, whether in playing music well, tutoring children in math, or helping clients to invest for their retirement. We rightly regard the life of faithful committed love in marriage as fulfilling. Raising a family, even with all its difficulties, disappointments, and frustrations, is fulfilling. In short, we understand fulfillment to be the attainment of some worthy, significant good. But what does this word "fulfillment" mean? Etymologically it suggests a kind of filling up. But what is filled up?

Plato offers a clue to the answer in his analysis of pleasures.

"Therefore, if being filled with what is appropriate to our nature is pleasure, that which is more filled with things *that are more* enjoys more really and truly a more true pleasure, while that which partakes of things *that are less* is less truly and surely filled and partakes of a less trustworthy and less true pleasure."[18]

Sense pleasures arise from the filling up of bodily appetites, while the spirited part of the soul finds pleasure in victory. Such pleasures are limited and transitory, because those things that satisfy these desires *are less*; they are less real than those things that fill up the intellectual part of the soul. According to Plato, the highest pleasure is had from that which most perfectly fills up the desires of the soul's intellectual part.

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[18] Plato, *Republic*, Book IX, 585e (emphasis added).

We need not accept the platonic theory of forms to grasp something extremely valuable in here. We have spoken of the soul and its transformation as the person pursues the good and gives himself to it. If indeed the person is an individual substance of a rational nature, then the transformation of which we are speaking must be of the rational part of the person–in St. Thomas Aquinas's terms, the intellect. If the intellect were formed completely by and according to the perfect good, then it would be fulfilled. Furthermore, since it is the intellect as practical that forms the actions of the person, then intellect is that according to which a person exercises self-determination. The perfection of the intellect would therefore constitute the fulfillment of the person.

> "Now man's highest operation is that of his highest power in respect of its highest object: and his highest power is the intellect, whose highest object is the Divine Good, which is the object, not of the practical but of the speculative intellect. Consequently happiness consists principally in such an operation, viz. in the contemplation of Divine things. And since that "seems to be each man's self, which is best in him," according to *Ethic.* ix, 8, and x, 7, therefore such an operation is most proper to man and most delightful to him".[19]

Human happiness, the attainment of the ultimate good for a human being, can be nothing other than the contemplation of the Divine Essence.[20] St. Thomas's argument is conceptually neat and, with appropriate adaptation, satisfies Plato's requirements. But a serious problem remains. Our passionate investor knows how to develop the understanding and skills needed for her profession. Romeo knew, albeit imperfectly and immaturely, how to win the love of Juliet and sustain it. The Divine Essence, however, remains beyond the natural powers of the human being. For the human intellect to enjoy the vision of the Divine Essence, this vision must be granted to it freely by God himself. Indeed, because (as we shall see shortly) the human intellect cannot conform itself to its Highest Good, God himself must conform that intellect to himself, so that by his action the human soul becomes "deiform".[21]

According to Karol Wojtyła, the principle behind human understanding is *induction*, which "is the intellectual conception of the unity of what is signified in the multiplicity and the complexity of the phenomena."[22] From within the multiplicity of experience, the intellect grasps its unity. This sense of induction is different from that of Hume or Mill in that it is not a 'short-cut' categoriza-

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[19]   Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 3, a. 5.

[20]   Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 3, a. 8.

[21]   Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 12, a. 5.

[22]   Karol Wojtyła, *Persona e atto*, Introduction, 846.

tion of somewhat similar individuals. Rather it is the discovery of the unity among the objects signified. The process of induction leads to a complementary operation of *reduction*, which is a kind of "exploration" of the experience at stake. Having grasped the essence of something, the mind explores its implications by way of deduction. This process leads to a deeper and clearer understanding of the essences of things. For instance, among the many streamlined creatures with fins in the ocean are some that surface periodically to blow steam from a hole atop their heads. No less a personage than Herman Melville identified these creatures as fish, precisely because of their physical appearance. However, many of their qualities are incompatible with our concept of fish. Whales are warm-blooded, bear live young, and breathe air. In these respects and others they are like mammals. And so, Melville's prestige notwithstanding, we classify whales among mammals. This is, in fact, how it is with human knowledge. We grasp the essences of things not directly but through processes of induction and reduction (or deduction, if you prefer), and our grasp of these essences is *always* fallible. We may think that we know something, but further investigation may reveal our understanding to be incomplete or even false. The knowing person *never* knows all that he needs to know for his understanding to be complete and perfect.

The implications of human fallibility are disturbing, especially if Thomas Aquinas is right that perfection requires the operation of the intellect. Descartes was scandalized by his own fallibility and sought desperately for certainty. He came to ascertain that "I exist", but this certainty did not allow him further to affirm "René Descartes exists", René Descartes being the son of M. Joachim and Mme. Jeanne Descartes, born in Le Haye, France, educated by the Jesuits, and so on. Our passionate investor, of course, is well aware of her fallibility, and her career characteristically infects her with chronic low-grade anxiety. How can she be sure that yesterday's spike in oil futures does not presage a crash in the energy sector? Founding his science on the hard implications of higher mathematics, the physicist deals in certainties–or seems to. Twentieth century physicists had to cope with the relativity of space-time, quanta, and an expanding universe.

Most ominously, however, human fallibility seems to threaten love. Karol Wojtyła insists that love must be founded on truth, and he warns against the dangers of idealization.[23] Romeo was in haste to marry fair Juliet, but, had not tragic misunderstanding intervened, would the young lover later have repented at leisure? Certainly one of the great challenges in the early years of marriage is for the young bride and groom to adjust their respective expectations as they come to know each other more intimately. The problem is deepened by the fact

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[23]   Karol Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, 97-99, 102-103.

that neither spouse is complete and fully knowable at the time of their wedding. As persons they are not fixed by nature to a determined way of being or acting. The very fact that a person is capable of self-determination–indeed, self-determination is an essential characteristic of personhood–implies that one's husband may well cease to be "the man I married". The cute bride may in ten years show herself to be a shrew *or* the bravely competent mother of a seriously ill child. We could multiply examples, but the central point is this: one person's knowledge of another is highly imperfect, so much so that we might well affirm that a person can know his horse or his automobile better than his spouse.

In a curious way, the fallibility of our knowledge of other persons parallels and even reflects our inability to know God. Of God one can know that he exists, is good and true, that he is eternal and one, even that his existence is identical with his essence. Even if we add to these metaphysical conclusions much of the data from the Bible, even then he does not know God as he is in himself. He knows God only when beyond this life God welcomes him into communion with him and reveals himself fully. As we have said already, this knowledge is not the fruit of human rational activity but of God's gift to the soul that responds to him in love. Similarly, although the metaphysical gap between God and the human soul is infinite, that between any two human persons is profound. One person's knowledge of another is always, in a way, exterior. I see him and observe his body; so too does his physician. I watch her act and can judge what she seems to value. We teachers do our best to evaluate the minds of our students; do they truly understand what we have asked them to learn? In every case, if seems however, that we know only from without. Our knowledge of the other is necessarily imperfect. How can communion with another person be possible? I suggest that its realization parallels, in a way, the attainment of communion with God.

According to St. Thomas, the human person is awarded the vision of God in response to his merits, by which he has manifested his rectitude of will or, to put it more simply, by which he has shown his love for God. Interpersonal communion among human beings is attained in much the same way. Two persons, drawn to each other by the values each finds in the other and by the goods which they commonly embrace, commit themselves to mutual pursuit of those common goods. The fullest realization of such communion is attained in marriage, which is constituted by the mutual complete gift of self, which is spousal love. From this commitment there arises a knowledge that goes beyond the inductive, rationally acquired knowledge we spoke of above. The two share their lives so completely that they increasingly come to hold in common their deepest values, which together they strive to realize, and share their bodies so completely that from their union come children in their image and likeness. This too

constitutes a kind of knowledge[24]. "Adam knew his wife, Eve, and she conceived and bore a son."[25] Note that this act by which the child is conceived is one that two must perform together. Furthermore it is intended as an expression of the mutual self-giving love of the two, and by it there comes to be one who is like them but independent of them, a rational being who also stands before God as a "partner of the Absolute".

Interiority and Transcendence

If we rigorously and logically consider our fallibility, we are humbled. All that we know and claim to hold as true must ultimately take the form of hypothesis. As Descartes so alarmingly showed, anything I believe can be doubted, and in Cartesian doubt we find nowhere to stand. Descartes had to find the absolute in the tiny shred of knowledge constituted by his *cogito*. If in fact it is our knowledge that makes us who we are, then we are pathetic beings. No matter how impressive our knowledge of the origins of matter and energy 13.8-billion years ago, of the Higgs boson, of the extinction of the dinosaurs, or the surprising discovery of the history of the Amazons, our fallibility, our intellectual weakness is such that we cannot know what is most important. Even if the human intellect is open to the absolute–for God can open it and fill it with himself in a marvelous way that leaves personality intact–we find ourselves limited by the frailty of our senses and our brains. We cannot directly grasp the transcendent.

As efficacious beings, living in the world with our senses and muscles guided by reason, we can transcend our own subjectivity and change the environment and ourselves. Such a *horizontal transcendence* is essential if we are successfully to live in this world[26]. In virtue of one's horizontal transcendence he is attracted to various values toward which he may direct his acts. For example, having learned that a particular enzyme shows great promise for treating cancer, the alert financial adviser may invest in the pharmaceutical market. Nevertheless, we are not merely 'exterior' beings. Concerning any value that experience may present, the person may ask "Is it genuinely good?" In recent years we have read debates about the morality of a gay man's leaving his wife for the sake of realizing his authentic sexuality. Most of the current debate about this is in "horizontal" terms, because the issue at stake is presented simply as a matter of balancing two kinds of desire. The married man presumably desires to re-

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[24]   John Paul II, *Man and Woman He Created Them*, Pauline Books & Media, Boston, 2006, 210-15 (21:1-22:3).

[25]   Genesis 4:1.

[26]   Karol Wojtyła, *Persona e atto*, 982.

main with his wife and family, but this is counterbalanced by a stronger desire to experience sexual contact with a male lover. The rightness or wrongness of the man's behavior depends not on some external moral code but on his being true to his deepest self, on his living according to his deepest desire. Within the context of horizontal transcendence alone, there is no way definitively to determine which choice is right.

However, in his analysis Karol Wojtyła speaks also of "vertical transcendence", which is transcendence toward truth as such, especially the truth about the good[27]. In virtue of his capacity for vertical transcendence, the person is capable of self-determination, that is, free. Vertical transcendence comes into play when we address the question of the truth about the good, when one evaluates his values. In this case, one can question the value of his pleasure, whether the sexual satisfaction of a particular form of sexual contact is, or even can be, the good. According to our hypothesis, he is married, and this implies that he has made a solemn vow to a particular person, a woman. The obligation to be true to his vow is incommensurable with the pleasures he wants. One might, of course, try to render them commensurable by positing a pleasure-quotient for keeping one's promise, so that the pleasure of being a promise-keeper can be compared to the physical pleasure of sex. However, this approach is nothing but an *ad hoc* mechanism to save the theory that no one can act save for pleasure or measurable self-interest. In truth, many human beings throughout history and across the world have recognized and acknowledged the value of fidelity to one's vows. Of course, fidelity might conflict with other values, whether sexual pleasure or profit or even survival. At stake, therefore, is whether this fidelity, which is really fidelity to the person with whom the vow was made, is a greater or more authentic good than the other values which conflict with it. As we shall show later, self-fulfillment depends directly upon vertical transcendence.

Vertical transcendence requires knowledge of truth, and truth as such is accessible only through reason[28]. Although reasoning necessarily involves the operation of a physical organ–the brain–it is ultimately a spiritual operation because the relationship between mind and reality that constitutes truth is spiritual; it is non-material. One attains to truth by processes governed not by physical conditions but by reasonable, which is to say logical, relationships of meaning and inference. And just as reason or intellect is ultimately spiritual, so too is the will. Although sense experiences and desires may present themselves as compelling and their objects as values, it remains to the person himself, by that power that is called will, to choose them. Even if at one moment will is too weak to overcome the impetus of some sensual desire, it can nevertheless re-

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[27] Karol Wojtyła, *Persona e atto*, 982 ff., especially 1003-1007.

[28] Karol Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, 97; *Persona e atto*, 1150-52.

main oriented toward the authentic good, toward which the person can eventually direct himself. In virtue of his reason and conscience, therefore, the person is an interior being[29]. He is free to direct himself to the good from within and thereby to transcend the conditions of material being.

Let us accept the premise that by living one's passion one can attain fulfillment. The investment counselor with a passion for investing *does* experience a certain kind of fulfillment when she has done her work well. But why is this fulfilling? The good at stake–increased financial (or artificial) wealth–is not of the sort of good that transcends one's earthly state. It is foolish to believe that increased wealth, even when necessary to avoid penury, is a fulfilling good. We know from experience that many people forgo greater wealth in favor of other values, such as freedom from big-city life, artistic engagement, or even a hobby. But our passionate investor does her work to benefit a client, whom she serves. To serve is, to some extent, an act of love, and this is reflected in the satisfaction our investor feels. Furthermore, her work has required a variety of virtues – intelligence, diligence, creativity, and even some selflessness. In her work, she has, to some extent, improved herself. On the other hand, if she is wise she will realize that what she does cannot fulfill her transcendent longing for the truth and the good itself. Even if she has not grasped the truth that St. Thomas Aquinas, Saint John Paul II, as well as Sts. Irenaeus and Augustine, knew, namely that the fulfillment of all human desire is had only in communion with God the Creator, she knows–or can know–that it is something beyond the realm of possessions and finance. Even if he could not describe the Form of the Good, Plato certainly knew this, and so did Aristotle, even if his characterization of the ultimate object of contemplation was unsatisfying and incomplete. Both knew that the ultimate good for a human being can lie only in the transcendent absolute.

The great paradox is that fulfillment–a filling up–is possible only by emptying oneself as a sincere gift, by giving oneself. "This likeness [to the Blessed Trinity] reveals that man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself." This self to be fulfilled is experienced as finite, limited by the conditions of its bodily existence. The infinite is beyond the capacity of human faculties. Nevertheless, because he is ordered to truth, the human person is curiously unlimited. Not only can he always learn more truths about the world, but his yearning is for the truth underlying all truth, the truth that draws all truth into union and harmony, that explains all truth.

More significantly, the person ardently desires the perfection of good, not only a limited and well-defined good, but the good that is unquestionably and

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[29]   See *Gaudium et Spes*, §19.

perfectly good. Finite goods may be had by possessing them in some way; one eats a steak, admires a painting, or holds his beloved in his arms. But the spiritual being desires an unlimited good, and paradoxically this can be had only by going out from oneself so to enter into that good. This is why love is necessarily creative. To love a spiritual being requires that the lover go out from himself, to give himself precisely to discover the good jointly with and in the beloved. Here is the great paradox that modern philosophy has such a hard time accepting. We experience ourselves as finite–fallible and prone to folly–and we can easily harbor the illusions that what is finite can satisfy us. However, as persons, as free rational beings, we are ordered to the transcendent. We are ordered to the truth of truths and to that Good which transcends the goods of experience. The human person, created in the image of God, can do none other than to seek his Father whose image he bears. Indeed, as the text cited earlier from *Gaudium et Spes* 22 shows, the frail and fallible constitution of ours was and is taken up by God himself for the Incarnation as a human being of the Person of God the Word.

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PERSON AS CO-EXISTENCE.
AN APPROACH TO LEONARDO POLO'S
TRANSCENDENTAL ANTHROPOLOGY

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ABSTRACT: We find a solid and coherent proposal in Leonardo Polo's thought, based on two inseparable pillars. These pillars are: a theory of knowledge that broadens human knowledge's scope, and an anthropology that places the person at an ontological level that is distinct and superior to the rest of existing beings and, at the same time, distinct but dependent and destined to her Origin. These two crucial issues deserve to be studied together. This paper aims to clarify basic questions regarding Polian anthropology and the cognitive method stemming from its abandonment of the mental limit. In other words, it inquires into other cognitive approaches, beyond the rational process, the 'mental presence', as Polo refers to it.

Leonardo Polo characterizes personal being as co-existence with the being of the universe, with her own intimacy, with her own potencies, with others and with God. Polo describes the person as additionally. The author of this paper intends to describe each of the dimensions of personal human co-existence. In other words, she looks for 'verbs' that accompany Polo's use of the adverb additionally, which he uses to characterize the person. At the same time, the author introduces Polo's proposed expansion for gnoseology, while recovering and deepening the innate habits as a method for knowing being.

L eonardo Polo distinguishes the being of the human person from the being of the physical universe and the being of the divine person, and characterizes it as co-existence because "the co-existence designates man's being as a being that cannot be reduced to existence."[1] He expresses this in a linguistically different way with the adverb: *additionally*. According to him, the person is *additionally*.

Polo also characterizes personal being as *co-being*, *co-existence,* which refers to the character of *additionally*.

a) With regard to knowledge, person implies an intellectual, knowing co-existence with the being of the universe.

b) Intimacy is an inner co-existence by which the person is accompanied.

c) Freedom of destination, co-existence with other persons and in God.

d) Freedom as a natural disposition refers to co-existence with one's own potency. Thus, the person is neither her intelligence nor her will, but is with them.

This presentation addresses each of these dimensions of the human person's co-existence. In other words, I will look for 'verbs' that accompany *additionally*, the adverb Polo uses to characterize the person.

1. Co-existence with the universe

Cognitive openness to being, which can also be called the innate habit of the first principles, can be described as *being additionally to objectifying*. Thus, Polo states: "*Additionally* indicates the pure non-exhaustion in operational knowledge."[2]

This statement responds to the deep understanding that capturing being as act is not objectifying; it is not 'having the concept of being', among other reasons, because it is not possible to abstract the act of being as a universal. To advert the real as real is neither an abstraction nor a judgment: it is the intellect's innate disposition. This innate disposition or habit does not rest on intellectual potency, which is *tabula rasa*. Rather, it rests on the active intellect or agent intellect or, as Polo refers to it: the intellect *ut co-actus*.

The importance Polo gives to dealing with the innate habits is fully justified by his attempt to deepen the Thomistic distinction between essence and act of

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[1]   L. Polo, *Presente y futuro del hombre* [*Present and Future of Man*], Rialp, Madrid, 2012 (2ª ed. corregida), 158.

[2]   L. Polo, *Antropología trascendental* [*Transcendental Anthropology*], I, Eunsa, Pamplona, 2003, 114.

being at the anthropological level. This is precisely because these habits, these innate dispositions, are the channels through which we grasp the being of the physical universe, of God as its Origin and of the person. Without delving into these habits, we cannot go beyond considering things at the level of essence, forms, and those captured abstractively.

The habit that captures the persistence of the universe as non-contradictory and dependent on the Origin cannot have reason's potentiality as its subject. This is because capturing the extra-mental being is a previous *requirement*, and is concomitant to all actualization of intellectual potency. Hence, its subject must be the agent intellect. In other words, *the agent intellect is the light that captures being* and, *thanks to this*, the intellectual potency *can capture* forms and essence as distinct from the act of being.

This is a fundamental clarification because it is not enough to admit that the intellect as act adverts being while potential intelligence discovers the entity's essence and other determinations. The intellect in act puts forth *more effort* in all knowledge of reason. In other words: it is necessary that the *personal advertence of being accompany all of reason's processes, without confusing it with them*. Otherwise, rational knowledge would not be knowledge *of the real*.

Referring to the habit of first principles, Polo says: "the truth of persistence rests on said habit."[3] Persistence is non-contradiction, and the person 'sees', adverts, non-contradiction, and, therefore, its truth.

Personal being co-exists with the universe in virtue of the extra-mental *knowledge of being* and its truth. "The human being's duality with the being of the universe is the habit of first principles."[4] However, it is not its ground.

Professor González García explains this in presenting Polo's thought: "to be a person is not to establish, cause or start; it is to be free. And freedom is not opposed to being –to the ground– nor does it replace it, because it cannot be reduced to a principle (of conduct, for example). Freedom does reach the principles, but it does so by releasing itself from them and from the depths of the personal being. This, therefore, involves a second sense of being added to the fundamental. The personal being is being *additionally*; this *plus*, which is the person, is freely added to the extra-mental being, and as a complete novelty."[5] Thus, knowing is a complete novelty, always a new discovery.

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3   L. Polo, *Antropología*, I, 199.

4   L. Polo, *Antropología*, I, 199.

5   J. A. García González, *Y además. Escritos sobre la antropología trascendental de Leonardo Polo* [*And additionally. Writings on Polo's transcendental anthropology*], Bubok, Madrid, 2010, 120.

Polo also explains this by recurring to the dual and hierarchical structure he discovers in the entire scope of what is human. Thus, in relation to the universe, man is dual in two ways:

First, the person is dual with the universe because it "is not a replica of man, nor vice versa."[6] Rather, personal being is superior to the being of the universe, and enters into duality with it through knowledge. In Polo, this duality is the habit of the first principles.[7]

One of Polo's criticisms of modern thought is precisely the loss of this duality in attempting to replace being with the subject. This 'symmetrization' –as Polo refers to it– is the modern mistake of acknowledging reality's foundation as the subject, rather than as being.

Man is dual with the universe in another way: "perfecting it through his practical activity."[8] This duality is not transcendental, but is at the level of both man's and universe's essence. Indeed, through his transitive work, man can facilitate that causes coincide.

However, vigor, the person's activity as knowing *ut actus* (agent intellect), does not end by illuminating this rational task: it is *additionally* to it.

Indeed, human co-existence is not exhausted in duality with the universe: the human being does not *consist* of knowing or perfecting the universe. Moreover, this person-world duality is not radical, because "the habit of first principles is, in turn, dual with a superior habit –the habit of wisdom–,[9] according to which man transcends his co-existence with the being of the universe."[10]

2. Co-existence in God

The title of this sub-section describes the person as co-existence *in* God. It seems more accurate to use the preposition *in* instead of *with* because personal existence (the personal act of being) is dependence on God, and thus does not exist outside of this dependence, but *in* it.

One could argue that the universe is also dependence, and it is. However, it is a dependence that begins and follows, but does not grow, nor seek, nor attain. The person does, and thus her dependence grows, because it is knowing and

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[6]   L. Polo, *Antropología*, I, 166.

[7]   Cfr. L. Polo, *Antropología*, I, 166.

[8]   L. Polo, *Antropología*, I, 171.

[9]   I discuss Polo's proposal regarding this innate habit later in this work.

[10]   L. Polo, *Antropología*, I, 166.

loving, and therefore freedom.[11] It is more appropriate, then, to refer to the person as *co-existence in God as the culmination,* and to the universe as *persistence from God as origin*.

One's own personal intimacy is not known in a rational way, through a process of abstraction, judgment and reasoning, but in another way: every person innately knows herself, concomitant to one's very existence, and as intellect. This way of knowing is the habit of wisdom.

In other words, in her intimacy, the person attains herself, knows herself as intellectual light. However, this light cannot fully clarify who she is and for whom she is. As Polo would say: it's methodical value does not attain it. Thus, another method, another person must be the light that penetrates the light of one's personal intellect.

Polo distinguishes between the *search for other* and the *search for a similar*. The person is a search in both meanings, and he makes it clear that 'other' is relative to love; 'similar' is relative to knowledge.[12] With regard to the search for the similar: "if the person does not find a personal replica, she becomes an enigma to herself. Otherwise, she would reveal her self to herself. However, in order to reveal herself the revelation must also be a person. Otherwise, the person remains unknown forever, which is a transcendentally absurd situation."[13] The person is the search for a similar, that is, for someone who fully and radically knows her, of an intellect that totally elucidates her being.

Let us further delve into this topic. The habit of wisdom is a disposition of the agent intellect by which it *reveals itself*: it allows itself to be seen as intellect. Not in one fell swoop, in a fixed way, but co-existing with the habit. Thus, the agent intellect is light, that *allows itself to be seen* in a habitual and innate way; *it reveals itself as light*.[14]

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[11]   It is clear that the agent intellect is freedom. Not only because without the agent intellect there is no freedom, but because "the personal act of being is intellectual in act and radically free... Thus, these two are characterizations of the personal act of being... The consideration of gift as transcendental is also personal." L. Polo, *La esencia del hombre* [*The Essence of Man*], Eunsa, Pamplona, 2011, 160. Also see: *Ibid*., 136.

[12]   Indeed, love seeks the other because it is the other: it does not yearn to be the other, or for the other to cease being itself. However, in knowing one seeks to see itself reflected in the one it knows.

[13]   L. Polo, *Persona y libertad* [*Person and Freedom*], Eunsa, Pamplona, 2007, 253.

[14]   "Transparency should not be confused with glass' diaphaneity, which is physical. The diaphanous is rather passive with respect to the light that passes through it, and therefore lacks what we call transparency's intensity. Transparency's intensity is the inward intellectual light, because the inside is light." L. Polo, *Antropología*, I, 191.

The light metaphor has been used classically to discuss the agent intellect, and is very appropriate: the light is not fixed, but spreads as it illuminates. However, it does not illuminate itself, but something else. At the same time, it is transparent. The intellect as act illuminates what is external to itself, but it also reveals its own interiority: it becomes visible for the one Who is able to see it, which is not itself, nor the other similar to itself, but God.

The person is also the search for other. Thus, Polo describes this as *transcendental loving*.[15] Co-existence is perhaps most clearly seen from loving, because loving sees the other as other, while the intellect seeks to find itself in the similar. Thus it is clear that loving cannot culminate in itself, but in *the other as the other*: in the beloved as different from the self. The person, then, is openness, gift-co-existence, because she gives and because she accepts, as we will discuss further on.

In short: the person, in her intimacy, is the search for the similar and the search for the other. In other words, it is a free intimacy that searches freely.

This approach is completely different from that of freedom as indeterminacy. Indeed, "if human freedom can be converted with other anthropological transcendentals, it cannot be included in mere indeterminacy. Although created freedom is not infinite, its condition of possibility *in God* is, and it is in an entirely positive way. In line with this approach, it is even clearer that arbitrariness is not a characteristic of freedom."[16]

Freedom is not pure possibility; it is a search. But it is a search that does not end with an *attainment* (because its end is not produced by it), or with *fruition* (because it is not a tendency that culminates in satiating a need[17]). Rather, it can be described as a *search for an understanding of oneself* that cannot be found in itself because it is received, not originating, freedom. And it is a *search for meaning*[18] that cannot be anything other than the response of the other person,

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[15]   Not as willful loving.

[16]   L. Polo, *Epistemología creación y dvinidad* [*Epistemology, Creation and Divinity*], Eunsa, Pamplona, 2013, 75.

[17]   In short, because neither knowledge nor love can be satisfied.

[18]   Viktor Frankl, the father of the 'Third Viennese School of Psychotherapy', included the following term in Psychology: search *for meaning*. He distinguishes between "the meaning that logotherapy instantly deals with (which) is a particular meaning, a meaning that is here and now (...) There is also a general meaning, an ultimate meaning. A meta-meaning, as I refer to it (...). It is a meta-meaning because it goes beyond our ability for purely rational apprehension." V. Frankl, *En el principio era el sentido. Reflexiones en torno al ser humano* [*In the beginning there was meaning. Reflections on the human being*], H. Piquer Minguijón (trad.), Paidós, Barcelona, 53. For Frankl, the search for meaning is possible because of man's transcendence. "In reality, what

nor of another created[19] person because no created person radically knows the other, as we will discuss later.

Transcendental freedom, or person as freedom, does not simply seek the truth and stop there. Rather, the encounter with the truth 'triggers' a search. "The person's freedom, without ending, begins as *it is added to the truth*. I refer to this inspired addition as: 'character of additionally'. To be *additionally* is equivalent to being a person. Personal freedom is *additionally*, and it distinguishes itself from freedom as an attribute of the practical will."[20] It is not only light that understands the truth and sees the good: it is an insistent light that searches for more. It searches for another light that illuminates it in order to fully know its own being. This is the agent intellect's *theme*: to know itself as God knows it.

Thus, in the search for the verb to accompany the personal *additionally*, one could say that while co-existing in God, the human person is *additionally to illuminating*.

3. Co-existence with other created persons

To summarize what we have already said: the person co-exists with the universe and co-exists in her intimacy. But she does not find a response, a 'replica' as Polo says, in either one of these dimensions: the material world cannot respond to personal knowing or loving. One is not a replica of herself. Thus, if there were no other persons, the person would be meaningless.

"A person by herself would be tragic, precisely because she would lack a replica. Therefore, man's co-existence with the universe would be frustrating if

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is essential to the human condition is self-transcendence, that there is more to one's life than oneself... Something or someone." *Ibid*.

[19]   In a theological context, and written with stylistic evocative beauty, Romano Guardini expresses a similar idea, shared with other authors such as Ebner: "He created me by calling me to be his. However, the response to the call requires that I be the one He called me to be, and that I live my life by carrying out the role of 'you' with respect to Him... This relationship constitutes the truth of my being, as well as my reality's ground." *La existencia del cristiano* [*Christian Existence*], 179, 467, quoted by A. López Quintás, "La antropología relacional dialógica de Romano Guardini" ["Romano Guardini's relational dialogic anthropology"] in J.F. Sellés (editor), *Propuestas antropológicas del siglo XX* [*Twentieth century anthropological proposals*], Eunsa, Pamplona, 2004, vol. I, 165.

[20]   L. Polo, "La verdad como inspiración" [Truth as Inspiration], in *La persona humana y su crecimiento*, Eunsa, Pamplona 1999, 2ª edición, 199.

it were the only duality, because the universe is not a person."[21] One might object that the person finds the response in God. But without other human beings, her existence in the world would be meaningless, as we just read in the previously cited text.[22]

It is obvious (and this is how Polo describes it) that man co-exists in society, satisfying his own needs and those of others. "Although certainly necessity is inferior to the person, satisfying one's needs marks a level of co-existence: the bestowment and acceptance of man's actions must intertwine for necessity to be satisfied."[23] Life in society, and the culture it produces, is a relationship at the level of acquired habits, of virtue. Therefore, it pertains to the field of ethics. However, it is not a realm of transcendental freedom.

The question is: can we also describe the person as transcendental co-existence with other persons? To clarify, we should return to our starting point: the person is co-existence in as much as she is a knower. Therefore, we must ask: how does the person know other persons? Clearly, she knows actions, languages, and, through these, she captures *how the person is*. However, this is not knowledge at the transcendental level but at the level of human *essence*: to know *how* someone is is not the same as knowing *who* she is. Knowing who she

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[21]   L. Polo, *Antropología*, I, 167. Similar statements can be found in the works of other personalist authors. For example, in Guardini: "Truly, the person is not only dynamis but also being; not only act but also form (Gestalt). She does not appear in the encounter, but actualizes herself in it. It certainly depends on the fact that other persons exist. It only makes sense if there are other persons one can encounter. Whether the encounter actually happens is another question (...). This refers to the ontological fact that, according to principle, the person does not exist alone. We can express this objective data by saying that man is essentially in dialogue. His spiritual life is oriented to be shared." R. Guardini, "Mundo y persona" ["World and person"] Encuentro, Madrid, 2000, 116-117, cited by A. López Quintás, "La antropología relacional dialógica de Romano Guardini" ["Romano Guardini's relational dialogic anthropology"] in J. F. Sellés (editor), *Propuestas antropológicas del siglo XX*, Vol. I, 159. Although the conclusion is similar to Polo's, the method used to reach it is distinct. Like other personalist thinkers, Guardini utilizes a primarily phenomenological method. We find something similar in Nédoncelle's personalism, derived from the concept of being as relation: "Relation indicates tendency, openness and transcendence, fundamentally between persons and themselves or the human person and God. At her most intimate core, the person is oriented towards others, God, and even physical things. However, we can only speak of her reference to them by analogy to what is true relation, which is established between free, spiritual beings whether they are divine or human persons." J. L. Vázquez Borau, "La Antropología de Maurice Nédoncelle" ["Maurice Nedoncelle's Anthropology"] in J.F. Sellés (editor), *Propuestas antropológicas del siglo XX*, vol. I, 352.

[22]   Also see: L. Polo, *Persona y libertad*, 143-144.

[23]   L. Polo, *Antropología*, I, 199.

is implies knowing her as *person*, knowing her as personal '*actus essendi*', knowing her in her radicality, novelty and uniqueness.

At least two authors claim they have not found a response to how to know another person as a person in Polo's thought.[24] However, in *Antropología trascendental* [*Transcendental anthropology*] Polo specifically says: "a human person's intimacy is not knowable by another, but only manifests itself in accordance with its essence."[25] Thus, we find it unnecessary to search his work for another answer.

Indeed, it simply is not possible. The person's radicality is not persistence like the universe, but free actuosity. It clearly cannot be known as simply non-contradictory, as a first principle, because it is not. Then, how can it be known? One might think that the habit of wisdom, which 'attains' its own being by accompanying it, might be the way to access others' personal being. But it is clearly not possible to *accompany* the other's being. It is not possible *to be in an intimacy* other than one's own.

"The character of additionally, as insisting on inward openness, is thematically equivalent to transparency. In this sense we refer to the method and subject's solidarity. The third dimension of the abandonment of the mental limit is not a method directed by a theme, but by insistent intellectual light, which attains transparency as its theme."[26] From this perspective, one's own being does not reveal itself to a personal human intellect distinct from its own.

The knowledge of the other as person must be *in God*. This does not mean that by knowing the personal God as creator one knows the other in her radicality. Rather, I suggest that such access to the other's being is only possible when we find our replica in God. This is also consistent with stating that the knowledge of my own being is a never-ending search. This is because the person only finds the replica in the knowledge that God has of her, not in the knowledge that the person has of herself (because no person is an identity), nor in the knowledge another person may have.

Thus, personal co-existence with other persons cannot be in the dimension of radical knowledge. Is a non-cognitive co-existence in the order of personal lov-

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[24]   Cfr. L. Fantini, *La conoscenza di se in Leonardo Polo* [*Self-knowledge in Leonardo Polo*], Tesi di Dottorato diretta de Prof. Juan José Sanguineti, Pontificia Università della Santa Croce, Facoltà di Filosofia, Roma, 2006, 82, and S. Piá, *El hombre como ser dual* [*Man as dual being*], *Estudio de las dualidades radicales según la Antropología trascendental de Leonardo Polo*, Eunsa, Pamplona, 2001, 263-265.

[25]   L. Polo, *Antropología*, I, 203.

[26]   *Ibid*., 175.

ing possible? If the answer is yes, this implies loving (giving and accepting) not preceded by knowledge at the same level. In other words, to personally give oneself and accept the personal gift of the other without knowing the other in her most radical transcendental intimacy.[27]

This is not absurd, even within Polo's vision of the person, as personal loving is superior to personal knowing, especially if one recognizes that personal loving does not imply "giving" being (neither one's own nor that of the other) because this is only possible for the Creator. To love is to give, however gift is not an act of being, but essential acts of the will, of the body, of reason.

To summarize, complete knowledge is not required in order to completely love. Here, freedom to love comes into play; which, in fact, also refers to God, and is a search without a fixed end. In light of this, one might think that knowing another person in her most radical intimacy is also a search and that it will be attained in so far as it 'advances' the encounter of the response to my own being. That is, knowing myself as God knows me.[28] Moreover, the total gift of one's own person to another is not possible, but to the extent that it grows in search of divine acceptance to one's own gift, an increasing gift and acceptance is, even when full acceptance by the other is not given.

The radical knowledge of the other's intimacy is not possible in this life, and co-existence with other persons is gift co-existence, but not radically intellectual. Thus, it is not a distinct dimension from co-existence, but somewhat of a branch of co-existence in God.

4. Co-being as intimacy

According to what we have outlined up to this point, the person knows herself as person thanks to an innate, intellectual '*habilitas*', the habit of wisdom, superior to knowing the existence of the entire universe. This is another aspect of personal co-existence: intimacy.

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[27]   We find a similar intuition in Blondel when he refers to the heart as a way of knowing one's beloved: "Eager and needy love becomes an organ of knowledge because any subject can only be known as such to the extent that it is loved." M. Blondel, *La acción* [*Action*]*,* 292, quoted by C. Izquierdo, "El hombre a la espera del don de Dios. La antropología de Maurice Blondel." ["Man awaiting God's gift. Maurice Blondel's anthropology"]. In J. F. Sellés (editor), *Propuestas antropológicas del siglo XX*, Vol. I, 240. However, as we know, Blondel does not sufficiently systematize the cognitive method he proposes: the methodical immanence, interiority as method.

[28]   Perhaps this is why humility is coexistence's first virtue: "humility illuminates willpower's limit and only then is inter-subjectivity possible." L. Polo, *Antropología*, II, 239, note 312.

Knowing oneself is neither an operation nor an acquired habit. Rather, it is an innate disposition of the '*intelectus ut actus*', that is, of the agent intellect, of the personal intellectual light.

What does this habit know, and how does it know? It knows who I am, and knows it by 'accompanying me'. This is *intimacy*. Now, the person knows herself but cannot be reduced to knowing herself. She is not *solely* self-knowledge. Moreover, self-knowledge is not something attained: it accompanies, it is an intimacy that flows with existence: "To be additionally is to intimately open oneself to more, to attain oneself: more than to persist, it means to accompany, intimacy, co-being, co-existence."[29]

Let us return to García González, as he very clearly expresses Polo's thought on this topic: "The human person is founded on the radical duality that, oddly enough, is the thematic methodical duality. The person as theme, and the person as method that knows of said theme: the person as a being who knows herself."[30]

When Polo refers to the personal act of being, co-existence, as the radical anthropological transcendental, he explains: "note that radical is not tantamount to first: the act of being is first as a first principle, not as co-existence; co-existence is the second act of being."[31]

The second act of being means *radical duality*, and we should not ignore this if we want to understand Polo's proposal and this paper's objective: to clarify freedom.

Among human dualities, not all are radical. The radical duality Polo speaks of is "the double methodical and thematic value of the character of additionally."[32] In other words, the person is, on the one hand, the known (*theme*) by his habit; and on the other, the search (*method*) for knowledge greater than herself. She is intimacy that is reached in intimacy and transcends from her intimacy.

This is what Polo describes as *interior openness* and *inward openness,* intimate duality. "*Interior openness* is the discovery of what I refer to as *lack of*

29 L. Polo, *Antropología*, I, 137.

30 J. A. García González, *Y además*, 90. Cfr. from the same author: "Leonardo Polo: la persona humana como ser libre" ["Leonardo Polo: the human person as a free being"]. *Thémata*, (2007) (39), 223-228. This is a short and very clear explanation of this point in Polo's anthropology.

31 L. Polo, *Antropología*, I, 195.

32 L. Polo, *Antropología*, I, 196.

replica, and it dualizes *with inward openness*, or the discovery that this deficiency cannot be definitive."[33]

Intimacy as lack of replica refers to intimacy as a free activity, it dualizes with it. In other words, it is attained as freedom in knowing[34] its own intimacy as distinct and superior to the universe (precisely because it knows it) and to its own human potencies' activity (rational knowledge and the unfolding of its voluntary action) which are not its radical intimacy. To put it in simpler terms: each person captures herself (attains herself) as freedom to the extent that she does not find a similar response to herself in the universe or in her own humanity. She captures herself as 'beyond' the external and the internal.

However, personal intimacy does not 'end' here, but discovers within itself that this lack of response cannot be definitive (otherwise, intimacy would be destroyed). Thus, it transcends itself: it searches beyond itself.

5. Co-existence as freedom

Polo refers to the relationship between intimacy as not finding a 'response' in the universe and free transcendence as *the duality between the discovery of the lack of replica and attaining the active value of co-existence*. In this second dimension, freedom *motivates* the search for response, although "search corresponds to the *intellectus ut co-actus* and gift-love."[35] We will discuss this later.

This discovered intimacy transforms into a search of who will respond. Thus, we find *inward openness*: the search. This search is both intellectual and gift. Therefore, it refers to "the intellectual transparency and the gift structure in which intimacy is reduced to inward openness"[36] as a search for replica and acceptance.

Intellect and freedom's conditions both appear in this description of the person as intimacy: "the personal act of being is intellectual in act and radically free."[37] Not only are they inseparable, but they become each other through conversion proper to the transcendentals.

Polo makes a very lucid distinction between the mode of the metaphysical and personal transcendentals' conversions. First, that they become each other

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[33]   L. Polo, *Antropología*, I, 196.

[34]   The term "intellectually" does not mean 'with intelligence' as cognitive potency, but by the intellect as act.

[35]   L. Polo, *Antropología*, I, 226.

[36]   L. Polo, *Antropología*, I, 197.

[37]   L. Polo, *La esencia del hombre*, 160.

means that "we distinguish them notionally, but they are not distinguished."[38] However, among the metaphysical transcendentals (being, true and good) there is an order, "and they can be converted through the order."[39]

However, "it is not so in the personal human act of being."[40] In other words, the personal transcendentals do not require an order: their conversion is clearer. "Conversion, really, is an expression of fullness,"[41] states Polo. This indication is particularly enlightening because it suggests that personal intimacy is freedom because it is intellectual light, and vice versa; it is gift-intimacy because it is free, and vice versa; it is intellectual light because it is gift and acceptance, and vice versa. We must think about this carefully, as Polo warns us.

For now, and to summarize, the person is –because she knows– not only outward openness, but *interior openness*, precisely because to know is to open one's interiority in order to fit what is external to it. To open one's interiority is to be free, and to know is to fit the external in it: freedom and knowledge are interiority's openness.

But the person is also *inward openness*, that is, a venture into one's intimacy, growing *in* it and *with* it. This means *the person's knowledge is openness* not only to what is external to it, but to herself; and that she *is freedom* because she is neither determined nor detained in this inner search that does not end and transcends herself. I say that in searching the person transcends herself because this consists in accepting that the answer to her search *cannot be found in herself*.

Taking into account these initial considerations, freedom appears superior to classical philosophy's willfulness and very distinct from modernity's indeterminacy[42] because it appears as intimacy open to the inside, as personal being.[43]

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[38]   *Ibid.*

[39]   *Ibid.*

[40]   *Ibid.*

[41]   *Ibid.*

[42]   Yepes Stork, one of Polo's close followers, writes: "All anthropology changes when it takes personal being's latent dimension into account: intimacy. If omitted or forgotten an objectivist and analytical vision, external to human realities, occurs. Certainly then, the personal dimension of these realities is left unknown since intimacy is the core from which one's own depth, permanent deposit, is assisted or not. Only then can one live an authentic existence, with one's actions and operations. But we must not forget that intimacy is being." R. Yepes Stork, "Persona, intimidad, don y libertad. Hacia una antropología de los trascendentales personales" ["Person, intimacy, gift and freedom. An anthropology of personal transcendentals"], *Anuario Filosófico*, XXIX/2 (1996) 1082.

"Freedom is intimately freedom, not originally freedom... Intimacy means giving, it is being as gift: *donatio essendi*."[44] From this perspective, creation is understood as *donatio essendi*, which is much more than causality.

God is originating intimacy that *gives* intimacy: this gift is the creation of each person. The gift is this intimacy. We can better understand this in the following manner: the act of being is the most intimate act. In fact, it is more intimate to the creature than herself. In the personal creature, this is true in an eminent way, more so than in the universe. Thus, knowledge of one's intimacy becomes a way to know God, distinct but not opposed to metaphysics' way.[45]

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[43] Intimacy is not synonymous with immanence. Immanence occurs in all non-transitive operations, and is typical of any kind of life. And very much so in knowledge. It is the living thing's outward openness to seize the external and bring it inward. Intimacy is more than this: it is inward openness.

[44] L. Polo, *Persona y libertad*, 152. Elsewhere, Polo directly states: "the expression 'man is person' is equivalent to 'man is born of God'. This means that man is the son of God... Born of God, man's personal being is relationship in the order of Origin." "La persona humana como relación en el orden del Origen" ["The human person as relationship in the order of Origin"], *Studia Poliana*, 14 (2012), 27.

[45] Cfr. J. A. Lombo, "Lo trascendental antropológico en Tomás de Aquino. Las raíces clásicas de la propuesta de Leonardo Polo" ["The anthropological transcendental in Thomas Aquinas. Classical roots of Leonardo Polo's proposal"], *Studia Poliana*, 6 (2004) 181-208.

LIFE AND COGNITION.
A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEONARDO POLO

Beatriz Byrne

ABSTRACT: There is an ongoing dissatisfaction and disappointment on the expectations placed on neuroimaging methods thirty years ago. Furthermore, the idea of cognition understood as a number of processes, the modular paradigm has also been challenge in neuroscience on the grounds of no correspondence between specific brain areas acting as independent processors for complex cognitive functions. The existence of brain networks across different areas seems to better explain cognitive functions. An example of this is the amygdala which is involved in cognition as well as in emotions. Other authors go a step forward and they argue that cognition cannot be localised in the brain area solely and it is the result of brain, bodily and environmental inter-wined activity: embodied cognition. However, could cognition be explained from a point of view which would encompass all the former views? Has the time come to re-introduce philosophical answers to the way cognition can be explained? The Classical Philosophical approach to cognition suggests a trans-corporal cognition rooted in a conception of life as an immanent auto-movement, of living organisms which includes a cognition remittance to the environment from which it extracts its knowledge, as well as the necessary involvement of the nervous system, sensorial organs and brain.

Introduction

The questioning of the validity of the Information Processing metaphor to interpret cognition processes based in the lack of information provided by the neuroimaging methods, together with the connection theory brought by the existence of neural networks en-charged of cognitive tasks, seems indeed to overthrow the former. Nevertheless, a careful consideration of each of the terms of this affirmation may rather lead to its affirmation thanks to the insights brought about by the cognitive understanding of Classical Philosophical Anthropology.

The present approach is an interdisciplinary consideration which respects the findings of neurocognitive sciences and its methods but it nevertheless aims at a wider and deeper view of the nature of cognition. Its main purpose is to bring back the suitability of philosophical approaches to explain the findings of neuroimaging techniques in neurocognitive science.

The Modular Paradigm

Cognitive psychology emerged in the 1960's as the outcome of several developments in the first part of the twentieth century. These developments were Psychophysicist, Structuralism, Gestalt Psychology, Behaviourism, Human Information Processing, Linguistic and Information Processing Systems[1]. Psychophysicists introduced measurement methods; structuralism and associationism engaged in the study of how elements of mental states were connected. Gestalt psychology examined regularities in perception. Behaviourists specifically concentrated in the study of behaviour in order to establish relationships between stimuli and responses, thus studying the process of learning but purposely ignoring the existence of a middle medium, such as the mind, which could account for changes in behaviour. Linguistics understood language as an expression of the mind and sought to find the mental process that informed it. Information Processing Systems captured the idea that information was transformed through a variety of mental processes. The later idea was developed in computer science, which in its turn became influential models for cognitive psychology. The introduction of computers afforded cognitive psychologists a metaphor of mental structures and processes[2], the IP metaphor. The computer is a symbol processor of great flexibility, complexity and adaptability. It has fixed components, also known as computer architecture, and includes a processor, a

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[1]   K. Haberlandt, *Cognitive Psychology*, Needham Heights, Allyn and Bacon, 1994, 25.

[2]   Marr's 1982 in P. Quinlan, and B. Dyson, *Cognitive Psychology*, Pearson Education Ltd., Essex, 2008, 29.

fast-access memory and a long-term store with a large capacity. The software programs are a list of symbolic instructions executed by the computer. Influenced by this, researchers began to view cognitive functions such as attention, perception, reasoning, language and so on, similar to symbolic computation[3], and the study of human cognition in psychology further developed on the assumption that there is an abstract entity called the mind and this is composed of mental states and mental processes[4]. The brain was seen as more like an information processing system such as a programmed computer. Mental states and processes, by analogy, are the mental software of the mind[5]. The brain receives input from the outside world, it converts this into codes and it then produces responses to the input. Similarly, the computer takes information from the keyboard, it then represents this in its own internal codes and consequently produces sensible outputs. Neuroscientists were to concern themselves with the hardware implementation level, while cognitive psychologists concern themselves with the first and second levels[6]. Following the IP metaphor, it was assumed that as the software of a computer is managed by a distinctive area of the hardware of the same computer, so it would happen in the brain and it is known as the modular paradigm. This was the view adopted by neuroscientist for decades[7]. The nature of mental processes was ignored and left open to further interpretations.

Neuroimaging Techniques

The modular paradigm was very successful as selective deficit from brain damage patients showed such as bilateral temporal lobe surgery produced the effect of amnesia. Other cognitive abilities with specify areas in the brain were short-term memory; semantic memory; reading; and planning among others[8].

However, there is a significant shift nowadays in the neuroscience approach to study cognition. This approach brings together the study of cognition research typically described as instances of neuroscience such as neuroimaging

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[3]   Haberlandt, *op. cit.*, 8-25.

[4]   P. Quinlan and B. Dyson, *op. cit.*, 13.

[5]   *Íbid.*, 23.

[6]   *Íbid.*, 29.

[7]   R Epstain, *The Empty Brain*, 2016, https://aeon.co/essays/your-brain-does-not-process-information-and-it-is-not-a-computer.

[8]   J. Driver, P. Haggar, and T. Shallice, Introduction. Mental Processes in the Human Brain, *Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B*, 362, 2007, 757-760, http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/, 757.

and the study of cognition through impairment[9]. Neuroimaging specifically threatened to displace, and in some cases to finish off, the study of cognition understood as a processor of information got through the senses. Once known how the hardware functions everything else can be discarded. In fact, there is a wide acceptance in science and medicine that all aspects of mental life can be explained by brain function because cognitive functions can be severely impaired by brain damage[10].

While there is no question on brain damage affecting cognitive functions, one can ask what is it that neuroimaging techniques measure and their relation to cognitive functions. Cognitive neuroimaging records neural activity while the subject is performing cognitive activities[11]. This neural activity is recorded by measuring the regional flow blood in the brain areas implicated. The most common types of techniques are the Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and the functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) which are different methods of measuring changes in the regional blow flood[12]. This type of measurements and their relation to cognitive functions has been put in question by some authors such as Uttal[13]. Their best accomplishment has been to show how higher cognitive functions require the involvement of several brain areas[14].

Brain Networks

In addition to above, research has shown the existence of brain networks. The findings on the organization of the brain in networks show two types. First, structural connectivity based on anatomical linkages due to synapse connections, and second functional interdependence which is based on joint activity in

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[9]   N. Braisby, and A. Gellatly, *Cognitive Psychology*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, 2012, 393.

[10]   Driver et al, *op. cit.*, 757.

[11]   *Íbid.*, 757.

[12]   M. Jueptener, and C. Weller, Review: Does Measurement of Regional Cerebral Blood Flow Reflect Synaptic Activity? – Implications for PET and fMRI, *Neuroimage*, 2, 1995, 148-152, 148.

[13]   W. R. Uttal, Hypothetical High-Level Cognitive Functions Can Not Be Localised in the Brain: Another Argument for a Revitalised Behaviourism in *The Behaviour Analyst*, 27, 2004, 1-6, 5.

[14]   M. Anderson, M. Richardson, and A. Chemero, Eroding the Boundaries of Cognition: Implications for Embodiment, in *Topics for in Cognitive Science*, 1-14, 2012, 2; Uttal *op. cit.*, 2; T. A: Harley, Does cognitive Neuropsychology Have a Future?, *Cognitive Neuropsychology*, 2004, 21 (1), 3–16, 10-11.

different parts of the brain[15]. The former one is based in the activation of different parts of the brain when performing a cognitive function which is measured by the increase of blood flow detected with neuroimaging techniques[16]. A sample of this is the higher order visual network detected in higher occipital and inferior temporal parts of the brain cortex[17]. There are five main neuropaths: spatial attention in posterior parietal cortex and frontal eye fields; a language network anchored in the Brocca's an Wernicke's area; an explicit memory network anchored in the hippocampal entorhinal complex and inferior parietal cortex anchored in midtemporal and temporopolar cortices; a face-object network anchored; and a working memory executive network anchored in the prefrontal and inferior parietal cortices Or the amygdala, a brain structure responsible for handling emotions, which is as well involved in cognition[18]. There is a subcortical pathway which connects the amygdala with the visual cortex, suggesting an emotional processing of emotions before they are perceived[19].

The results of Brain Networks theory also show how higher cognitive functions require the involvement of several brain areas, and the apparent failure of the IP metaphor.

The Embodied Cognition Theory

As in the previous Brain Networks theory, the Embodied Cognition Theory also sustains that cognition cannot solely be localise in the brain. However, it proposes that cognition rests on a structure made out of task specific synergies which includes neural, bodily and environmental components, including other individuals. This claim is supported in research such as the one which shows how higher cognitive ability is supported by neural resources involved in motor-control processes[20]. It is related to Evolutionary Psychology which sustains that cognition was built fitted to situated actions[21]. New cognitive capacities would have to rely in the pre-existing neural, behavioural and environmental re-

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[15]   S. L. Bressler, and V. Menon, Large Scale Brain Networks in *Cognition: Emerging Methods and Principles in Trends in Cognitive Science*, 14, 2010, 277-290, 278.

[16]   *Íbid.*, 282.

[17]   *Íbid.*, 283.

[18]   L. Pessoa, *The Cognitive Emotional Brain. From Interactions to Integration*, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Massachusetts, 2013, loc 4905.

[19]   *Íbid.*, 857.

[20]   Anderson, Richardson and Chemero, *cit.*, 2.

[21]   *Ibid.*, 3.

sources[22]. This is confirmed by verbal retrieval tasks activating motor control areas; naming colours and animals activating visual cortex areas; or perceiving manipulating artefacts activates the grasping brain area. Or the direct relation between handling objects and an improved reading comprehension. Or abstract planning activating motor areas[23].

According to this theory, cognition is directly related to the actions of the organism provoked by the necessity of new responses to the challenges imposed by the environment. Challenges which from a brain point of view have to be answered with the all the neural resources available, which may not be directly related to the task demands but from which nevertheless they spring. This suggests re-use and re-configuration of the brain existing circuits[24] as well as the idea of cognition function going ahead of cognition structure. Furthermore, Embodied Cognition Theory proposes an understanding of cognition as a highly interdependent coordinative structures involving neural re-use; tools use; group cognition; and social coordination dynamics which suggest that cognition does not happen only in the brain but in outer structures as well[25].

Neuroimaging Techniques, Brain Networks Theory and Embodied Cognition Theory are evidence for the involvement not only of specific parts of the brain for distinctive cognitive functions, but also for the overlap of functions in areas of the brain. As well as for the direct involvement of the body and environment in cognition. However, up to now none of those theories explain how neural activity is 'decoded' in mental estates or vice-verse. Brain activity does not fully explain mental activity. There are no ideas, emotions, memories in the brain, only neural activity[26]. This is opposed to the initial expectations of the IP metaphor where each region of the computer hardware would only be involved in one aspect of software, which were also the initial expectations of neurscience. So, while the IP metaphor still stands on the existence of mental estates and hardware brain activity, the former has been complicated to an enormous exponential given the fact that there are 86 billion neurons and their 100 trillion interconnections[27] and the involvement of several sections of the brain in each cognitive function. If the correlation between neural activity and mental processes has been complicated to such extend, this could indicate the need for an understanding of cognition which could encompass its deeply and

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[22]   *Ibid*., 4.

[23]   *Ibid*., 4.

[24]   *Ibid*., 4.

[25]   *Ibid*., 1.

[26]   R. Epstain, *op. cit*.

[27]   *Íbid*.

complicated organic structure, as well as the existence of mental estates. This understanding could be found in Classical Philosophy's interpretation of cognition.

Cognition in Philosophical Anthropology

Cognition is understood in Philosophical Anthropology as a further development of life. Life is the difference between organic and inorganic beings: t is the substance of organic beings. It is substance because it begins and ends in itself[28]. It is also known as soul. It is real but immaterial, trans-corporal, and it has its own capacities to deal with the environment. Polo establishes that life is auto-regulated motion[29]. It is auto-regulated motion in regards to the answers of the organic being to the environment. Depending on the type of answer given by the organic being, life can be divided in three types: vegetative life; sensorial life; and intellectual life[30]. Each level has different operations which are made possible for a different capacity or faculty. At the vegetative level, the organism can perform three operations: nutrition, growth and reproduction. In the nutritional operation, the organism literally takes in another being, inorganic or organic, from the environment and transform it in itself for nutritional or growth purposes. It can also transform it in a similar being, in this case it is known as reproduction[31]. Life at the sensorial level can perform three further operations which are made possible by their capacities or faculties: sense knowledge or knowledge apprehended by the organic senses; appetitive faculties which regulate behavior; and local motion or the capacity to locally move from place to place[32].

Polo understands sensorial and intellectual knowledge, following the Aristotelian's anthropology, as the immaterial or intentional possession of a form. There is no need to physically transform a being into another by nutrition, in order to possess its form. Knowing is a type of non-material possession. This idea has its origin in the metaphysical understanding of organisms. Organisms, as the rest of beings, are made out of matter and form. Form is what makes possible for a being to be something specific and not something else. In the order of Quantum Physics, this metaphysical understanding is similar to the relational dynamic network of quantum information between subatomic particles and

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[28] L. Polo, *Lecciones de Psicología*, Eunsa, Pamplona, 2008, 28.

[29] *Íbid.*, 23.

[30] *Íbid*, 60-1.

[31] *Íbid.*, 63-72.

[32] *Íbid.*, 100.

waves, created in the Big Bang[33]. All type of beings spring from the combination of matter and information already contained in it at that point. In Metaphysics, matter is capable of possessing forms materially and this is what makes possible for beings to exist in nature[34]. Knowledge, however, is another way of being which is different than the material way of being. Knowledge is a trans-corporal or immaterial way of being though as real as the material world. Knowledge is the capacity to possess forms in a trans-corporal or immaterial way. This type of possession highlights something without its matter in order to possess it in a type of representational way[35] which is not 'a picture like' representation but rather a sensorial representation directly associated with the specific being, as a bark is a real trait of a dog.

How does this immaterial possession of the object form take place? In sensorial knowledge, immaterial possession takes place in the sensorial organ of each sense: eye; ear; skin; tongue; and nose which are the senses faculties. The environmental stimulus which each sensorial organ can sense are different, such as electromagnetic waves for the eyes and wavelength for the ears. When the waves hit the eye, the form of the eye is perturbed. The eye's form not only informs the eye but it is also capable to perform the action of intentionally possess the form of whatever object the eye is seeing. This perturbation is the actual possession of the stimulus form[36]. This is known as the act of sensorial knowledge. It is an instantaneous apprehension. It is the basic act of cognition. In the case of the eye, this is the information perceived by the optical nerve's photoreceptors and carried to the brain where further non corporeal processing will take place.

Other aspects of the stimulus can also be known by the action of at least more than one sense such as movement; figures; number; magnitude; and repose[37]. There are also internal senses such as cogitative or estimative in animals; memory; imagination; and common sensorial[38]. These internal faculties allow the form possessed immaterially by the external organs, or known object, to be processed in different ways. Memory allows to evoke past events. Imagination allows memories to be manipulated in order to imagine new situations or events and infer information from them. The common sensorial is the union of all par-

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[33]   D. K. F. Meijer, The Universe as A Cycled Organised Information System: John Wheeler's World Revisited in *Neuroquantology*, 13, 1, 2015, 57-78, 60.

[34]   L. Polo, *op. cit.*, 103.

[35]   *Íbid.*, 103-4.

[36]   *Íbid.*, 118-9.

[37]   *Íbid.*, 140.

[38]   *Íbid.*, 131.

tial known objects[39] and it is the equivalent of the modern concept of perception. It is remittent to the original environmental stimulus but it does not mean it is a definite cognition, it is always open to know more of the stimulus. Sensorial cognition is not a once off event, the object known is open to further knowledge of the stimulus depending on the dealings of the subject with it.

Estimative in animals allows to compare information obtained through the senses with the needs of their instincts, the collatio sensibilis[40], in order to choose the more adequate behavior in each situation. Animal behavior is directly linked both to sensorial knowledge, or perception, and to the satisfaction of the ends of the instincts including social instincts. Their behavior is focused in the satisfaction of the aims of those instincts. They are not aware of the aims of the instincts. Only intellectual knowledge is able to apprehend the aims of the instinct and to rule behavior as a consequence. It is the difference between sensorial knowledge in animals and humans. Estimative capacity in humans, permeated by intellectual knowledge, is known as cogitative.

Intellectual knowledge is remittent to the perception of the stimulus extracted through the senses, but it differs from sensorial knowledge in that intellectual knowledge is able to extract universals from the common sensorial or perception. It is not an organic capacity[41] though it depends on the former. Abstraction is done through the Intellect Agent, a theoretical piece which explains the difference between the two types of knowledge[42]. It is also open to further knowledge of reality upon further abstractions from the same stimulus, in a back and forth way because intellectual cognition pours out to the material world where it comes from. It is intellectual knowledge that allows humans to know the end of the instinct and because of it they are able to get away from its boundaries. Humans satisfy their tendencies cognitively by choosing how to satisfy them. Humans are able to regulate their behavior through cognition. They are able to recognize their behavior as means to satisfy the ends of their tendencies. This capacity is also known as Practical Reason[43]. Abstraction and Practical Reason are two aspects of human cognition exclusively human. They are not organic capacities but they are orientated to satisfy organic and intellectual needs.

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[39]   *Íbid.*, 142.

[40]   *Íbid.*, 205.

[41]   *Íbid.*, 237.

[42]   *Íbid.*, 217.

[43]   *Íbid.*, 241-2.

Discussion

It could be concluded that there is a similarity between Information Processing Theory and Classical Philosophy Cognition as both consider the five external senses; perception; abstraction; reasoning and language as well as behavioral impact of cognition in living organism including humans. However, both theories look at cognition from different perspectives. The main difference between them is that the latter refers to information received by the senses and processed by an unknown entity called mind which involves other neural structures such as the nervous system and the brain, without explaining how mental estates relate to senses and brain activity. In other words, Information Processing theory does not explain how the information from the stimulus is coded in the sensorial organ, neither how the total information contained in the final perception of the stimulus is un-coded to allow a mental representation. The metaphysical explanation in the case of Classical Philosophy does not need coding or un-coding of information, the information is already contained in the perturbed form of the sensorial organ by the stimulus. The perturbed form will later be subject to further cognitive life related operations for sensorial knowledge, and cognitive intellectual related operations for abstract knowledge. The difference is the information processing concept versus sensorial and intellectual operations as a result of cognitive capacities. They are both theoretical visions. In the case of Classical Philosophy, even though it considers cognition related to life, it is nevertheless a theoretical vision because it uses metaphysic concepts to explain how knowledge happens. In the case of Information Processing theory, it is theoretical vision because it cannot explain how mind estates relate to the nervous system or the nature of mental estates.

Both theories give credit to a cognition remittent to the environment. Perception and abstract cognition are not innate ideas, they refer to the environmental stimulus they come from. They consider cognition rooted in the responses of sensorial organs to the environment, which means that sensorial organs, neuron-brain activity and the environment are closely related. Information Processing Theory presupposes a direct correspondence between senses and brain areas, an assumption based in a computer comparison. Classical Philosophy view cannot explained why several brain areas or network neuron paths, activate for one single cognitive function but sensorial knowledge presupposes the activation of all brain areas involved in the final perception of a certain environmental physical or social stimuli. A view which supports the findings of neuroimaging Techniques and Brain Networks Theory.

Both visions go further in their explanation of sensorial cognition. They acknowledge the fact that perception is a learning process which is constantly growing in its further dealings with the environment. What is perceived from

the environment at one point is not all that it can be perceived. Further cognitive processes/operations are also needed such as memory, imagination and reasoning in Information Processing. In Classical Philosophy estimative is reasoning for sensorial knowledge and cogitative is perceptual reasoning permeated of intellectual knowledge. Intellectual knowledge is also open to further operations of their faculties on new abstractions made on changed perceptions of the physical and social environment through the senses. Knowledge is open to and depending on the environment.

The further development of Classical Philosophy about internal senses can help to understand the concept of embodiment. External senses have an improved perception of their exclusive object of the environmental stimuli according to movement, figures, numbers, magnitude and repose, which are shared by the five senses. Perceptual cognition is rooted in all sensorial organs including their common sensorial aspects, and their internal senses. Perceptual cognition as a result is embodied in the environment. Cognition is the form of the environment without its matter. It can very well explain why the motor cortex is activated when the subject thinks about abstract planning, as Anderson above explains. Cognition happens according to the container which is knowing[44]. If abstract planning refers to motor actions, memory of those actions is directly linked to the brain motor areas when they were perceived.

The fact that a trans-corporeal perception requires the involvement of so many areas of the body suggests a wide involvement of the brain in cognitive abilities. The trans-corporeal organic concept for cognition could be paralleled to the software function in the Information Processing Metaphor, not in the sense of an already programmed software by an unknown entity, but as a trans-corporal capacities of life to deal with the environment, closely related to the brain and body. In this regard, Classical Philosophy interpretation fits better with the later findings of Neuroimaging Techniques, Brain Networks and Embodied Cognition.

What seems to have been lost in the understanding of modern cognition is that cognition is remittent to reality because it is intentional. This intentional aspect of cognition refers to the immaterial possession of a form[45] existing in the environment with its matter, extracted from it and depending on the nervous system including sensorial organs, synapses and the brain for physical expression. An environment which can be physical or social. Cognition does not refer to 'a pictures in the head' but rather to informative representations brought about by sensorial knowledge or perception, as explained above, which is later

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[44]   *Íbid.*, 124.

[45]   *Íbid.*, 105.

the object of abstraction and other intellectual operations. They are cognitive operations which activate many areas of the human brain at the same time. Both sensorial and intellectual cognition are continuously pouring out to the environment from which is extracted in order to improve its knowledge. Human cognitions can be defined as an embodied sensorial-abstract informative-immaterial representations, which are cognitive intellectually transformed, multiply rooted in the brain and the environment.

Perhaps the time has come to introduce a new metaphor in the study of cognition. A metaphor based on Classical Philosophy. The Life and Cognition Metaphor.

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FUNCTIONALIZATION. A NEW WAY OF LOOKING AT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN THE BRAIN

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ABSTRACT: There is no dispute in neuroscience that structure and function are related, but it is difficult to identify how exactly this relationship occurs. The phrenological view advocates for the idea that each area of the brain corresponds to a particular function. This view then evolved into a modular view, meaning that each brain network corresponds to a singular function. But these views have serious limitations and a more systemic one is in order. It is thought that brain function is related to dynamic and temporary neural assemblies. What seems obvious is that the relationship between structure and function is not straightforward. In this article, we will see how the non-function of brain areas and the non-univocal relationship between structure and function can serve as an opportunity to offer a new concept, i.e., "functionalization", which the philosopher Leonardo Polo proposed. Polo understood functionalization as a part of function. We believe that the presence of this "intermediate element" can help to provide new insights into the relationship between structure and function.

Introduction

Following recent advances in neuroscience, there is no doubt that structure and function are linked bi-directionally. However, it remains difficult to identify the way in which these relationships are established and what they correspond to.

In the history of neuroscience, various solutions have been proposed with regard to this problem. The first attempt is found in a phrenological solution (each brain area plays a specific role), and then was revised and expanded by the modular view, which holds that each brain network is associated with a function[1]. These views have serious limitations and there is now a demand for a more systemic and dynamic view[2]. While the phenomena related to perception were studied as a constructive and modular process, the relationship between structure and function seemed clear. For example, vision was explained as follows: there is a dorsal route of transmission of information that serves to sense the movement of the object seen, while the ventral pathway serves to define the characteristics, such as color, of the object seen[3]. But with the constructivist view dismantled[4], the problem of the relationship between structure and function reappears, this time even more acutely.

Now it seems obvious that the structure-function relationship is not direct, i.e., expressible in a common average or measure because it involves incompatible dimensional realities. Every formula demands dimensional compatibility between the formula's elements (e.g., in the formula of universal gravitation, force is expressed in Newtons and distance in meters). Structure and function

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[1]   C. Blanco, *Historia de la neurociencia. El conocimiento del cerebro y la mente desde una perspectiva interdisciplinar*. Editorial Biblioteca Nueva, Madrid 2014.

[2]   Cfr. M. L. Anderson, *After Phrenology. Neural Reuse and the Interactive Brain*. London: MIT Press; Pessoa, L. (2013). *The cognitive – emotional brain. From interactions to integration*. London: MIT Press; Sporns, O. (2011). *Networks of the brain*. MIT Press, London, 2014.

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have different dimensional units, meaning they cannot be related with a formula.

In the case of perception, functions[5] correspond to sight, hearing, etc. Characterizing functions thusly is an interpretation that we make of perceptual experience. We call "seeing" a perceptual experience when visual *input* is relevant to perceptual experience. What we call *perceptual experience* is, in turn, an understanding of experience: we call perceptual experience the experience in which we consider the perceptual elements of particular value[6]. This is not to dispute that there are functions in an organism, but rather to point out that, when we name them, it appears as if they were independent realities when they are not.

This re-understanding of what sight is can help us understand that it is not something that happens in the brain, but rather is a conceptual classification that we make from a very concrete experience in which the value of what is perceived from outside of one's self through the eye is highlighted.

Therefore, perceptive functions are conceptualizations of experience itself. The brain, for its part, is matter. In a formula, an element cannot be a concept and a unit of measurement. Therefore, structures or brain areas cannot as such be places of function even though function happens in them: this is called "the non-function of structure (or areas or cores)"

In this article, we will see how the non-function of brain areas and the fact that structure and function are not biunivocally related might offer the chance to formulate a new concept, i.e., functionalization. It is not an "intermediate element," but rather a way of understanding how things that cannot be separated relate to one another. We believe that overcoming the constructivist view of cognitive processes is necessary, which is why we do not consider functionalization an intermediate element.

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[5]   Here we must explain that the term "function" is not used in the same way in neuroscience and philosophy (specifically in Polian philosophy). For a neuroscientist, function can refer to the heart pumping blood, to vision, etc. Instead, in philosophy, the latter would be called an "operation," not a "function." This distinction should not be taken lightly because it reflects the problem of actions being functions of organic structures and which actions transcend this schema and should be considered something like the soul.

[6]   L. F. Barrett, The future of psychology: Connecting mind to brain. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 4(4), 2009, 326-339. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6924.2009.01134.x.The.

Situating the problem

The non-function of various nuclei

We will see how diverse brain nuclei do not have any properly assigned function and some possible properties that make them good candidates to participate in functions.

To understand the non-function of diverse nuclei, we propose the example of tools.[7] They do not have a specific function properly speaking; their user assigns them a function (function comes from the user, not the tool). The possible functions that a hammer can perform are varied; it has properties that make it suitable for many functions. A hammer must be hard, heavy and consistent, among other things, which allows it, for example, to be a paperweight or to be used for hammering. These properties make the hammer very versatile, but certain types of stone can also have these same properties, thus a stone can also be used as a paperweight or for hammering.

Relatively speaking, something similar happens with brain areas and networks. Because they have diverse properties, they can end up participating in various functions, but their properties do not automatically become placeholders of fixed functions. The properties of various brain areas must be established for example by their cellular architecture (i.e., cytoarchitecture or internal layout) and connection system, although more elements may exist.

In neuroscience studies, subjects are asked to do a task during which their brain function is recorded. Therein, some areas over-activate in relationship to others, leading to an implicit association between the activation of a given area and function. But this association seems too hasty and is questioned when other seemingly different functions equally active the same area. In addition, activations are not all or nothing, but rather are a matter of degree and vary by person (while for one person a function may activate an area very little, in another, it may activate the same area a lot). This effect can be camouflaged since many studies present average values. Stranger phenomena also appear, such as the case of two people who, for the same functions, have different areas activated and what for one is, or seems, necessary, for the other is not.

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[7]   This example presents a clear limitation: The tool, in the case of a human being (or the brain), corresponds to the human being herself. The example of a tool is frequently used because it responds to a transitive structure, which requires the inclusion of an intermediary element. But the case of the brain works differently because if a third intermediary element is included, the problem, rather than being solved, shifts elsewhere.

Several authors have explored various approaches for discovering the non-function of brain areas using the orbitofrontal cortex (ofPFC)[8]. The authors demonstrate (1) that the ofPFC participates in inhibition functions, (2) that inhibition can also be achieved by other means, and (3) that other functions such as knowing how to unlearn, or the flexible association between stimulus and response, or emotional assessment, among others can happen with or without the ofPFC.

Other articles indicate the same upon discovering that the ofPFC is necessary for reactivity, unlearning, and emotional regulation, but its absence still allows for said functions[9].

The parietal lobe is a lateral, posterior brain region that is highly relevant for perceptual phenomena and is also required for many other functions. More specifically, the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) is involved in functions such as differentiating the self from the other[10], or distinguishing one's feelings from those of others[11]. It also directs brain synchronization for physical imitation[12]. Thus, it forms part of the social brain and is more active as it matures, allowing it to conceptualize more and work more impersonally[13]. It is also activated when assessing what is just and unjust[14] x and it participates in decision-making to

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[14] *Ibid.*

differentiate the object sought from everything else[15]. It is activated for mathe-matical calculation[16] and for the manipulation of spatial images[17]. According to the traditional understanding of visual functioning, this area serves to detect where visual objects move[18].

At first glance, this list of functions seems like a meaningless jumble. If we ask what is common to all these functions, we see that, for all of them, a comparison between the whole and the part is required. The parietal lobe's potential ability to compare the whole with the part may warrant further research, however, it is probably due to the conjunction of its cellular architecture and connection system. Having a given structure and being related as indeed it is, allows it make comparisons between the part and the whole.

Comparing the whole and the part is not a function or a sub-function, but rather a part of a function. A sub-function is a function as well. For example, sight can be seen as a function or a sub-function since both come down to a mere conceptual matter. If we consider sight alone, it is a function, but if we consider walking, then sight is a sub-function to the extent that by walking we also see and use what we see to walk properly. Distinguishing the part from the whole cannot be done in isolation, but rather is exercised when we exercise a real function (sight, thought, manipulation of an object).

The non-biunivocal relationship between function-structure

All this leads us to argue that there is no biunivocal relationship between function and structure[19].

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We think that we should stop looking for where things happen because this search contains the assumption that the brain works analytically. Instead, we propose looking for how various events occur.

Psychological processes are domain-general. The generation of feelings, body perception and thoughts activate various domain-general shared networks. They change according to how they interact. Correspondence is seen between the domain-general network and the domain-general psychological process[20]. The brain demonstrates great flexibility, showing that alliances that arise are temporary.

Mental processes seem to be best described by pinpointing the way alliances are made rather than by concentrating on areas themselves. The alliances linked to a specific process consist in rapidly forming teams working together on a specific task; these teams come together and disband quickly depending on the demands of the task– they are flexible, temporary and opportunistic[21]. It seems that, within these flexible and temporary alliances, the frontoparietal network, which covers the brain from the front to back side, connects with other networks depending on the task and objectives[22]. Such alliances cannot be attributed to specific networks, but rather refer to extensive interaction between brain regions. Only then can we understand how the coalitions of regions support the relationship between mind and brain[23].

The alliance is recognized by the presence of synchronization, and the quality of the function corresponds to the quality of synchronization[24]. According to what we currently know, synchronization is preceded by a series of iterative cycles until it emerges. But this should not be understood sequentially. Instead,

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tional brain connectivity. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 17(12), (2013). 600-602. http://doi.org/-10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.011.

[20]   S. Oosterwijk, K. Lindquist, E. Anderson, R. Dautoff, Y. Moriguchi, L.Barrett, States of mind: emotions, body feelings, and thoughts share distributed neural networks. *NeuroImage*, 62(3), 2012. 210-28. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.05.079.

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when these iterative cycles reach their "up" moment, synchronization emerges. This is seen in both emotional evaluation[25] and in movement routines[26]. Sequentialization is not necessary since disbanded and unified functioning can occur with many junctions and loops, as seen when doing tasks related to visual identification where perception, cognition and emotion cooperate during the learning process[27].

Pessoa[28] proposes that we speak of multiple waves and competitive dual systems because the same area can appear in different functions depending on context. No one region implements a behavior; rather, it is implemented through multiple interactions with dynamic recruitments in multiple regions[29]. He also describes what he calls a "functional fingerprint"[30] where it becomes apparent that all functions recruit the entire brain in different ways and degrees of intensity depending on the given function. Other authors subscribe to this same idea; for them, the key is not found in which networks are involved, since all of them do a part, but rather in how they participate[31]. Brain structure function thus lacks definition and forces the issue of intention of action and agency, as several authors have highlighted.[32]

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[28] Pessoa, *The cognitive – emotional brain*, ed. cit.

[29] *Íbid.*, 199.

[30] *Íbid.*, 221.

[31] Oosterwijk et al., *op. cit.*

[32] A. Juarrero, *Intentional Action: a Dynamical Account. In Dynamics in action. Intentional behavior as a complex system*. MIT Press, Massachusetts, 2002. 175-194; J. A. S. Kelso, *Intentional Dynamics. In Dynamic Patterns. The self-organization of brain and behavior*. MIT Press, London, 1995. 136-158. Taking up the example of the hammer again, it obviously depends on the person (the agent) with a specific intention to perform a given function. To the extent that this issue remains unresolved, the systemic view remains incomplete. This tentativeness is also a virtue because it allows us to consider more phenomena in human life such as agency and the intent of an action (and other issues like freedom). Without considering the intention of an action, it is impossible to understand that a structure (the hammer) completes a function (to hammer). The intention of behavior allows us to distinguish various psychological actions (L. F. Barrett,

Bridging the gap between structure and function

With this problem situated in the field of neuroscience, we will see how neuroscience itself has tried to resolve it and then we will focus on Leonardo Polo's idea of *functionalization*.

Neuroscience's demand for "intermediate elements"

Despite the above, an effort to find the relationship between structure and function is still very much alive, and it seeks to define intermediate elements that serve as a link between structure and function.

The term *emergency*, for example, tries to offer a solution. It is something of a magical term because, although it is well known that an inferior state (e.g., a neuron) does not explain a superior state's functioning (e.g., the network), some still simply state that this happens[33]. They use the figure of the attractor, i.e., milestones and markers that seem to drive growth, but it is difficult to identify and define them. Attractors are "stable or semi-stable states in the temporal dynamics of the activity of a neuronal population"[34]. This path is problematic because, as shown in other studies, no system can explain itself[35]. Therefore, we should seek other solutions.

Other attempts try to uncover intermediate elements of a reciprocal nature, i.e., that simultaneously allow for a relationship between both structure and function and between function and structure.

The future of psychology: Connecting mind to brain. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 4(4), 2009, 326-339. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6924.2009.01134.x.The; Psychological construction: The Darwinian approach to the science of emotion. *Emotion Review*, 5(4), 2013, 379-389. http://doi.org/10.1177/1754073913489753), and understand that a psychological action can be done by virtue of being the one who directs the action (J. A. Kelso, B. Tuller, E. Bateson, C. A. Fowler, Functionally Specific Articulatory Cooperation Following Jaw Perturbations During Speech: Evidence for Coordinative Structures. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance*, 10(6), 1984. 812-832). It is important to note that intention should be included for a global understanding of phenomenon, however, the issue of intentionality goes beyond the scope of this article.

[33] For example, E. Thelen, L. B. Smith, *A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and Action*. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994.

[34] R. Yuste, From the neuron doctrine to neural networks. *Nat Rev Neurosci*, 16(8), 2015. 487-497. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nrn3962.

[35] J. V. Orón, J. Sánchez-Cañizares, ¿Es posible la reducción epistemológica? Todo sistema necesita presupuestos extra-sistémicos. *Anuario Filosófico*, 2017. (to be published).

In 1973, Alexander Luria, upon considering brain function as a complex system and overcoming a "localizationist" view, proposed the term "functional knots," "functional connections" and "diverse components of a functional system." Luria later described these units and, for example, indicated that one is devoted to processing information from the outside and another to mental activity[36].

Other authors speak of "functional components" of cognitive function. These functional components are hierarchically organized to allow for function itself. These functional components are closer to cerebral anatomical structure[37].

There is also talk of "more primitive psychological states"[38]. What we call psychological states (cognition, emotion, belief, consciousness) become combinations of more primitive psychological states that have a closer relationship with brain architecture.

In this problematic context, which offers various ways of more deeply understanding the topic, philosophy can offer a possible solution. While neuroscience and philosophy are (at least at this point) different ways of addressing the same reality, they are meant to be complementary. To the extent that their methods are different, philosophy does not replace neuroscience; thus, a comprehensive critique of the solutions and paradoxes herein presented is not necessary. Within a context where definitive solutions are still far off, it is enough to present this solution as a suggestion that can be improved upon.

Leonardo Polo's contribution

Leonardo Polo's contribution is found in denying a statically understood notion of structure. For Polo, structures, in as far as they support functions, are not things on or in which functions take place. Rather, to truly support function, they must be dynamic parts. How can they be dynamic? By appearing from the very beginning as made dynamic by functions, i.e., functionalized. Thus, the key concept in this philosophical claim is functionalization.

Below we will detail the meaning of this concept in Polo's philosophy. The author's texts are particularly clear in this regard and thus do not require extensive exegetical work.

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[36]   J. A. Mora, El modelo de las tres unidades funcionales del cerebro de Luira (1973): sus raices hitóricas e influjos posteriores. *Revista de Historia de La Psicología*, 19(2-3), 1998. 413-420.

[37]   Price, Friston, *op. cit.*.

[38]   L. F. Barrett, The future of psychology: Connecting mind to brain. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 4(4), 2009. 326-339. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6924.2009.01134.x.The.

Polo, in his theory of sensory knowledge, briefly studies the nervous system and the functioning of neurons and the brain. In this study, he argues that a key concept for understanding brain function is functionalization.

The concept of functionalization springs from the theory of knowledge, i.e., from a philosophical point of view, and therefore it is not demonstrated according to neurology's empirical method in the text (although it is mentioned to provide criteria that allow for an interdisciplinary project). The concept of functionalization is tasked with designating the mode in which Polo intended to solve the problem of the connection between structure and function. It is therefore necessary to take a look at how the author framed the problem:

> "It should be noted that the distribution of the system between functions and assumptions lends itself to misinterpretation and that, while it is due to neuron theory (which is its starting point), it is nonetheless a prejudice… This erroneous interpretation is expressed in the following formula: functions are established from assumptions, which are, as such, a part of functions (included as things in functions themselves)"[39].

A clarification is in order to properly understand this text because it contains a terminological distinction that indicates a conceptual distinction, which might seem ambiguous if left unexplored. The author makes undifferentiated use of the terms "assumption" and "support." In later texts, this use is not undifferentiated; rather, Polo distinguishes both terms as two distinct concepts. Assumption means "static antecedence," i.e., a thing that comes before its own movement to the extent that it is still (like a soccer ball before a player kicks it). Furthermore, the concept of support means (in a generic sense) "part" of a function, and does not necessarily have to be static.[40]

The fundamental thesis of this text is that the distinction between assumption and function is a prejudice, i.e., a hypothesis that cannot be proved, which therefore remains mere conjecture. Why then is such a hypothesis set forward? This hypothesis emerges from the logical need for a static assumption of functional activity. Without this assumption, functions do not appear real, i.e., incidents without a location. Polo states this as follows: "This formula is a compromise between synchrony and diachrony, i.e., between a local or static structural dimension and a dynamic structural dimension. One of the reasons that leads us to accept this is that systematic functions, being larger than thing-like

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[39] L. Polo, (2016). *Obras Competas Volumen V. Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento II*, Eunsa, Pamplona, 31-32.

[40] Thus, in the end, we will see how Polo necessarily concludes by accepting the notion of support because he rejects assumption. This distinction is maintained throughout his study of the nervous system even though it is not explicitly explained.

parts that are not mere inert matter, require it; otherwise, the functional system seems abstract and unrealistic: its location is unknown and it is too much of an unstable and mysterious thing be called an entity. Real functions must consist of real parts"[41].

Does this logical hypothesis respond to a real need? This question is key because it problematizes the proposed solution (the distinction between structure and function) and presents it as *a priori*. According to the author, this logical necessity does not have an empirical correlation; rather, empirical research seems to refute it: "At every stage of neurological research, its activities and assumptions are defined. But progress in research consists in the discovery that such assumptions are also functional. And as it does not seem possible to go entirely without functions' supports or assumptions (properly said, supports or elements are discovered), research continues without end"[42]. Each advance in research finds that the alleged static assumption of a function is actually of a functional-dynamic nature. Therefore, the structure-function distinction is a conceptual distinction since there is no structure outside function. Now, this does not lead to an abstract relocation of functions because the notion of support, part or element, still makes sense when explaining functions. That is, functions, even without assumptions, can have parts or elements.

What are these parts like? Polo calls them functional parts: "functions do not consist of parts that are its supports, but rather of functional parts: they are 'functionalizations' of the supports, which are only then integrated into them in as far as supports cannot fully become functions"[43]. By introducing the notions of *functional part* and *functionalization*, Polo aims to justify the brain's dynamism. In contrast to his suggestion related to the notion of assumption, brain structure (not just its functioning) should be understood in a dynamic sense. The parts of functions are not thing-like assumptions, i.e., they are not mere inert matter, but rather functionalizations of supports. This means that there are no non-functionalized supports, but supports are not functionalized in and of themselves, but rather because of functions. If there were an un-functionalized support in which function "occurred" or "localizased," then the support would be for the function, i.e., the support would be exhausted in the function and we would have to return to a view close to phrenology, which has already been discarded. But each support sustains various functions according to different intensities, which is why supports cannot be transformed into functions.

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[41]   *Íbid.*, 32.

[42]   *Íbid.*, 31.

[43]   *Íbid.*, 32.

The thesis that the support is for the function, or that the support must be exhausted in function, is, according to Polo, paradigmatically mechanistic and constructivist. The Polian stance aims to be the polar opposite of mechanism and constructivism. As Polo argued, "The mechanistic approach is inadequate and does not allow for any adjustment to the system. We now see why: the system is not composed of parts; it is not a consistent or rigid system, but rather partially leverages its parts (...) The system can not be rigid, nor exhaust its antecedent organic reality, nor be reduced to it"[44].

This position seeks to define a static structure in the brain that, when a function happens, transitions into a dynamic state. From this perspective, function is a construct of the structure. But studies of the brain do not show the existence of a static assumption, as we have seen– a static brain can only be found in a corpse.

Despite this, Polo is aware that abandoning the mechanistic model is not easy because of the autonomy of the neuron. Polo's treatment of this issue implies a certain alternation between the philosophical and neurological methods. Since the neuron, or one might say the nervous system itself, is where it is and not elsewhere, we cannot say that function makes the neuron appear. The solution to Polo offers is as follows: "The place-function model is inadequate if places are also functional. There is no passing from place to function in absolute terms. Any interpretation of the nervous system as the seat of faculties should start by following this indication. (...) A place-based interpretation of connection does not follow from its functioning. The structure of a calculator consists of local connections, but it does not start because of them. The nervous system is not like this: if they are not "under way," system connections are not established (or destroyed). It seems, therefore, that function is first with respect to connection"[45]. This formulation points definitively to the concept of functionalization: while it can be said that the neuron precedes function (just as the stomach precedes the digestive function), however, connections between neurons are not given outside of functions. Connections are functionalizations rather than structures.[46]

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[44] *Íbid.*, 32-33.

[45] *Íbid.*, 29-30.

[46] Polo's thesis may seem strange from the point of view neuroscience and a clarification is thus in order. There are usually spaces between neurons (however, there are many types of neural connections: some of them are rigid and have no gap, although they are in the minority). Those with a gap are not suspended in the air, but rather have connection systems between them. On the other hand, a neuron does not start functioning with an on/off switch, but rather passes from one type of "activity" to another. In other words, there is novelty, but it never starts from scratch. Therefore, this connection is impossible to explain both without activity and without structure.

These statements are nothing more than the enunciation of a thesis that still needs to be proven. In order to reach a proof, we must go beyond the philosophical method and analyze research results from neurology. Polo was aware of this, and said so in his writings, thus leaving the door open to both neurological research and interdisciplinary collaboration with philosophy.

Applying Polo's concept of functionalization to neuroscience

The Polian notion of functionalization and neuroscience research start from different methodologies, thus requiring some work to bring them closer together. The present article does not intend to go that far, but rather to clearly present the place that we believe corresponds to the notion of functionalization within one of neuroscience's fundamental dilemmas. Once this place is uncovered, the problem is not solved, but a possible solution materializes.

A graphic is included below presenting functionalization as an intermediate conceptual element– but not as an intermediate stage– between organic support and function. It cannot be an intermediate element because structure and function are not separate elements. To speak of structure apart from function is an assumption rather than a scientific statement. Therefore, the following three-dimension schema does not intend to present them as sequentially different, but rather as aspects simultaneously integrated into brain activity's one and only reality.[47]

Organic support can be both specific active areas and networks of active areas, which may themselves form part of various networks. The brain's connection system is not a disorganized mass. Rather, the rich-club is responsible for organization[48], but networks are not fixed because of it. The discovery of the rich-club connection system is based on structural studies and the functional situation of the resting state. Even when a person is not engaged in any particular function, the brain is still in a state of active connections. All connection systems are time sensitive, since, as mentioned, networks can also rapidly form temporary alliances through synchronization processes.

Functionalizations are due both to the constituent elements' cellular architecture, as well as the connection system, and, since this system is variable, the very same active network or area can be part of various functions. In the graphic

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[47]   All graphics, because of their spatial limitations, cannot avoid being somewhat mechanistic. Thus, a sequentialist interpretation is hard to avoid, but this is the precisely the effort we make.

[48]   Sporns, *Networks of the brain*, ed. cit.; M. P. van den Heuvel, O. Sporns, Rich-club organization of the human connectome. *The Journal of Neuroscience : The Official Journal of the Society for Neuroscience*, 31(44), 2011. 15775-86. http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3539-11.2011.

below, for example, to achieve functionalization 1 (Fnzn. 1) areas 3 and 5 are required (A.3 and A.5), but these areas are part of other functionalizations (A.3 with A.6 for Fnzn 6. and A.5 with A.2 for Fnzn 4).

It also does not exclude the fact that functionality itself can be achieved with another connection pattern. That is, although the graphic only has a single arrow between support and function, there could be several functionalization arrows. Just as one article suggests that we must differentiate between first order assessments and other second order ones based on prior ones[49], we could postulate that the same is true of functionalizations. This would make some functionalizations more strongly linked to supports and others less so.

The graphic can be found below and is explained further on:

The supports (or areas or networks) refer to a living biological reality. Because supports are living matter they are accompanied by a drawing of a brain. Functionalizations can be formulated as logical relationships and are therefore represented as a logical formula. Functions are psychological and behavioral processes and are therefore represented with a drawing of a child studying. There are also lines that, starting with functions and going through functionalizations, reach structures. These lines represent the fact that functions constitute functionalizations and that, in addition, this constitution also affects structure, such that function plays a role in the constitution of structure. These lines help us avoid falling into constructivist sequentialism (and are therefore more difficult to represent). The black lines indicate that active areas are likely to participate in certain functionalizations. Because of their diverse cellular architecture

49   M. Lebreton, R. Abitbol, J. Daunizeau, M. Pessiglione, Automatic integration of confidence in the brain valuation signal. *Nat Neurosci*, 18(8), 2015. 1159-1167. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nn.4064.

and connection, not all active areas are likely to participate in a given function-alization.

One person could perform a specific function (Fn. 3) through various functionalizations of the active supports Fnzn 1 and 4 (yellow arrows), while another person could do the same through Fnzn. 4 and 6 (brown arrows).[50] Both perform the same function, but in different ways, which involve diverse functionalizations. Imagine that these two people have a stroke in A.5. Both would have a deficit in this function, but to varying degrees since, for the person represented by the yellow arrows, damaging A.5 involves damaging two functionalizations, but, for the person represented by brown stripes, damaging A.5 only involves one of the functionalizations. This explains why there are different recovery processes for the same pathology; it also reveals that there could be a function that is more intensely present in one functionalization, whether because of educational processes or for another reason.

Of course, the more general the function is, the further it is from being linked to a specific functionalization. We see this in functions that are proper to human beings, such as creativity, which requires brain wholeness, i.e., it involves extensive interhemispheric relationships and intense prefrontal activity[51]. Similarly, intelligence is an integral and very global act[52], as is reaching certainty on a given topic[53]. All cognitive acts are themselves global because cognition involves perception, attention, short and long term memory, decision-making, language, emotion...[54] and greater cognitive effort implies greater overall brain activity[55].

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[50] This could be related to what psychology calls learning styles (DA. Kolb *Experiential Learning. Experience as the source of learning development*. Pearson Education, New Yersey, 2015, 2nd ed.).

[51] V. Goel, Creative brains: designing in the real world. *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience*, 8, 2014. 241. http://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00241.

[52] Crone, Dahl, *op. cit.*

[53] P. Potvin, É. Turmel, S. Masson, Linking neuroscientific research on decision making to the educational context of novice students assigned to a multiple-choice scientific task involving common misconceptions about electrical circuits. *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience*, 8, 14. 2014. http://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00014). Detecting uncertainty also requires a wide, but not bilateral, activation like certainty does.

[54] J. Hastings, G. A. Frishkoff, B. Smith, M. Jensen, R. A. Poldrack, J. Lomax, M. E. Martone, Interdisciplinary perspectives on the development, integration, and application of cognitive ontologies. *Frontiers in Neuroinformatics*, 8, 62. 2014. http://doi.org/10.3389/fninf.2014.00062.

[55] Pessoa, *The cognitive – emotional brain*, ed. cit., 215.

Conclusion

The history of neuroscience marches on with the unfinished task of understanding how the brain works, an important part of which is found in understanding the relationship between structure and function. Speaking of these two terms separately is itself an illegitimate philosophical assumption, which constitutes suggesting the existence of matter apart from function and is not supported by empirical research. In as far as it is a philosophical assumption, it is not exempt from hypotheses and assumes a mechanist doctrine: first, the machine or mechanism exists in a static state, then it is made to work. This does not occur in living realities.

We cannot argue that structure is exclusively used for function because structure does not precede function. In addition, empirical data shows that organic support itself is activated in various functions. Current neuroscience research is making a concerted effort to understand dynamic brain reality and is finding that it happens through large temporal and dynamic assemblies coordinated by the function. Neuroscience has discovered that there are areas or active networks involved in many functions, but that maintain a certain common denominator that we refer to as parts of functions, which are not sub-functions or brain functions, but rather logical processes that are necessary in many functions, such as distinguishing the part from the whole (which is required to see, hear, think, etc.).

The term functionalization that Leonardo Polo offers is an invaluable aid in this unfinished task. According to his proposal, a variety of functions functionalize the various supports that constitute living matter. Thus, a new concept emerges, which does not designate an intermediate reality, but rather the dynamic condition of reality called "structure."

This article posits that the parts of function that neuroscience studies, and that are necessary for a function to happen, but that are not the function in itself, may be closely related to the term functionalization that Polo uses. This relationship involves both extremes aiming for a structure that is understood as active.

Extra-bibliography

Yoder, K. J., & Decety, J. (2014). "The Good, the bad, and the just: justice sensitivity predicts neural response during moral evaluation of actions performed by others" *The Journal of Neuroscience : The Official Journal of the Society for Neuroscience*, 34 (12), 4161-6. http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4648-13.2014

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NOTES ON LEONARDO POLO'S RECTIFICATION OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL MODERNITY: TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF JURISPRUDENCE OR PERSONAL LAW

Daniel H. Castañeda y G.

ABSTRACT: This research has its origins in the analysis of the doctrine of dominion of goods (property) of Francisco de Vitoria, one of the great constructors of modern legal thought. The path blazed by Vitoria, locating the human person (*esse hominis*) as creative method of the ius, will find in Leonardo Polo a solid foundation. Thus, the convergence point of the theory of knowledge and transcendental anthropology – theology (topic) and the personal intellect (method)– can be employed as the cognitive light for understanding the focus and the method of jurisprudence. Vitoria developed his doctrines with great seriousness, but was not clear about human cognitive levels and their topics. As a result it was difficult to get to know the cognitive method of Revelation, in order that it might become judicial praxis. The Vitorian methodology would have been a great advance if it had not violated the axiomatics, since Vitoria sought to understand the highest (supraobjective) truths in an objective manner, connecting (by logic) some objects with others.

Theology (supernatural theology) and in particular Revelation can illuminate both the knowledge of the philosophical foundations of jurisprudence and of the knowledge required for developing highly technical responses that imply knowing things, the human actions that use them, circumstances, etc. However, this only can be achieved by a hierarchical distinction between methods and cognitive topics, such that they allow knowledge of what each one knows (Polo); and it cannot be achieved by an amalgam that is the product of the violation of the axiomatics of the theory of knowledge (Vitoria).

1. Approach

To start off with, I will distinguish certain terms that are key for the development of my presentation here. The first and most important is the term "person" or "human person", which in Polian language is synonymous with the agent intellect, agent understanding, personal knowing, personal love, transparent light, etc. I prefer to use the term "esse hominis", which allows me to emphasize the importance of its discovery by Thomas Aquinas, which permits a more technical sense.[1] Secondly, there is the term "ius", which in Romance languages has been replaced by terms such as "derecho", "diritto", "droit", "dret", etc. Nonetheless, these terms do not express the authentic meaning of *ius*, which makes it important to emphasize its original meaning, i.e. as *concrete justice*. It derives from the opinion of a judge, who resolves conflicts between persons that stem from the use of things.[2] In the same way, I use the term "jurisprudence" instead of "law", in order to avoid any misunderstanding that might result from the use of the latter term to describe the legislation enacted by the legislative powers of the state, i.e. congress, parliament, etc. *Ius* and *iurisprudentia* are, in contrast, the work of judges. Finally, personal law and the theology of jurisprudence would derive from the discovery of the greater reach permitted by the abandonment of the mental limit, which is superior to the natural law. The following inquiries are directed toward an understanding of this law.

First, however, I must note that this research has its origins in the analysis of the doctrine of dominion of goods (property) of Francisco de Vitoria, one of the great constructors of modern legal thought. A deep analysis of Vitoria's doctrines runs into a number of inconsistencies, which the philosophy of Leonardo Polo can correct. Thus the path blazed by Vitoria will find a solid foundation in Leonardo Polo. However, a Polian correction of Vitoria's teachings will go further, and thus the convergence point of the theory of knowledge and transcendental anthropology –theology (topic) and the personal intellect (method)–

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[1]   For a deeper discussion of this fundamental dimension of the human person, the reader may consult Polo *Antropología Trascendental I. La* persona *humana*, Eunsa, Pamplona, 2ª. Ed., 2003 and the four volumes of the *Curso de teoría del conocimiento*, as well as J. F. Sellés, and the ample bibliography that he cites, both in *El conocer personal. Estudio del entendimiento agente según Leonardo Polo*, Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona, 2003, and in *Antropología de la intimidad. Libertad, sentido único y amor personal*, Rialp, Madrid, 2012, 397-415.

[2]   For more on this issue cfr. the masterful article by Alfonso García Gallo, "Ius y derecho", *Anuario de Historia del derecho español*, 30 (1960), 5-48, which unfortunately has largely been overlooked by scholars.

can be employed as a cognitive light for understanding the focus and the method of jurisprudence.

Given the shortness of time available, I will have to skip a deep exploration of the doctrine of property of goods in Vitoria, which has already been studied by other researchers.[3] As a result, I will only mention the Vitorian theology of dominion to the degree that it allows for rectification, i.e. by Polo's understanding of theology. This correction will ultimately contribute to an understanding of the illuminative role of theology in jurisprudence. This, in turn, will shed light on the role of theology in an understanding of the *final meaning* of both the task of judges in resolving controversies between persons, and of the use of things by those persons. This role, in reality, is nothing other than a specification of human knowledge and the person's destiny as revealed by theology. Consequently, Vitoria's theology of dominion has been merely the occasion, motive or pretext for proposing a theological approach to jurisprudence and concrete justice. It has been the cause of an advance in the understanding of personal law.

As I have already mentioned, this work has its origin in a broader study of the foundations of property in Vitoria and Polo's rectification thereof. Nevertheless, once that article was sent for peer review, and during my preparation of the paper I was to present at the congress "Transcendence and Love for a New Global Society" I realized that there were certain consequences of the Polian rectification of Vitoria that were not included in that article, or were only mentioned tangentially. The approach I propose here has its origin, to a large degree, in a conversation that I had last fall in Pamplona with Prof. Dybowski and other Polish colleagues. In order to propose at least a sketch of these consequences, I will need to summarize the general lines of what was discovered in my research on Vitoria, so that I can frame the significance of personal law and avoid the need to appeal to that investigation. Therefore, what I present here will only be a "note" to that article.

2. The theologization of jurisprudence: an approach to Vitoria

In what follows I will give a précis of Polo's rectification of the foundations of legal modernity.

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[3]   For an exhaustive list cfr. J-P. Coujou, e I. Zorroza, *Bibliografía vitoriana*, Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona, 2014; regarding the doctrine of dominion cfr. Guzmán Brito, Alejandro, *El derecho como facultad en la neoescolástica española del siglo XVI*, Madrid, Iustel, 2009, 6-61.

Since ancient times reflection on the many aspects of human activity–and material reality–has been part of the vocation of theology. Nevertheless, in the legal realm, with Francisco de Vitoria it takes on a special meaning. The thought of Vitoria is part of a process Kurt Seelmann calls the "theologization of jurisprudence".[4] This began in the 16th century, and is characterized by a strong theological influence in legal thought. The detonating factors were certain socio-political changes: the discovery of America, which meant that Spain was confronted by new cultures, as well as the Reformation and Counter-Reformation and an economic development without precedent in Europe, among the principal changes. These changes made patent the need for new legal responses that were not to be found in the Romanist tradition, and which involved institutions that were pierced through by a *more universal anthropology* (natural law), by interconfessionality (international law), by the assurance of individual private property (property law) and, paradoxically, of the common possession of the seas (communication law).[5]

Despite the need for renewal in legal responses, its theologization (following Vitoria's proposal), extends all throughout Second Scholasticism and iusnaturalism, but is nonetheless insufficient. This insufficiency arose because juridical doctrine must provide light for *distinguishing what is distinct* in cases; light that makes viable the employment of these distinctions in concrete lawsuits. But the problem is that this doctrine does not permit this extreme, since what it does is *divinize* certain legal institutions, establishing them as a *paradigm of what should be* without unifying knowledge at the different levels of knowledge, which should necessarily be based on experience of cases and the concrete necessities of legal actors. Only the doctrine that is the result of the *unification of operations*, like that which I outline here, can be a cognitive light for exercising the *distinctio*, in order to develop *ius* in concrete controversies. There is a difference between–on the one hand–a doctrine about "what the juridical realm should be like", with a more political character, and which outlines economic and social aspirations, and–on the other–a unifying theory of levels of knowledge which casts light on the issue of determining what corresponds to each person in a concrete argument over the use of things.

Therefore, and based on the study of Vitoria's doctrine of dominion and its historical setting, we can infer that it is a matter of a doctrine that–supposedly *deduced* from Revelation–seeks to impose new canons of fittingness in the relations of the usage of goods. Of course Vitoria developed his doctrines with

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[4]   Kurt Seelmann, "Teologia e giurisprudenza alle soglie della modernitá. La nascita del moderno diritto naturale nella tarda scolastica iberica", *Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica*, 29, 2, (1999), 277-298.

[5]   *Íbid*., 283-5.

great seriousness, but was not clear about human levels of knowledge and their focuses (*temas*). As a result it was difficult to get to know the cognitive method of Revelation, in order that it might become judicial praxis.

From the perspective of the gnoseological status of theology, the Vitorian doctrine of dominion has had a *negligible effect on judicial practice*. To this we must add that Revelation is of course a cognitive light, but it is *not immediately usable* in the development of legal doctrines, nor is it immediately usable for judicial practice. Therefore there is a necessity for theology, which must be in (axiomatic) harmony with the rest of the human cognitive dimensions. Here it becomes clear that it is not just theology that sheds light on human activity, but human knowledge contributes to theology as well, as St. John Paul the Great teaches. On this point he held that "Theology in fact has always needed and still needs philosophy's contribution. As a work of critical reason in the light of faith, theology presupposes and requires in all its research a reason formed and educated to concept and argument".[6]

3. Polo's approach to Theology and Revelation

According to the Catechism of the Catholic Church, a cursory approach to theology permits us to describe it as the knowledge of what is contained in *Revelation*; by way of it "God has revealed himself and given himself to man (…) by revealing the mystery, his plan of loving goodness (…) It pleased God, in his goodness and wisdom, to reveal himself and to make known the mystery of his will (…) God, who 'dwells in unapproachable light', wants to communicate his own divine life to the men he freely created…".[7] Consequently, Revelation is the "manifestation and communication of the intimate life of God", and the communication of the Ultimate of Ultimates. Here, God shows Himself as he is, and thus allows *Himself* to be known along with *the rest of the real*, especially *regarding human beings and their personal meaning*. It is, then, the news and message that God communicates about Himself and about his plan for the created cosmos. It is contained in Sacred Scripture and in Tradition, which is the living transmission of the oral preaching of the apostles.[8] Over the course of the centuries there have been so-called "private revelations", but which do not be-

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[6]   *Fides et ratio*, 77.

[7]   *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, (*CCC*), 50-2.

[8]   *CCC*, 75-8.

long to the deposit of the Faith. In addition, God can act directly in each person.[9]

> "Even though Revelation is complete, the *depth of its meaning has not been fully understood*, so that it *corresponds to the Christian faith* to gradually understand all of its contents over the course of the centuries.[10] In this task he found his vocation theology. This is distinct from Revelation, but has to do with growth in the understanding of the Faith: it is "theological investigation which should penetrate deeply into the knowledge of revealed truth". This is principally thanks to the aid of the Holy Spirit, by way of an *understanding of the divine words* that is derived from contemplating and studying them".[11]

A concise, rudimentary Polian approach to theology, especially to the *theology of the faith* or *supernatural theology*, from the point of view of the theory of knowledge, would understand it as "that atom of knowledge (*saber átomo*) that derives from the subalternation of natural knowledge to revelation".[12] I understand *atom of knowledge* as meaning an indivisible knowledge, without parts or distinction of levels of knowledge, i.e. simple. It is a knowledge that is above natural knowledge or the various cognitive operative and habitual levels, subalternated levels, exercised by the *esse hominis* which is actualized by the supernatural habit of the faith.

Supernatural theology is understood better if one knows how *pluripersonal theology is put into practice*. This is the knowledge used by the *esse hominis*, whose focus (*tema*) is another *intellectual, personal Act of being*, which explains the *esse hominis* itself. Consequently, it knows God as knower of the *esse hominis* and therefore is the truth, elucidation or complete meaning of the *esse hominis*.[13] This permits us to know that the *esse hominis* is co-existent with its Knower, that the *esse hominis* is a co-act of a personal being and that there is a reply by the One with whom it co-exists. This focus (*tema*) is, therefore, a search for the knowledge of God; in the end it is a theology.[14]

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[9]   On this point the reader may refer, principally, to Ignacio Falgueras, "Itinerario de la razón hacia la fe", *Fe y razón*, Eunsa, Pamplona, 201ff.

[10]   *CCC*, 66.

[11]   *CCC*, 94. Therefore he especially emphasized the charism of episcopal unction.

[12]   Leonardo Polo, *El hombre en la historia*, Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona, 2008, 31.

[13]   J. F. Selles, *Antropología para inconformes*, 408ff., http://glifos.unis.edu.gt/digital/libros/21580.pdf, September 10, 2015. English edition *Anthropology for rebels: a different way of doing philosophical anthropology*, Strathmore University, 2010.

[14]   J. F. Sellés, *Antropología de la intimidad*, 209ff.

This is how the transparent light, which is *personal knowing* (method), is beyond its own light. This *transparency* is regarding the illumination by the Divine Being (focus); thus, the *esse hominis* knows that it is designed natively for being known. This means that its focus (*tema*) is *the Personal Knowing that knows the meaning of personal knowing*; that is, *Light in the light*,[15] which transcends it, since it cannot capture that Light, being already ontologically limited. Thus the *esse hominis* is a search.[16] The *esse hominis* never fully knows itself, and as a result it is called to grow or be an *additionally (además)*. This knowing the light is *to know the Light that knows the light*, knowing the *Esse* that knows each *esse hominis*. This does not mean that the Light prevails over the light, but rather that *the light must co-exist with the Light*. Thus, the *transparent light* does not illuminate anything, but instead points to the Light that illuminates it, to the Light that allows this *esse hominis* to know who it is. One speaks of pluripersonal theology because pursuing it cognitively brings one to the discovery of the one and triune God.[17]

At the level of supernatural theology, knowledge is exercised by the *esse hominis* elevated by *the supernatural habit or virtue of the faith*,[18] whose focus (*tema*) is the content of the Scriptures and of Tradition. The *esse hominis* elevated by the habit of the faith thus knows the divine intimacy; that is, the supernatural habit *makes the act of being grow*, *makes it more intense*, permitting it to know what is above its ontological limit. This constitutes an intensification

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[15] This and other analogous terms in Polo have been studied exhaustively by Sellés in *El conocer personal*, 131ff.

[16] J. F. Sellés, *Antropología de la intimidad*, 191-4.

[17] The issue of *esse hominis* is thus the *Act of personal knowing*. Exercising this knowledge the *esse hominis* discovers that the Knower with whom it co-exists is a Person, since co-existence is something exclusive to persons. In turn this Person cannot be unique; rather, it co-exists at least with *Another Person*, since his intimacy is an opening that must be corresponded to in the other. Theological knowledge continues in accordance with the other personal transcendentals, so that *personal freedom* permits the discovery that the co-existence of the Persons *opens towards Someone*. In this way, the Persons are at least two, since *personal divine freedom* can only open itself towards *another personal divine freedom*. *Personal knowing* discovers that One of the free divine openings knows originarily, in such a way that the Other divine, free opening is known originarily, in such a way that each of them is a focus for the other, a cognitive origin where the other is a cognitive reply. Finally, *personal love* discovers that the Persons are a reciprocal giving and accepting, which allows us to discover a Third Person which is the gift. See J. F. Sellés, *El conocer personal*, 157-9.

[18] Sellés specifies the difference between the pluripersonal theology that is the focus (*tema*) of *esse hominis* and the supernatural theology that is the focus of the *esse hominis* elevated by the theological habit of the faith. "Descubrimientos cristianos relevantes, según Leonardo Polo, para la filosofía", *Estudios filosóficos polianos*, 1 (2014), 46.

and insertion into natural knowledge: not its annihilation,[19] but rather its subalternation. It is, therefore, an aid for understanding revelation, clarifying the mystery, what God says about Himself and about the rest of the real. As a result, what is revealed is that Light that illuminates the light of the *esse hominis*, in which the supernatural habit of the faith is rooted. It constitutes a *yet more powerful Light* that points to the light and allows its personal meaning to be known without error... together with the meaning of the entirety of reality. This is precisely where a theology of jurisprudence would fit in.

4. Polo's correction of Vitoria's legal theology

A brief look at the Polian correction of Vitoria's theology of dominion will allow us to understand the illuminating role that theology has in jurisprudence.

In summary form, we can say that for Vitoria theology is the foundation of his doctrine of dominion and the possession of goods, since he seeks to deduce the institution of property from Revelation. This methodology would have been a great advance if it had not violated axiomatics, since Vitoria sought to understand the highest (supraobjective) truths in an objective manner, connecting (by logic) some objects with others. Nevertheless, the highest realities, God, human destiny, the destiny of creation, etc., are not known with the same acts of knowing as the physical world or human praxis, nor are they known objectively.

In the end one can see why Vitoria's doctrine on dominion is not so easily usable in the practice of courts of law, nor in jurisprudence. This relates to the thesis of Jesús Lalinde, who, in referring to the Second Scholasticism, holds that it does not occupy a relevant position in the Spanish private law of the 16th and 17th centuries, and by the 18th century it no longer left visible traces.[20]

Vitoria's theologizing doctrine regarding dominion is not, then, the result of a hierarchical, unified knowledge of the focuses (*temas*) by means of their methods. We can affirm this because it confuses methods or cognitive acts and their focus; as Seelmann notes, this due to their doctrinal bases. Antonio Osuna holds that Aquinas, partaking of the atmosphere in the university of Paris of his era, sought to expound theology in harmony with the Aristotelian corpus, which

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[19]   On this point one may best consult Francisco Conesa, "El conocimiento de fe en la filosofía de Leonardo Polo", *Anuario filosófico*, 29, (1996), 435ff.

[20]   Jesús Lalinde Abadía, "Anotaciones iuspravatísticas al iusnaturalismo de la segunda escolástica", *La seconda scolastica nella formazione del diritto privato moderno*, Giuffre, Milano, 1973, 303-75. Lalinde seems also to be referring to the scarcity of modern studies concerning the influence of these authors in private law.

later led Vitoria into error, as well as other commentators who thought they were defining the nature of theology.[21]

Certain authors have deeply studied the scientific and epistemological status of Vitorian theology. On the basis of those studies we can specify Vitoria's cognitive drift more precisely. This is the case with Langella, who summarizes the epistemological status of Vitorian theology, claiming that "the principles by which the theologian moves in his argumentation are the great mysteries of revelation, i.e. the articles of the faith. These make up the starting point for theological reflection, which directs its search according to the laws of the Aristotelian *demostratio*". So, "the theologian, *in statu viae*, based on the unshakable foundation of the faith (...) proceeds to ulterior knowledge: adhering to the first truth, it can reach knowledge of the rest according to the proper mode of knowing, i.e. proceeding by the discursive path, from principles to conclusions. Thus, the method of theology is essentially deductive…"[22]

This summary allows us to see that from the Vitorian perspective, the knowledge of Revelation would be susceptible to being split apart by dialectics into *objective*[23] arguments, which could be used combinatorially by analytics in inferences from which conclusions would be obtained. Nevertheless, this is to seek that the non-objective knowledge that the *esse hominis* has of supraobjective realities be *objectivized*. Subsequently they will be combined, through logic, in order to infer true conclusions, which would also be the object of practical reason. This is, of course, a violation of the axiomatics of the theory of knowledge. These operations of the *logos* or *unifying operations* take place when the intentional compensations of the rational path involve objects of the generalizing path, i.e. when the operative unification takes place.

Following this path, we might say that what the *esse hominis* knows is *unified in some form* with the habitual levels of knowledge and those of the human essence. However, this is not logic any longer, nor can we speak of science, but is rather another kind of knowledge, in which there can be error, but no demonstration of necessary premises. Whatever the case might be, this supposed theological science has no knowledge of the real, and even less of the supernatural. This is the root of its jurisprudential sterility.

Vitoria certainly assimilated theology to habit, but does not respect its supraobjectivity or *non-objective knowledge*; rather he amalgamates what is ha-

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[21]   Antonio Osuna, "Índole científica de la teología en Francisco de Vitoria", *Helmántica*, 65, (2013), 328-31.

[22]   Simona Langella, "El estatuto epistemológico de la teología y de la filosofía en Francisco de Vitoria", *Helmántica*, 65, (2013), 356.

[23]   *Íbid.*, 349ff.

bitually known with what is objectively known by *unifying operations*. This ultimately means mixing what is known by abstraction from what is revealed, without distinguishing cognitive operations and hierarchical levels, i.e. violating the axioms.

As is clear, the Vitorian doctrine of dominion and its system of private law is a theological doctrine, or rather, *it is deduced from theology*. Hence, because of not distinguishing the circumstantial in his concept of science, he makes it "sterile and a generator of multiple dialectical reasonings, always biting their own tails, without contributing any real advance to our rational understanding of the truth as revealed by God".[24] Nor does he appear to contribute anything by which one might learn about aspects of the conflictive concrete relations between persons, when goods are used exclusively. Nor does it shed light on making these relations fit (*ajustarse*).

5. The possibility of a theology of jurisprudence or personal law

To conclude, we can affirm that based on Leonardo Polo's philosophical proposal, Theology (*supernatural theology*) and in particular *Revelation* can illuminate both the knowledge of the philosophical foundations of jurisprudence and the knowledge required for developing highly technical responses that imply understanding things, the human actions that use them, circumstances, etc. However, this can only be achieved by a hierarchical distinction between methods and cognitive topics (axiom B[25]), such that they allow knowledge of what each one knows. This is the Polo's approach; and it cannot be achieved by an amalgam that is the product of the violation of the axiomatics of the theory of knowledge; the Vitoria's approach.

The path blazed by Polo, I repeat, permits what is revealed to be the Light that illuminates the light of the *esse hominis*, in which the supernatural habit of the faith is rooted. It constitutes a *yet more powerful Light* that points to the light and allows its personal meaning to be known without error, together with the meaning of the entirety of reality, and of course, the conflicts between persons arising from the use of things. In a similar way, *Pluripersonal theology* is

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[24]   Antonio Osuna, "Índole científica de la teología en Francisco de Vitoria", *Helmántica*, 65, (2013), 337.

[25]   Unfortunately I cannot develop here the axiomatics of the theory of knowledge. Polo's explicit treatment of the axioms of this discipline can be found in *Curso de teoría del conocimiento*, primarily in the two first volumes, although the four volumes cover the development of these axioms. There is a brief treatment of this axiomatics and the references to each of the axioms in every one of the editions of the *Curso*, in addition to other bibliographic references in J. F. Sellés, "La extensión de la axiomática según Leonardo Polo", *Studia poliana*, 2, (2000), 73-111.

the knowledge used by the *esse hominis*, whose focus is another *personal Act of being*, which explains the *esse hominis* itself. Consequently, it knows God as knower of the *esse hominis* and therefore is the truth, elucidation or complete meaning of the *esse hominis*. This permits us to know that the *esse hominis* is co-existent with its Knower, that the *esse hominis* is a co-act of a personal being and that there is a reply by the One with whom it co-exists. This focus is, therefore, a search for the knowledge of God; in the end it is a theology.

Before concluding this paper, I note that in an article entitled "Ley natural, ley esencial, ley personal. Estudio sobre la índole, jerarquía y fin de estas 'leyes' humanas"[26] (Natural law, essential law, personal law. A study about the nature, hierarchy and purpose of these human laws), Sellés, basing himself on Polian philosophy, holds that *personal law is the highest illuminating factor of human action*, above natural law and the essence of the human being (essential law). It thus seems that the theologies described here would in fact be that *personal law*, which in reality is not a law as such; rather it is the *esse hominis* or human person qua method that understands the focus, which is *the Light that gives meaning to that person and to the rest of reality*. If it were possible to develop a specialization of this theology, regarding the configuration of society by way of justice, as well as the relations of use of goods by persons, we would be in the presence of an authentic *theology of jurisprudence*.

The most didactic way to exemplify this illuminating character of theology with respect to the rest of the fields of knowledge or cognitive levels is by a comparison with the *architectural arch*. This engineering element permits the opening of a space in a structure, i.e. to make it useful, obliquely transmitting the vertical forces, using certain elements called voussoirs, the most important of which is the keystone. This element transmits the force to the other voussoirs, thus permitting the existence of the whole. In this sense, supernatural theology would be the keystone that permits the existence of the structure, allowing the whole to serve its purpose. The other cognitive levels would be the other voussoirs. First, the lowest stones correspond to sensible knowledge, since if there are no data known by the senses there could not be anything at the higher levels, nor the possibility of explaining anything theologically. Later, there are the rest of the voussoirs or operative and habitual levels of knowledge, which exist in a hierarchy, and without which there is no unity (axiom C) that can be given meaning by the keystone (theology-faith).

The interesting aspect of the comparison is that the keystone permits a harmony between the vertical and horizontal forces, permitting the existence of the whole, just as supernatural theology explains the ultimate meaning of every-

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[26] Now in *Los hábitos intelectuales según Tomas de Aquino*, Eunsa, Pamplona, 2008, 451-69.

thing that is known by the other levels. Of course theology is the key, but it is key in regards to something that there is, i.e., to the other methods and topics that exist in a hierarchy (axiom B). As a result, without the keystone the voussoirs serve no purpose, not being able to support forces or function, and without voussoirs there is no need for a keystone. Theology, then, is the knowledge that "permits organization and harmony" among the other fields of knowledge, i.e. *what destines them to something that transcends them*, to their full meaning. The keystone is able to maintain a distribution of forces among all the elements that make up the arch, and permits supporting the structure above; in the same way, supernatural theology gives meaning to all the kinds of knowledge, but not as an amalgam or "mosaic of separated and unconnected tessellas", but *unified* instead (axioma C). Finally, in the arch all its components are necessary, for they are unified; nevertheless there are voussoirs that are higher than others and support more weight; in the same way, in knowledge, the higher level is that which harmonizes the others, *that which knows their purpose*.

What distinguishes theological knowledge, the study of the *esse hominis* illuminated by the habit of faith, from the other fields of knowledge is that it does not deal with *mere knowledge*, with a series of mental contents that are *contemplated*, but is rather the knowledge on which "every later activation of human potential depends",[27] that is, knowledge of human essence and nature. Finally, it is not simple knowledge that can be stored in a library. St. John Paul the Great says that it is not a matter of a teaching or commandment, but rather is something much more radical, that "involves holding fast to the very person of Jesus, partaking of his life and his destiny, sharing in his free and loving obedience to the will of the Father (…) since it touches man at the very depths of his being".[28] This means something more than a simple "knowing more"; rather, it is *something that demands the commitment of one's entire life and being*: "Christ's message opens an endless horizon and brings incomparable energy, light for the mind, strength for the will, love for the heart".[29]

This full meaning that Revelation gives to the other levels of knowledge (the organization of voussoirs in order to distribute the forces that make the arch possible) is the *harmony between faith and reason* or *lack of contradiction between faith and reason*. Hundreds of studies have been written on this topic, but nearly all have been about how there is no opposition of the faith to the knowledge achieved by the so-called hard and experimental sciences. Nevertheless, on the basis of this short exploration we can see that the harmony between

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[27]   J. F. Sellés, *Los hábitos intelectuales según Tomas de Aquino*, 468.

[28]   *Veritatis* splendor, 19-21.

[29]   *Address of John Paul II to the participants in the pre-synodal symposium organized by the Pontifical Council for Culture*, 14 January 1999.

faith and reason is transcendental when it is a matter of human action, since it is the *growing remaining in the limit*. However, it is more important that there be a harmony between faith and reason in the decisions for action that the human being makes every day, than in the scientific explanations of the cosmos, evolution, the big bang, the neurosciences, quantum mechanics, etc. This is because actions are what truly matters to the growth of the person, which is why these actions have an eternal value. Thus, giving an *ultimate meaning* to *human actions*, in particular those of judges, through "building them on rock",[30] that is, of "building them" in harmony with the knowledge derived from Revelation and that acquired by the human being in the exercise of all his or her cognitive acts, is more important for human completeness than the explanation of physical reality.

One of the branches of human action where one expects a solid harmony between knowledge of Revelation and the many dimensions of human knowledge is jurisprudence. There have already been explorations of how certain authors, Francisco de Vitoria among them, took this task seriously, but it was not until Leonardo Polo's proposal of a theory of knowledge that explains the acts with which notions are thought, that it became possible to achieve a harmony between human knowing and Revelation. Polo's philosophy permits explaining the harmonious unity between the human knowledge of things and the object of theology, as well as the highly technical decisions of judges regarding the use of things in concrete times and by specific persons, with the teachings of Christ contained in Scripture and Tradition.

It should be remembered that Polo proposed the axiomatic formulation of the theory of knowledge in order to overcome objective thought, which results in aspectuality and fragmentation. Thus, speaking of the *organization*, *construction* and *harmonization* of knowledge is only for explaining something non-objective. I have not mentioned it here, but the axis of this theory of knowledge is the consideration of the active character of knowledge (axiom A and the laterals E, F and G). This means that knowledge is exercised through acts. First, there are the operations or acts of the organic and rational faculties. The second type of acts are noetic habits, which are the unrestricted growth of acts (axiom D and lateral H). The act as operation is the immanent operation, characterized by the possession of the object by the act of the faculty. In this way the object is possessed as an end by the operation of the faculty. This is why knowledge has two dimensions: that of method and that of topic.

But not only is it important to maintain this in regards to the unification of what is known by all levels, but it is necessary–for an understanding of theology

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[30]　This is precisely the meaning of the words of Mark 7:24-27.

as the keystone of the arch and its unification of the other levels of knowledge, and for an understanding of human action in general and jurisprudential action in particular–to "extend" the axiomatics to it. Sellés, with a great Polian spirit, has proposed that this knowledge, upon which any later activation of human potentiality depends, be studied "at other levels of human knowledge, concretely the innate habits (…) such that one might wonder whether this unification must be made extensible to that knowing (…) which is proper to the innate habits",[31] In the same way it is possible to study the ground of the axiomatics in the *esse hominis,*[32] which of course is act (axiom A), and ground of the habits (axiom D),[33] in order that what is known by that esse be unified with what is known by the other levels of knowledge. This is because human knowing "is not made for being isolated from divine personal knowing", such that "the theory of knowledge without God is reductive", since "human knowing is made for co-knowing with God."[34]

Finally, I would like to stress that this theology (method) must be in agreement with the axiomatics of the theory of knowledge, especially with axiom C, which will permit a correct unification of all the levels of knowledge. This would proceed from the sensible levels, in which one must emphasize the work of the imagination and cogitative power, passing through rationality–where I must make special mention of practical knowledge and knowledge of language–thereby reaching those levels that are habitual. This is the only way that it can become judicial praxis: the light, guidance and purpose of the other levels of knowledge. Furthermore, it would be the only possible method for the development of so-called "Global Law", which has been the object of much research over recent years. I would like to make clear that in research about this Global Law, while it is important to bring together jurisprudence and legal texts whose contents are perennial in time and common to peoples dispersed around the

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[31]   J. F. Sellés, "Los niveles cognoscitivos superiores de la persona humana: la vinculación de los hábitos innatos", *Studia Poliana*, 10, (2008), 57-8.

[32]   "The demonstrative recourse to axiomatics is reduced to a deeper understanding of the act of the intelligibles in act, which elevates it above its condition as an explicative hypothesis, since that condition is completely inadequate for it (…) The proposed axiomatics permits this development in what regards the very notion of agent intellect", *Curso de teoría del conocimiento*, III, Eunsa, Pamplona, 1988, 14.

[33]   In this regard Polo holds that "the agent intellect is more than what Aristotle says (…); he never saw its value as illuminative of acts and, therefore, he did not place it relation with habitual knowledge. And since I believe that it must be done, I formulate it axiomatically: habitual knowledge is due to the agent intellect. The axiom of the habits says that the intelligence is susceptible to habits; at this point, I add that the habits are possible thanks to the agent intellect", *íbid*.

[34]   J. F. Sellés, *El conocer personal*, 136.

globe, its ultimate ground is rooted in the study of the dimensions of knowledge of the human being (method). These explain its perennial character in time and the community in space of the institutions, which are the product of solutions, discovered through the exercise of knowledge, applied to the controversies between persons derived from the use of things (topic).

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DECODIFICATION, COMMON GOOD,
AND RESPONSIBLE SOCIETIES
BEYOND THE ELINOR OSTROM'S THEORY OF GOVERNING THE COMMONS

Grzegorz Jan Blicharz

ABSTRACT: Discussion with E. Ostrom's theory is methodologically limited to governing the commons. However, the idea can be expanded, on the one hand by applying philosophical idea of common good and on the other hand, by introducing the theory of rule of law, and by taking into account the ongoing process of decodification in the Western legal orders. It is possible to make use of the presented perspective in developing responsible societies. In that approach there is much to be done within the issue of shaping the rule-making and rule-following processes as a part of the heritage that is transferred between generations. The outcome of the study can reveal the rules possible to be applied on the state level.

1. Introduction

It was Elinor Ostrom, an American political economist who has brought a new approach in the field of governing the commons. For almost 50 years she has conducted theoretical and empirical research and in 2009 she was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for her achievements. Namely, she proved that there is another dimension of solving the problems of the commons. There is a solution which goes beyond the state and the market dichotomy.[1] The common good and governing the commons are connected with the issue of the state as a participant in the rule-making and rule-following processes. How far is it reasonable to take advantage of self-governance of communities in that respect? At the same time, there is a deep relation with the problem of the process of decodification. It means that legal codes are losing their importance. The process is observed mainly in continental Europe and is connected with an unparalleled amount of specific legislation, acts and statutes which modify the solutions provided by the legislator in a code, i.e., Civil Code, Commercial Code, etc. Moreover, the legislation at the state level is changing due to the globalization and political unification rules: that of the European Union, of the US federal law, or due to the rules established by global organizations. At the end of the day, the idea that a branch of law can be unified in a single act and limited to the territory of a given state is now being falsified. The legal order should reflect these changes. There is a hidden opportunity that multilayered legal systems of the present Western legal orders could be better governed by small communities which are more adjustable to the changing reality. This experience is somehow present, though in a different context, in the heritage of Elinor Ostrom and her studies on polycentricity as a way of governing in metropolitan areas.[2] On the other hand, the philosophical idea of common good enables one to see how much cumulated potential resides in the whole structure of society: associations, organizations, groups, clubs, etc. that create the specific network, which accounts for an individual and for state as such. The main issue is, who is responsible for the rule-making and rule-following processes and how they relate to the phenomenon of shaping a responsible society. The examined perspective concerns the possibility of changing the paradigm of state control and state initiative towards the legislative process. What does it mean that *ius* is more flexible and intuitive than *lex* set up by a public authority? Could better effects be achieved with self-governed communities than with the centralized power system?

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[1]   E. Ostrom, "Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems", *American Economic Review* 100 (2010), 1.

[2]   *Ibidem*, 3.

2. The common good perspective and Elinor Ostrom's theory

Governing the commons is the management of those natural resources, which are limited in amount and necessary for a community to survive, produce and manage its households. The most typical examples are: limited water basins, limited flows of rivers, limited areas of forests, fisheries, or grazing lands, etc. The crux of the matter is how to find the most accurate way of using the common resource and how to enable the whole community to benefit from it. One should keep in mind that any abuse of a resource, even by an individual can cause its devastation[3].

According to E. Ostrom's research the "third way" to govern, protect and use an endangered resource can be found outside the dichotomy of the market and the state. The best way to govern the commons is more plausible to be found by the community itself.[4] The perspective within the commons' debate has changed since E. Ostrom's outcomes. Self-governance of a community can bring better economical, cultural and legal results than management by a single subject.

This idea has been empirically confirmed in all over the world – from California, through Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, India, Sri Lanka, to Nepal and Japan.[5] Empirical experience made the idea very powerful. For the sake of merging the concept of common good with the idea of E. Ostrom towards a more anthropological view on self-governance, it is useful to analyze the specific legacy of E. Ostrom that deals with the rule-making and rule-following phenomena. It can be summed up by three ideas. The first is to better understand the human nature. We have to inquire into the human nature and bring the person into the foreground instead of reducing an individual to a consumer or a voter.[6] Decision making and motivational processes are much more complicated than it appears in popular economic theories.[7] They depend on the context – social, cultural, also environmental. That is why, in order to construe effective and justified rules, they must be fit not only to the logic of theory, to the logic of law but must also be matched to the social and ecological surroundings.

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[3]   G. Blicharz, "Przełom w zarządzaniu zasobami wspólnymi. Praktyka dobra wspólnego", In *Dobro wspólne. Teoria i praktyka*, eds W. Arndt, F. Longchamps de Bérier, K. Szczucki, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe/Fundacja Utriusque Iuris, Warszawa, 2013, 211.

[4]   E. Ostrom, *Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1990.

[5]   *Ibidem*, 19; 72-73.

[6]   E. Ostrom, *Beyond*, cit., 7-9.

[7]   *Ibidem*, 2-4.

The second idea is that members of a community should build trust in one another. The more members of communities are able to trust each other, the better results they achieve in governing a resource. It is possible thanks to often communication between them, especially face-to-face communication[8] which increases feeling of obligation and loyalty.

The third idea reflects the proposition that a community can be self-responsible. The outcomes of E. Ostrom's research encourage the affirmation of the idea that communities can be self-responsible and do not need to be directed in every problem by the central government.[9] It usually cannot encompass the specific nature of each community. E. Ostrom's research confirmed that community itself is more likely to deal with complexity and can introduce rules which bring out the best in their members.

Having presented these three ideas, it is not surprising that, among the scholars, the outcomes of E. Ostrom's research have been compared as similar to the Catholic social teaching.[10] One of the most commented conclusions from the theory of commons is that those "who are intended to benefit from the system, should be allowed to develop and adapt the rules to the changing conditions".[11] In the formulation of the teaching of the Church it appears under the name "subsidiarity".[12]

We can take catholic social teaching and that which was presented by Benedict XVI in his official speech in Bundestag.[13] As Benedict XVI says: "community must always respect the ecology of men and the ecology of nature". In this context, it is surprisingly similar to the thought of E. Ostrom, who has emphasized not only creating rules in accordance with the characteristics of natural resources but also in the way that recognizes the real human nature. It was not by accident, that E. Ostrom, in her foundational book on governing the com-

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[8]   E. Ostrom, *Governing*, cit., 90.

[9]   M. D. McGinnis, "Foundations of the Ostrom Workshop. Institutional Analysis, Polycentricity, and Self-Governance of the Commons", 3 *Public Choice* 143 (2010), 297.

[10]   P. Booth, "The Environment, The Common Good And The Economic Way Of Thinking", In *Catholic Social Teaching and the Market Economy*, ed. P. Booth, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 2014, 323; G. Blicharz, *Przełom w zarządzaniu...*, 216-218. A. Habisch, "Corporate Social Responsibility and Catholic Social Thought", In *Values, Catholic Social Thought and Public Policy*, ed. B. Reynolds, S. Healy, Dublin: CORI Justice, 2007, 28.

[11]   Ibidem. Cfr. E. Ostrom, "Institutions and the environment", 3 *Economic Affairs* 28 (2008), 24-31.

[12]   P. Booth, op. cit., 323.

[13]   Benedict XVI, *The Listening Heart. Reflections on the Foundations of Law*, Reichstag Building, Berlin, 22 September 2011.

mons, invoked Aristotle and his idea of common interest of society.[14] For Aristotle "the good life then is the chief aim of society, both collectively for all its members and individually"[15]. It shows that social and political thought can go through the same paths and presents values which last unchanged in various contexts.

The common good present in the catholic social teaching is said to be the sum of conditions that allow a person or group of people to have a chance to improve and thrive and benefit properly from the surrounding reality.[16] Catholic social teaching points out that the existence of a responsible community depends on internal and external conditions.[17] On the one hand, a person should cooperate to achieve the objectives of the community, especially of the permanent group or organization.[18] On the other hand, the community must ensure respect for human dignity and fundamental values and rights. Only on this basis, can one think about the fair use of goods. Shaping society according to the teachings of the Church is based precisely on the development of associations, and organizations. Participation in the life of smaller groups gives the ability to achieve common objectives and to reach a compromise with their own interests. Expressed in this way, the sense of initiative and the desire to be responsible for making something that is beyond the reach of a sole individual.[19] In the philosophical approach, one can say about the good not only of individuals, but also of families, groups, associations, enterprises of an economic nature, cities, regions, countries, and even globally - of the community of people and nations.[20] Thus, the common good is the result of actions of individuals and depends on their attitude and ability to take responsibility for others.[21]

On the other hand, the Church stresses that besides proper conditions for an individual, it is necessary to have well acting political institutions and the state which can guarantee the consistency of the social organism.[22] It is worth noting, however, that the teaching of the Church has always been seen in the transcend-

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[14]   E. Ostrom, *Governing*, cit., 2.

[15]   Aristotle, *Politics*, 1278b.

[16]   Cfr. the similarities between governing the commons and catholic social teaching in G. Blicharz, *Przełom w zarządzaniu...*, 216-218. Cfr. Pontifical Council for Justice And Peace, *Compendium Of The Social Doctrine Of The Church*, USCCB PUB, 2004, pt. 164.

[17]   *Compendium*, cit., pt. 164.

[18]   *Compendium*, cit., pt. 150-151.

[19]   *Ibidem*.

[20]   *Compendium*, cit., pt. 165.

[21]   *Compendium*, cit., pt. 167.

[22]   *Compendium*, cit., pt. 168.

ent sense, i.e., the result of realizing the common good cannot be only the socio-economic well-being.[23] The common good should manifest itself primarily in the development of individuals and the relationships between people. That makes it possible to satisfy everyone as a human being in this place and time and has to lead a person to God as the ultimate goal.[24]

The idea that connects both Elinor Ostrom's research and the catholic social teaching is self-governance and human development. That personal approach towards the organization of community life in both cases led to the conclusion that one of the most important factors is how to shape the process of rule-making and rule-following. In that sense, the solidarity between generations should receive new meaning, i.e., how to transfer vertically (and not horizontally) the rule-making and rule-following process, how to organize it not only among a given community but also for the future members of the community.

This phenomenon breeds doubt whether the state should only be responsible for security – general rules and principles, or should it be treated as "the state of rule of law", which enables communities to govern themselves. The second type of government seems to be more accurate in a search for common good. It is interested in shaping communities' capability to act independently for their own good, for the good of their members. Its authority has to be the last resort in solving conflicts and imposing rules of using goods which belong to the community.

3. Decodification of legal order and the rule-making and rule-following processes

E. Ostrom's research is not only similar to the catholic social teachings about the common good and the way of looking at any society. The beginning of her studies has much in common with the concept of polycentricity as a way of governing metropolitan areas. In its core, polycentricity deals with the idea that only the governance through many decision centers, having limited and autonomous prerogatives, can yield better results.[25] They should be connected with each other by a guiding set of rules, principles that should be followed. However, in practice, the decision making process should be granted to the lower-level communities or networks. The very same phenomenon can be traced to the realm of law. The decodification process means the multiplication of centers

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[23]   *Compendium,* cit., pt. 170.

[24]   *Ibidem.*

[25]   P.D. Aligica, V. Tarko, "Polycentricity: From Polanyi to Ostrom, and Beyond", *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2012, 237.

which have legislative power – state, national, supranational, and on the other hand, the multiplication of the sources of law: codes, statutes, court decisions, executive orders, etc. Nowadays, legislators and lawyers should answer the question of how to shape the legal order and how to act within the "polycentric" legal system. The reality of a multilayered legal order should be analyzed within the perspective of the common good and community self-governance.

Active participation of the members of communities in the rule-making and rule-following processes is one of the main factors in the effective management of the commons. However, this idea seems to be much broader. In fact, not only is it present in the political economy, but also in the teaching of the Church. Moreover, self-governance is a Western idea – rooted in our Western tradition and also a Roman concept.

E. Ostrom made a firsthand observation of the division between formal law and working rules. „When the mandates from relevant laws and official regulations are deemed impractical or improper, individuals may devise their own working rules that assign *de facto* rights and duties that are contrary to the *de jure* rights and duties".[26]

It is what Benedict XVI mentioned in the speech in Bundestag: "Where positivist reason dominates the field to the exclusion of all else – and that is broadly the case in our public mindset – then the classical sources of knowledge for ethics and law are excluded. This is a dramatic situation which affects everyone, and on which a public debate is necessary."[27]

Codification as a fruit of a positivist approach towards the law always tries to replace the natural multiplicity of the legislative powers. It wants to provide legal certainty by reducing complex regulations into one act.[28] Codification was a new phenomenon in the modern times, in so called "age of codification" – in 17th and 18th century. It remained so until the turn of the 19th and 20th century.[29] In the 80s of the 20th century, in the field of private law, the process of decodification was considered a fact. Today, the process of decodification can also be noticed in other branches of law, like administrative proceedings.[30] The idea of codification at the national level is an essentially unresponsive solution

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[26] E. Ostrom, *Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems*, Institute for Contemporary Studies, San Francisco, 1992, 20.

[27] Benedict XVI, *op. cit.*

[28] G. Blicharz, "Samolotem lub pociągiem. Dekodyfikacja umowy przewozu w obliczu europeizacji i globalizacji prawa", In *Dekodyfikacja. Szkice do portretu*, ed. F. Longchamps de Bérier, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2016 (Forthcoming).

[29] *Ibidem.*

[30] *Ibidem.*

to both the essence of a code and to social needs. Even the unification of an entire branch of law: may it be private law, administrative law or penal law on the international level, like the one within the European Union, would not fulfill the requirements of the code. There is always the global context that has to be taken into account.

Europeanization is mixed with globalization and it is difficult to avoid the polycentricity of the legislative powers.[31] Without doubt, in the framework of the European Union, however, comes a certain harmonization, a convergence of actions and rules of conduct. This process, however, is easier to be called convergence than European codification. It occurs through the acquisition of independent models from other member states or from the European Union itself. They are selected due to their attractiveness, as they are more profitable, legitimate, effective or, finally, more transparent and thus better for democracy and values common to the European countries. Exchange of experience within the doctrine of law, conducting joint scientific research is a more effective path towards the discovery of common principles of law. The idea of unification of law already proved to be ineffective in the case of private law. Hence the question of codification not only at the European level but also at the national level or in other contexts, like in the USA, should not only be seen in the light of the process of decodification, but should also reflect the need for the flexibility of law. Some situations may require different treatment, depending on the economic and social situation. Meanwhile, a code always stabilizes law, making it less dynamic. Then easily begins the process of decodification as a sign of law that keeps up with reality. It seems that only the understanding of the legal tradition can be used to shape a more permanent legal order. Worth noting is the experience of Roman law and the other ways in which the rule-making and rule-following processes can be shaped.

The division present in governance of the commons and in the catholic social teaching which is: state vs. individual vs. community, is in the same manner present in the realm of law. It appears as an opposition between *lex* and *ius*: between stabilized law and flexible interpretation of a case. In fact, in the theory of law and in the Roman legal experience it can be treated as an opposition between the "top-down" approach and the "bottom-up" approach. The top-down approach is characterized by formal laws, stability that is associated with the written law.[32] The top-down approach is present in the positivist model which wants to deduct a solution to every situation from the rules established by the legislator who created a closed system of legal rules. The bottom-up approach

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[31] *Ibidem.*

[32] J. Stelmach, B. Brożek, *Sztuka negocjacji prawniczych*, Wolters Kluwer, Warszawa, 2011, 54-60; 85-100.

was an identifying sign of Roman law. It was the solution to a particular situation that was called law – *ius*. It was always connected with a specific case and the generalization of a set of them can lead to the written rules. It was like that in Roman law, where the statutes were an exception, and it is a bit like that in common law systems where the judge-made law has a strong position. In the continental Europe the positivist model, which was predominant for centuries is now in decline. The decentralization of legal systems caused the uncertainty of legal rules and made judges more important than before.

There is a challenge for a standard system of jurisdiction and formalized courts. Equitable and fair solutions are possible to discover by cooperating societies. The problem is how to provide the sphere of justice – a public place to resolve conflicts without high costs and pending decisions of the court. The increasing popularity of negotiations and arbitrations, the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) are not the only signs of searching for economically effective solutions.[33] These phenomena also show that the problem lies not in deciding what is equitable and fair – that is understandable for everyone. The problem lies in finding the trustworthy people who can provide a fast and justified judgement that respects the governing principles of society.[34] The problem lies in the feeling of uncertainty and lack of security due to complicated and enormously expanded legal system, legal rules and acts.

4. *Ius* comes from *Iustitia* (d. 1,1,1 pr.) – Non-positivist source of law?

It is particularly useful to analyze the bottom-up approach through the lense of the Roman law legacy. The passage from the most important source of Roman law – the first book of Justinian's Digest: D. 1.1.1 pr serves as an example. The first title of the book begins with the text of the jurist Ulpian (3rd century AD), which was sourced by Justinian's compilers from the first book of his "Institutions". The famous jurist wrote in *principium*:

D. 1,1,1 Ulpianus primo libro *insitutionum*:

pr. *Iuri operam daturum prius nosse oportet, unde nomen iuris descendat. est autem a iustitia appellatum: nam, ut eleganter Celsus definiat, ius est ars boni et aequi.*

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[33] C. J. Menkel-Meadow, "Mediation, Arbitration, and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)", In, *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, ed. J.D. Wright, 2nd edition, Vol 15. Elsevier, Oxford, 71; Cfr. H. Woolf, *Access to Justice: Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System*, HMSO, London, 1996.

[34] Cfr. C. J. Menkel-Meadow, *op. cit.*, 70.

This text was the subject of a great number of analyses, mainly due to the extremely concise definition of law: *ius est ars boni et aequi*, which Ulpian attributes to the jurist Celsus (2nd century AD). The Roman jurist Celsus described the law as the art of goodness and fairness. However, one should also draw attention to the first sentence of this passage, namely: *Iuri operam daturum prius nosse oportet, unde nomen iuris descendat*. By inquiring about the origin of the word *ius*, Ulpian seems to imply that his lecture will start from the analysis of the linguistic and grammatical origin of the term. Meanwhile, just in the second sentence, he says that law is defined by justice: *ius - iustitia*. As it is known from the point of view of etymology, it is not entitled to derive law from justice (*iustitia - ius*), but rather it is *iustitia* that is derived from *ius*. The order presented by the jurist does not constitute a linguistic analysis, but it answers the question about the origin of the law. "In the beginning is the *iustitia* from which descends the *ius* as *ars boni et aequi*".[35]

This perspective is not that of the positivist sources of law. Of course, even the Romans distinguished those sources, which today might be called positivist, like statutes, constitutions, edicts, etc. What catches the eye, is that today, justice is not considered so much the source of law but, perhaps, a mere criterion of the law. While for Ulpian the first and the most important source and origin of law is justice, and it is named so in the first passage of the Digest. The classification of sources in a modern positivistic sense can be traced even to the second book of the Digest – *De origine iuris et omnium magistratuum et succession prudentium*, or the third book – *De legibus senatusque et longa consuetudine*, or in the fourth book – *De constitutionibus principum*, etc. Before studying law, one should know first the origin of *ius* – not in terms of sources of knowledge and creation of law in the modern meaning of the term. Ulpian writes about the roots of normativity, which is why he answered that the origin of *ius* is *iustitia*. In another passage of the Digest, Justinian's compilers have put the reflection of Ulpian about the meaning of justice.

D. 1,1,10 pr. Ulpianus libro primo *regularum*:

Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi. Iuris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere.

Justice is the constant and unchanging will. In literature, the character of justice is analyzed primarily.[36] Instead, it is worth to dwell on another fact. On the one hand, Ulpian, when he speaks of *iustitia*, sees it as a will (*voluntas*). However, one cannot forget an important debate on whether this passage from Ulpi-

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[35]   M. Bretone, *I fondamenti del diritto romano*, Bari, 1998, 199.

[36]   W. Waldstein, "Ist das suum cuique eine Leerformel?", *SDHI*, vol. 61, LXI (1995), 186.

an contains the definition of *iustitia* or only so called *Inhalt der Aussage* – content of a proposition.[37] On the other hand, the *iustitia* seems to refer to a practice of an individual, to a virtue – *constans et perpetua voluntas*. In this context, it is easier to understand the precepts of law that Ulpian formulated in the next passage, which comes from the first title of Digest - D. 1,1,10,1. All this means that the precepts of law are not those of the modern positivist perspective, and do not depend on the obedience to the statutes or to the state, but are built on what is meant by the term justice, that is: to live honestly, not to damage others, and to give what is due to every individual[38]. Therefore, in essence, the law for Ulpian was related to the practice, the practice of life and the administration of justice.

5. Conclusions

The empirical experience of E. Ostrom and the theoretical approach of catholic social teaching towards the common good, and finally the Roman legal experience shows that the idea of the third way in dealing with problems is not only about the commons, about the common good, but also about the law. The engagement of people and every person in the process of rule-making and rule-following seems to be a cross-disciplinary idea. Three different fields of analysis show that there is no single pattern for all problems but there is one way that should be followed. It deals with the creation of circumstances for development of an individual and a community through self-governance, the bottom-up approach towards legal rules, which will help to put human development in the center, which enables anyone to take part in the social life. E. Ostrom's research revealed that community is capable of discovering and following equitable rules. Decentralized legal systems and systems of jurisdiction enable a community to self-govern and develop responsible societies. Finally, the most important idea is that the common good of society needs to be matched with better understanding of human nature. There is a place to expand on E. Ostrom studies, on the one hand by applying the philosophical idea of common good and on the other hand, by introducing the theory of rule of law – *ius*. It is possible to make the use of presented theory in public administration and in developing responsible societies.

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[37] *Ibidem*.

[38] D. 1,1,10,1 Ulpianus libro primo *regularum*: *Iuris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere*.

DOMESTIC WORK:
THE FIRST PROFESSION?
Rafael Hurtado

ABSTRACT: John Paul II's famous apostolic exhortation "Familiaris Con-sortio" calls for a better understanding of the relationship between work, family and profession. The dignity of the mother's work in the home and the im-portance of the father's participation in such work must be recognized as true professional works: as true contributors for building the human world. The promotion of the work that a father and a mother perform at home must be ex-tensive to the whole of society, deserving of respect and dignity of social assets.

Introduction

The issue of *parenthood and married life* engaged in a very important part of Saint John Paul II/Karol Wojtyla's pastoral and intellectual writings[1]. His thought is very unique in style, revealing two particular aspects of his personal life: one of great relevance would be his difficult childhood, lived under the custody of his widower father and Edmund, his older brother who was killed by a terrible disease when little Karol was twelve years of age. Undoubtedly, *Lolek's* (as they used to call him) character was forged by death and suffering, a fact that contributed enormously to strengthen his moral education. A second aspect would be the importance of his juvenile environment (*Srodowisko*) where Karol, now ordained priest, wielded his ministry – later on as bishop and cardinal– in a time when Poland was being tormented by political changes, wars, and various campaigns in favour of sexual freedom.

Such experiences among politicians, heroic figures of the Catholic Church and mostly youngsters showed the polish priest to have a profound respect to human love. As he commented years later on several occasions, he literally learned to "love human love". Truly, it was among youngsters where Wojtyla sat the grounds to build up a very broad philosophical and theological rationale, together with a solid academic, religious, and pastoral instruction. It is here when he also acquired the complementary experience that encouraged him to work on a manuscript in the early sixties that would remain in the years to come as one of the most prominent writings in its topic: *Love and Responsibility*, a book inspired by a profound pastoral need among the group of friends and young couples he worked with.

All these experiences, closely related to family life, lived by ordinary people, gave full-body to what we can call an "introductory" stage to what was coming in the late sixties. It is fair to say that Wojtyla's background among students, his experiences as pastor and as lecturer became one of his most recognized abilities. A charisma that earned him prestige and fame, up to a point of being considered an authority on related topics in the areas of morals in married life, sexuality and family. In fact, a few years after *Love and Responsibility's* first edition was published in the 60's, he was called by Pope Paul VI to participate in the Pontifical Commission that was formed to investigate the hidden moral grounds in the new contraception technology. Alongside with his own Polish Commission, Wojtyla's investigations were in agreement with the Roman draft that embodied Paul VI's *Humanae Vitae* in 1968, the encyclical that change the history of the modern Church forever.

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[1]   R. Hurtado, *La paternidad en el pensamiento de Karol Wojtyla*, Eunsa, Pamplona, 2011.

As a consequence, the controversies around Pope Paul's new encyclical marked Wojtyla's future interest around sexual ethics. He took the dissentient opinions issued by the masses as an authentic challenge for scholarship, a fact that can be confirmed in a series of papers and articles he wrote about of *Humanae Vitae's* doctrine. His intellectual agenda was strongly inspired by the Pontifical document from that moment on, even when the time came for him to be called to take a sit on Saint Peter's Chair. It was at that moment when all these experiences gave birth to the one of the most promising theological works of his time: *The Theology of the Body*, an extended catechesis on human love seen through the prism of the Divine Plan, written and taught by John Paul II himself, from Saint Peter Square, in the renounced Wednesday general audiences.

Nevertheless, in was in 1980 when the Synod of Bishops was assembled in Rome with the strong purpose to discuss the role of the Christian Family against the "changing tide" brought by postmodern culture. As it is well-known today, *Familiaris Consortio* was the result of the Roman Synod, the same as John Paul's intention to conform the *Pontificio Istituto Giovanni Paolo II per il Studi su Matrimonio e Famiglia*, an initiative that was sealed with "blood, toil, tears and sweat" the 13th of May 1981, when Alí Agca shoot the Polish Pope in Saint Peter Square, at the heart of Christianity, on the feast of our Lady of Fatima.

1. A Renewed "Theology of Work"

Among a broad range of "bright spots and shadows" around marriage and family, *Familiaris Consortio* addresses one particular issue of tremendous importance in the way families live in our days: *their relationship with paid-work outside the home*. Certainly, John Paul II's famous apostolic exhortation can be seen as a pontifical call to all husbands and wives to reflect on a series of topics concerning their vocation to work. As a challenge for scholarship, numbers 23 and 25 call for a renewed "theology of work" that could "shed light upon and study in depth the meaning of work in the Christian life and determine the fundamental bond between work and the family, and therefore the original and irreplaceable meaning of work in the home and in rearing children"[2].

Furthermore, number 23 –*Women and society*– of *Familiaris Consortio* states that the true advancement of women's dignity will come when the maternal role in the family receives the same recognition as any other profession that prevails outside the home, or any public service that holds prestige and social status. In that sense, society must be structured in such a way that wives and

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[2]   John Paul II (1981), *Familiaris Consortio*.

mothers are not required in practice to work outside the home, so their families can live a prosperous and dignified life, even when mothers freely decide to devote themselves entirely to their own families. The Church has the responsibility to remind society that women working full-time in their homes should be recognized, treasured, and respected for the irreplaceable value of their work in the home, and the mentality that honours women more for the work they perform outside the home than for their labour within their families must be overcome. For this to be accomplished, it is necessary that men love and respect women in all their dignity, and society produces the conditions to favour work in the home[3].

At the same time, number 25 –*Men as Husbands and Fathers*– states that man's role as a father is naturally fulfilled by loving his wife and his children, above society's constant promotion of a masculine figure that neglects family life and the education of his children by an excessive dedication to his professional work outside his home. The father is called to ensure the harmony in the home and the development of all its members. He will accomplish this by exercising a generous responsibility for the children that have been conceived under the "heart" of the mother. His role in the education of the children is a shared responsibility with his wife, which is not meant to be a cause of division but to promote unity and stability in the family[4].

Relevant guidelines can be observed in these two sections (23 and 25) that can assists us in a deeper reflection on what we understand nowadays as "work" and "profession". Regarding the later, some people believe that the father should work less, so the mother can freely pursue a professional career outside the home (ICWF-Barcelona or CIMAD-Mexico). According to this view, at the end of the day, both fathers and mothers should take care of the household chores and the education of children with a 50-50 distribution, not without external support of other individuals or civil institutions. To my understanding this position needs revision (and alternatives), but my intention here is to provide a simple reflection that could bring new lights to this relevant discussion, drawn from my developing academic research, and most importantly from my personal experience as a husband and father of four children (born in four different cities, in 3 different continents). More specifically I intent to reflect on the following key questions: what is work? What is professional work? Can the work of a father and a mother in their home be considered true "professional work"?

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[3]   *Íbid.*

[4]   *Íbid.*

2. Understanding work and profession

Work has traditionally been acknowledged as an activity that implies *effort* (sometimes painful) and usually done with the "bare hands". This basic definition is expanding today as there are many ways we can work with our "bare hands" without putting in much physical effort. By examining the Latin roots of our modern term "work" we can gain some insight into its true meaning. The main characteristic of work, or *neg-otium*, remains as something different than leisure and contemplation–*otium*[5]. The distinction between *negotium* and *otium* illustrates the difference between: 1) the process of realizing or fulfilling a particular task (work) and 2) the glorious fulfilment of possessing its end (leisure or contemplation). Work, therefore, can be understood as *the progressive realization of something that is not yet done*, and that will eventually be realized so that the worker finds *ecstasy* in the "contemplation" of a work well done, whether interior of exterior, intellectual or physical[6].

Every time the acting person finds himself in the middle of an activity that "has to be done", he or she is still on the way to accomplishing the pursued goal or end. On the contrary, whenever we find ourselves in "contemplation", happy to have completed the job, it means that we have finally reached our pursued goal. Saint Josemaría Escrivá maintained in his teachings that we can even set up a virtuous dialogue between a work to be done and its reward in contemplation up to the point of working without knowing *when one or the other begins, or ends*[7]. This means that we can work well and expect (or predict) the reward that is coming in contemplation and happiness. Why? Because they are both related to the Divine Love who has entrusted us with such specific tasks, goals or objectives that are good for us, and to be in dialogue with this Divine Love is enriched by the effort that we put into our work that is in progress.

So, the notion of work understood as *movement* or *motion* that pursues a concrete goal opens the way to discuss an equally important matter: *its relationship with personal growth*. Work and the development of our personality are deeply intertwined, because a person's internal-spiritual development can be considered a true work according to what we just explored. What we can call "interior work" is the most fundamental work that a person can perform and, to some extent, the most essential one to be accomplished in life because: 1) it is a

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[5] M. P. Chirinos, *Claves para una antropología del trabajo*, Eunsa, Pamplona, 2006.

[6] M. Santamaría, "Hoc Genus Humanum: Amor Fit Labor, Homo Fit Christus, Mundus Fit Ecclesia", Trigo (Ed.), *Dar razón de la esperanza. Homenaje al Prof. José Luis Illanes,* Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona, 2004, 1011-1030

[7] San Josemaría 2002.

process to be done, and 2) it absolutely depends on *free-will*[8]. "Interior work" (what a person accomplishes within himself), like any other "exterior work" (what a person accomplishes in the external world), is also the outcome of a person's individual initiative. For that reason, we can also affirm that a true work *is a process that has to be done by someone*: by a man or a woman. It is something that is there, waiting to be done by a person's free act. It is not "naturally" accomplished, or ruled by the mere forces of nature, where everything functions according to a set of immovable laws. Human work is something that has to be done and is presented to the doer as a chore, an occupation, a task or a job that awaits a definitive free-answer of the possible doer.

Nevertheless, to answer "yes" interiorly, meaning to freely accept a work that has been given, has a *threefold dimension* that can be drawn from a simple analysis of what the basic responsibilities of the human person are: 1) to develop our personality; 2) to give back what has been received; and 3) to be ready to participate in building of the world for other human beings[9]. We can deduce from our first analysis of what work is that these three dimensions have something in common: each one of them can be accomplished through *work*. How can we justify those three dimensions of human existence? The human person comes to life with a certain level of *inconclusiveness*. This is a fact that can be confirmed in every-day experience, not just with human beings but also in the world around us. Freedom makes sense in front of a world that holds a certain degree or level of "plasticity", an internal inconclusiveness that is also shared by human beings: a "space" that allows us to grow up, to be brought up. We find ourselves immature in front of an equally "immature world". Human persons are not brought up or educated automatically. It is only through the progressive realization of acts that involve our freedom (virtue) supervised by the people we trust and care for, that the human person becomes truly "human". To grow in the physical, intellectual and moral realms constitutes our first formal work that takes place mostly inside us at the first stages of our personal history.

At the same time, we are members of a particular species that hold a particular genetic code; living in a concrete era; we are loved and embraced by a particular culture through the goodwill of our parents, our friends and our community. Furthermore, we came into existence through the love of our mother and our father, cared and nurtured by our relatives and friends. We are *children of other children*, and after reaching a certain level of maturity we are entrusted with the task of giving the same gift (life) that has been given to us. To be a person, man or woman, radically implies to be a "son" (as Leonardo Polo would have agreed) and a "potential parent" at the same time. To reach maturity im-

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[8]   Santamaría, *op. cit.*

[9]   *Íbid.*

plies being ready to care for the growth and education of others, not just in the natural sense but also in a spiritual dimension. It is true that we come to life through the love of our parents, but at the same time we are born into the intellectual and spiritual life through our teachers, mentors and priests.

And finally, because we are also called into existence in a world that holds a degree of indefiniteness –as mentioned before–, we enter this world recognizing a certain responsibility to build it up as the world of men and women, as the cradle for the Children of God, like our own existence, by means of our own free-will, that is: *through our work*. To civilize the world, in simple terms, means to participate in building the global "cradle" or "home" for our children. This basic task, realized over the centuries, requires the development of a *Polis*, *a* society, full of strong relations between individuals and institutions; full of homes and families, with great protagonists in the economy, law, politics, ethics and religion, which can become a place for "civilizing" the future gnerations[10]. In that sense, being involved in building the world can be considered true work, because it implies the progressive realization of a task or a job that "awaits" to be done. Still, there is something else about working on "building the world" that calls our attention. There is an extra character imprinted in this kind of work that claims a certain level of *mastery* and *commitment*. We are talking about a *profession* (from *profess*, 'declared publicly'), understood as the way human beings contribute to build and enhance society in a technical way. In that sense, the criteria that distinguish a professional work from non-professional work are: 1) a character of service, and 2) its connection to the social sphere, both of them as direct result of reaching personal and social maturity[11]. A professional work, then, is a service that is publicly declared that benefits society for which the worker receives compensation (due to its import to society), becoming the promise of a "good service" and a "good product", so common and heard of in our days, by which the individual earns a "compensation", a "wage", or a "salary" for a job well done.

We can see there are some professions that can be considered *essential* from a "technical" point of view. That is to say, that without them, no other professional work makes real sense in building the social sphere. If a true professional work is defined by its intrinsic character of service, mastery and commitment to participate in building the world for human beings, we can point out some basic professional works that can be seen as the most essential and of immense social importance: 1) to give birth to children and nurture them; 2) to educate them to return what has been given to them; 3) to encourage them to work in the con-

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[10] R. Alvira, *Intento de clasificar la pluralidad de subsistemas sociales, con especial atención al derecho*, Persona y Derecho, 33, 1995, 41-51.

[11] Santamaría, *op. cit.*

struction of the world. A society that holds its culture in high esteem and understands it fully would keep and safeguard the supremacy of these "professional works" that are basically accomplished within the family by mothers and fathers in the home.

3. Work of the home. The first profession

Learning to work and to love in the home requires technical skills to be acquired in order to reach perfection. But those skills are not innate: we have to learn them from "experts". Certainly, parent's true contribution to society's wellbeing can be described as upbringing "healthy" children in the physical, psychological and spiritual realms. But still, it wouldn't be reasonable to say that mothers and fathers are self-sufficient or completely independent in performing this (professional) work. They need help and support from other members of their community in order to fulfil this task the best possible way: they need siblings, extended family, friends, neighbours, schools and Churches that collaborate with them in the education of their children.

Saint Josemaría Escrivá used to say that *children are indeed the first and most important business for parents*. What this phrase suggests is that the upbringing of children (mainly accomplished in the home) can be called *mankind's ultimate "profession"* because it is precisely through the upbringing of children that society is nurtured and perpetuated. I believe there was a time when perhaps that statement was addressed only to husbands and fathers. Today, however, it seems that it is acquiring a very strong meaning for wives and mothers as well. Mother's, in particular, need to remember the importance of their involvement in the work of the home. This will be facilitated by the example of father's who show how much they value the work of their wives in the home by being part of it again. Only then society will begin to recognize it as a true "professional" work. My perception of the matter is that, in order for society to move on from today's misconception of parenthood, it is essential that husband's recognize the vital importance of the mother in the home as well as their own. Otherwise, it will not be possible for mothers to accept it either, as *Familiaris consortio* has stated: "This requires that men should truly esteem and love women with total respect for their personal dignity, and that society should create and develop conditions favoring work in the home"[12].

The family (the home) is the place where we all come back to, as Professor Rafael Alvira has stated over the past decades in many occasions[13], and the vin-

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[12]   John Paul II, *op. cit.*

[13]   R. Alvira, *El lugar al que se vuelve. Reflexiones sobre la familia*, Eunsa, Pamplona, 2000.

dication of the "professional character" of the work that a mother and a father do at home to educate their children –the future generations of any society– is most needed today. Caring for a home and a family is, without a doubt, the most important professional work a person can perform to build the "global cradle" for the Children of God, where women especially have been entrusted with a very special "charisma", as G. K. Chesterton would have agreed[14]. Certainly the richness of being a human person, man and woman, allows fathers and mothers to be subjects of a broad and plural set of "professions" in the social sphere. But still, the most basic and necessary one is primarily accomplished in the *home*, where the human person can experience, in a pure and natural way, all there is to know that makes life worth living.

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[14]   G. K. Chesterton, *La mujer y la familia*, Ed. J. R. Ayllón. Styria, Barcelona, 2006.

BUSINESS IN SEARCH OF INNOVATION AND BUSINESS VENTURE

Silvia Carolina Martino

ABSTRACT: Good management of organizations is to achieve innovative companies, capable of changing, in a constant search for new ways to grow, endure and be ethically and responsibly sustainable. It has been shown that "the key is to centralize people", but later they are instrumentalised: they become one more group. Why do we treat them as one more resource if we understand them to be persons that are working under our charge? There are authors who shade some light on this and challenge us as Teachers of Higher Education in Economic Sciences. In this case, I shall explain the approach used and contribution made by Spanish Philosopher and author of the recent edition, Filosofia y Economia (Philosophy and Economics), Leonardo Polo. One of his suggestions is based on looking for innovation and entrepreneurial capacity from the only ones capable of giving them: the people in the business. Mega-dysfunctions of our societies, important levels of labour frustration, stress, etc. are not due to technical advances or to the development of experimental sciences, but because no one is sufficiently bold enough in the human, personal, transcendental or ethical sense, nor responsible. We might be technical and model experts but we do not know those who make the difference: the people. My objective is to explain that formation in Anthropology – as presented by the cited author – in Business Faculties is decisive for a real change that allows for the forging of ethical and responsible future managers. The actions of Managers have to stimulate innovation as a distinctive feature of an ethical and responsible leader. This requires a universal formation that raises disciplinary terms and all work to its truly human dimension.

T he title that concerns us is fascinating and helps us to realise just how current it is.

In fact, we are at a moment in which people do not usually find that organizations are an environment for growth. It is a moment of crisis (this term could give rise to rich conversation, but to briefly summarize the issue). I would like to say that I understand that we have neither an economic nor a productive crisis before us. Rather, it is a moral crisis of sense, of the person and to reverse a crisis of persons and of sense requires a long term study that has to do with innovation, to bring out "novelty from within"[1]. It is necessary to come out of the entropy in which culture finds itself, making it "new", personal, free.

Today is a good time to be innovative; it is of no convenience to go backwards. Modern crisis is an opportunity. It is possible to bring life from the death. That is why reflection, study, planting, conversing, listening to professors of such intellectual and personal category, from diverse places who question, and search for ways to achieve development and growth of the person in Organizations is not simply one more topic. Whether person grow or they are debased affects society itself. Human and social development is harmonic and systematic growth in virtues.

Now…What does one say to businesses that would like to develop their businesses, wish them to grow, or are searching to innovate? How does one make them understand that their expectations have a profound relation with what they think are persons who work in their organizations?

As businessmen, professor of Management in universities and at Business Schools, we tend to seek to understand how to undertake an organization from a perspective in which innovation and enterprise achieve a competitive advantage in companies.

In the last few years, models of management of "vanguards" have been suggested and so we hear talk about

1. Total Quality Management (TQM)[2]… and the question is: How to achieve that employees have a real, personal attitude of change and continuous betterment?

2. Learning continuous[3]-reenginering-Business Process Management o BPM: What motivates employees to have these attitudes and how can the

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[1]   L. Polo, *Antropología Trascendental* II, Eunsa, Pamplona, 2010, 18

[2]   W. Edwards Deming, *The New Economics for Industry, Government, and Education,* MIT Press, Boston, 1993.

company be sustained over time? Does one reinvent? Is it from where or …from whom?

3. Knowledge Management (KM)[4]: What factors, what knowledge, make adaptability to changes made in context, are confronted from an integral vision and mutual trust thereby generating internal stability? How to achieve that person are really prioritized in their integrity and not only their "knowledge" as if they were simply resources who generate internal loyalty?

4. Innovation management and leadership. How to understand where innovation is and unrestricted growth to value and empower it. How to distinguish between input from sophisticated technological Big Data or the Supply Chain from the contribution made by those working on these novelties?

Great emphasis is placed on how to streamline organizations, how to understand that they grow, and how we have to foster an environment that favors a positive attitude in persons. How do we retain talented people??? (rivers of ink and fortune that revolve around the world). Finally, they are all various strategies of items that are implemented.

At times we catch a glimpse of supposed key issues and that the important thing is the person. However, later we observe how they are instrumentalised and are regarded as one more clog in the wheel (we could remember the tittle of book: "Men and clogs"[5]). If they are managed according to what we understand persons under our charge to be, then what do we understand them to be if we regard them to be just one more resource?

Leonardo Polo, philosopher and humanist, has been published a book with fourteen works on businesses issues, "Philosophy and Economics"[6] and Management. They are courses that he taught in different business schools and have been published together. Polo highlights and develops 10 topics of capital importance[7]. He directs and challenges us as managers, persons with the role of directing or consultation, trainers of future businessmen (table below).

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[3] P. Senge, *La Quinta Disciplina. España*, Ed. Granica, 1992. G. Hamel, C.K. Prahalad, *Compitiendo por el futuro*, Ariel, Barcelona, 1998.

[4] I. Nonaka, y H. Takeuchi, *The Knowledge-Creating Company*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995.

[5] E. Sábato, *Hombres y engranajes. Heterodoxia*, Alianza, Buenos Aires, 2004.

[6] L. Polo, *Filosofía y Economía*, *Obras Completas*, Serie A, volumen XXV, Eunsa, Pamplona, 2015.

[7] Cfr. J.F. Sellés, cap. 10: "Persona y Empresa, la tarea del Directivo" en *Los tres agentes del Cambio en la Sociedad Civil: Familia, Universidad y Empresa*, Ediciones Internacionales Universitarias, Madrid, 2013.

In this paper I shall focus on two points posed and explained by Polo that, precisely, the company has got to be innovative, embark on new paths and ways of growth. Person and innovation. However, his suggestion is rooted in the fact that this innovation and business ability have to be found in the only ones who know how to provide them. These are the persons in the company and that is why *it is important to know them*.

It is interesting to know that the mega-dysfunctions of our societies, the important levels of work stress, etc. are not due to the development of experimental sciences nor technical advancement. Rather, neither one nor the other is imbued by sufficient human sense, or personal nor transcendental sense[8].

In the daily running of things, we usually find it complicated to link our organization and business bearing to the integrity of that which is humane. This is particularly so when it comes to ethics, a discipline capable of linking in an orderly manner diverse human manifestations, more so when it comes to personal intimacy.

We manage technology, models, statistics, micro and macroeconomics, accounts, information and control systems, etc. but know nothing about those who make a difference in our organization, the person.

It is said that they are the most relevant capital, and yet later this is not clearly seen in their works and decisions made. What he proposes is deep, consistent, new and transgressive for the actual state for the so called business, economy, etc. What must a manager keep in mind and who should be trained to carry out their functions? If we do not know who it is that make the difference, without doubt, such training is decisive regarding change. The way in which I understand who persons are, is the way in which I will lead them and I may or not find this innovative and business ability that is proper of the person.

First the person

What happens to the Person? Polo propounds that the persons come first and that is through understanding them and their intimacy: their personal freedom, personal know-how, their co-existence and their personal Love[9], that understanding this could shade light on all the human manifestations.

What tends to happen is that those manage companies know neither the practical aspects nor the theoretical aspects of the person. Theoretical knowledge is

8   L. Polo, *El profesor universitario*, Universidad de La Sabana, Bogotá, 1997.

9   L. Polo, *La esencia del hombre*, *Obras Completas*, Serie A, Volumen XXIII, Eunsa, Pamplona, 2015, 172.

superior to practical knowledge[10] as it widens ones view as well as broadens understanding, both of which are necessary. Knowledge of the reality of the person is not simple, neither should it be taken for granted. We might know person in daily life, how to deal with them, their experiences. Each one of them is distinct, unique and unrepeatable. If one does not *know-how* personal human intimacy is formed, it is difficult to admonish in practice the diverse dimensions of each one of them[11]. In the best of cases, one would remain simply with impressions.

Learning about the theoretical reality of the person is to learn about being. It is important to learn about man, the person and his most intimate being, etc. This is the reason for which it is vividly advised to include Anthropology as basic subject matter in Economy and Business faculties and in the Master courses on Business Policy and Human Resource Management b. Personalist learning, practice, which consists of knowing each one. This is undoubtedly a difficult task but it will make the so searched for difference. It is important to know each persons and their way of being: the same as a good technical manager and in this way the team can truly be a team. Each one, "puts his/her personal seal"[12], and between them all the company is made. Management should therefore "(…) know its men, because, if not, the enterprise ends up failing"[13].

The human being is the most radical thing in a business precisely because it is they who "add"[14] , their *contribution*. Polo explained that "Person is added to himself"[15]. He is not a static being as they have an unrestricted capacity to become better[16]. Their superior faculties: *intellect* and *will*, enable the development of their practical activities.

Growth in intellectual habits and virtues of the will may be limitless. S/he is an open being and human growth is essential. Man may grow in potential be-

[10] Aristóteles, *Ética a Nicómano*, X, cap. 7 (BK 1178 a 6-7). "The theory is the highest form of life".

[11] Cfr. J.F. Sellés, *Los tres agentes*, 175.

[12] L. Polo, *Filosofía y Economía*, 402.

[13] L. Polo, *Antropología de la acción Directiva*, Aedos, Madrid, 1997, 114.

[14] L. Polo, *La esencia del hombre*, *Obras Completas*, Serie A, Vol. XXIII, Eunsa, Pamplona, 2015, 157-158.

[15] L. Polo, *Antropología Trascendental* II, 85.

[16] L. Polo, *Filosofía y Economía*, 442.

cause as a *person* he is a growing being, an unfinished project[17]. And Polo explains that the persons are innovation[18].

What is mainly relevant here is that management, because they are persons, (…) act (direct, lead, decide) as persons in companies – community of persons-. What, therefore, does a manager need to know?

1. Know who he is and who the others are as distinct persons, progressively know the sense of being of each one.

2. Know how human *nature* is common to all men, and how to draw from it for his own perfection. This requires of the director to have "a strong dose of humanism"[19].

Innovation and entrepreneurship

What about innovation and entrepreneurship? What links the person, innovation and entrepreneurship?

"To be enterprising is the only thing that a man can truly do in this world. One cannot be enterprising without being an entrepreneur"[20]. To be an entrepreneur means to be enterprising. As has been explained, man is not limited by nature, he is above it and he enjoys radical freedom.

Person is enterprising by nature because he is a *future project* [21]. Polo is an optimist and a realist and urges: "launch out to life, contribute, play your part, don't fall short. To act is a question of starting"[22]. This is the great start that advocates, "want, do"[23] . "Do all you can and better the situation"[24].

Only once it is known who the person is and that it is this person who works in my organization, can changes be effectively suggested.

This is linked with knowledge of moral principles because it is this knowledge that leads, confirms that man must have initiative not as something added but as an extension of personal freedom, intimacy: pursuing the good, finishing what one starts, not falling back, not omitting it, not giving in to lazi-

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[17] L. Polo, *Antropología Trascendental I: La persona humana*, Eunsa, Pamplona, 2003, 137.

[18] L. Polo, *Persona y Libertad*, Eunsa, Pamplona, 2007, 167.

[19] L. Polo, *Antropología Trascendental I*, 159.

[20] L. Polo, *Filosofía y Economía*, 397.

[21] L. Polo, *Quien es el Hombre, un espíritu en el tiempo*, Rialp, Madrid, 1991, 115.

[22] L. Polo, *Ética, hacia una versión moderna de los temas clásicos*, Aedos, Madrid, 1997, 161.

[23] Ibid., 161.

[24] Ibid., 160.

ness. "Man in an eminently active being because he is a being called to unrestricted growth"[25]; he is innovative and creative as act of being.

Why is innovation proper of human beings? Because he is an acting being, modifier of processes[26]. For this reason, this action has an ethical dimension which is responsibility. He is responsible to the extent to which he is the author of his acts, of new futures: new acts that resolve problems. That are enterprising. He is responsible for the acts carried out as well as those that he ought to have carried out and those omitted[27].

"*Efficient intervention with innovation is the first Moral Principle*"[28]. To be ethical is to intervene as long as one is competent. This implies a responsibility to be prepared. To disregard this would not be ethical. Ethics is directly related to action, it drives us not to fall into fatalism. It enlivens, (as opposed to how others tend to see it), it forcefully stimulates, "do good and to not tire of doing it. (…) Do good and don't deny it, act"[29]. This perspective is interesting as from the point of view of innovation and venture, we are raising ethical issues. Polo raises the issue that actions are not only ethical but also transcendentally free.

 Action that comes after an act that is, gives rise to an ethics that originates from within the person. An integral ethics of virtues, norms and good, to more, and more greater good, and more life, etc.

When man acts, he is a continuous inventor. Even if it seems like he carries out the same actions, each one is different from the others. There is an impulse that sets them off, factors that convert it into action that contributes, that assigns resources. Actions have aims and make both the person and those around him in the organization in which he acts, to grow or not to grow. The same holds for the organization and society. Society improves because its agents improve.

To conclude, "Active attitude, entrepreneur, innovator is what corresponds to the person and that is why he leaves his personal imprint on events"[30]. Person is "a perfectible perfectionist, who is not immune to his own actions"[31], neither are those who surround him. Let us say, man, through his actions, can become better unconditionally. That is how he can either lead to growth in the organiza-

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[25]   L. Polo, *La esencia del hombre*, 135.

[26]   Cfr. L. Polo, *Filosofía y Economía*, 402.

[27]   Cfr. L. Polo, *Ética, una versión moderna de los temas clásicos*, 157-158.

[28]   L. Polo, *Ética, una versión moderna de los temas clásicos*, 171.

[29]   Ibid. 137 y 151-152.

[30]   L. Polo, *Filosofía y Economía*, 402.

[31]   L. Polo, *Antropología Trascendental I*, 14 y en *Ética, una versión moderna de los temas clásicos*, 181.

tion or he may degrade, dehumanize or depersonalize himself. This is the reason that leads us to propose that the managers of businesses who search from among the people, in each one, this innovation and entrepreneurship, that this is probably where the key is, the new course, the solution to our search.

This demands formation of entrepreneurs, future businessmen, Business faculties and institutions, and of each one of us. It is a matter that implies formation: time, quality and constancy, vision and intelligence. As mentioned earlier, Polo suggests 10 topics about companies and business organisations. We have commented on the person and on innovation and entreprenuership. When these manifestations go together, are described and hierarchically organized, they highlight the inferior ones, give them sense which at the same time become coherent and in that way serve the superior ones.

Because it is an Anthropological approach that Polo offers us a personal action theory[32].

For example, we can link with the models of vanguards and say: Experts in reengineering and emotional intelligence, might they also be experts in resocialization, reinclution, reconstruction of social networks, reinvention of jobs, human resources, and personeel encounters?

Or… Playing around with words that link management theories: Through their personnel, companies are able to find innovative solutions to reinvent our countries and our world through personal and human quality.

Human organisations are managed for persons, by persons and as persons.

Each person discovers and freely grows in personal intimacy ways in which to constitutively open up to others and to God. Knowledge of the personal act of being brings knowledge of human essence which in turn gives rise to integral ethics: virtues and norms and the good.

As a colophon, I would like to present a table that in Leonardo Polo's book, there are ten central points (or more) that I would like to emphasize as relevant for reconsideration by university Business and Management Schools and institutions.

Ten central points offered by Leonardo Polo

1st. *Be conscious that one is in charge of persons*. Each person has and maintains personal affinities that are not *common to the human race*. Rather, each one is distinct, novel, unique and distinct. There is knowledge of that which is

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[32]   L. Polo, *Presente y futuro del hombre*, Rialp, Madrid, 1993, 149-203.

common to all and that which is *personal*. THE PERSON is INNOVATION, NOV-EL/new.

2ⁿᵈ. The person as a perfectible perfectionist is by essence ENTREPRENEURAL, solver of problems, etc.

3ʳᵈ. *The team that aims to form*, is the *collaborators* who accompany me in the search for my company's vision and mission. Solitary government is sure death.

4ᵗʰ. The search for competent managers is a matter that implies formation: time, quality and constancy: vision and intelligence.

5ᵗʰ. *Formation* of company members has various dimensions: sensible intellectual habits, virtuous and practical know-how.

6ᵗʰ. There is true *development* if each member manages to grow in *virtue*, more so in: responsibility, prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance and truthfulness. The crown of all these is friendship.

7ᵗʰ. *Laying down achievable objectives*: 'great ideals over a long period'. Man is a future object and so too is the business.

8ᵗʰ. Ensure that *governing acts* are managed appropriately: the aim, motive, carrying out and knowledge.

9ᵗʰ. Consider *money as potential work*.

10ᵗʰ. Service of the *common good* would consist of human betterment of those in the company, their internal responsibility and the responsibility of the company in society.

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INSPIRING THE "SENSE OF VOCATION" IN FUTURE BUSINESS LEADERS THROUGH CHARACTER EDUCATION

Claudio Andres Rivera[1]

ABSTRACT: For more than 100 years, business leaders have been traditionally educated in business schools, which generally have influenced decisively the what, how and why of their profession. The latest financial crises and corporate scandals, particularly the 2008 crisis, have promoted a revision of the role, approach and curricula of business school programs. Major initiatives have been launched all across the globe as, for example, the United Nation PRME program. They have encouraged the incorporation of more ethical values in the management and teaching activities of business schools.

However, most of these initiatives have been limited simply to the incorporation of new tools and reporting activities. Though these new tools are helping students and professors to look at business "beyond the financial bottom-line", they have so far failed to help students and professors to understand the deeper ethical meaning of the business world. In this sense, one the limiting paradigms is the one that considers "business school" simply a professional school with a prioritization of the teaching of "useful content". This paradigm prevents the incorporation of content and approaches, which could help students to understand better the ethical and anthropological roots of their profession.

I will elaborate on these issues in the paper and will propose the promotion of the concept of "character education" as a suitable vehicle for the general re-introduction of ethical and anthropological content in business schools. The author argues that this strategy could support the inspiration of the "sense of vocation" between business schools students and could help anthropology be seen as "more relevant" for business schools.

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[1] Research Assistants: *Oscar Pau Vinaixa and Guillermo Mislata Correa (University of Navarre)*.

Introduction: Role of business schools and the formation of leaders

In a society powered by its economy and a mechanistic vision of the human being, it is more needed than ever that business schools - the "crib" of managers, entrepreneurs and business leaders – take the responsibility for educating leaders who display a broad and deep view of the person and the society, who understand the meaning of the economy, and who are motivated not only for their own interest, in other words, exclusively for their profit. In other words, we need that business schools educate leaders with a deep sense of the meaning of their profession. It means that they see their business profession as a calling, a vocation.

If the mentors of the business schools forget the essential and focus mainly on the "superficial," this attitude will hinder the long-term perspective so needed for exercising business responsibly. Missing the long-term will leave a void in the value-systems of individuals and negatively impact their character. A person's character is built of habits which require a set of intellectual convictions or values. If business schools focus on the short term, the expected holistic education of the reality of business will become narrowed to utilitarianism. In this way, business schools might easily become simply the "channels of communication" towards "generally accepted ideas" –a place where faculty delivers "acceptable ideas", not where information becomes knowledge–.

To educate future leaders, business schools need to personalize their education as, in order to work in their values and deepest assumptions, they need to make an effort to understand each individual; the personal reality of each student. In this way schools can become more efficient in appealing directly to each individual and leave their mere divulgate function in order to become more knowledge enhancers.

Learning impacts the appreciation students have of themselves. This makes the work of business school educators harder. Education is about truth and truth often means giving up on things and perspectives, which are stable in the mindset of the students. Hence, if the student wants to learn, he needs to have the willingness to recognize his own needs and failures.

The business schools face many challenges regarding of programs: identity, faculty, environment and the variety of demands from the different stakeholders. But the most significant challenge is to "awake" an authentic willingness to learn among the students.

In my experience, on one hand most students come to business schools to upgrade their technical knowledge and further build their network. On the other, and sometimes primarily, they come to business school to understand or find a vision and mission for their future career. Managers see a difference between

who they are and who they think they should be. Their implicit or explicit objective in business school is many times to close this gap. Closing this gap implies a big investment in self-awareness, which schools many times don't have the capacity to undertake.

If business schools don't take their role in the formation process of business leaders seriously, and they just focus themselves in the distribution of generally accepted ideas, they run the risk of losing the trust of their communities and their leaders. That happens already, unfortunately. And there is certain reason for this claim. Many consider that business schools don't manage to send the right message or they don't send it in the right way.

The role of a business school is nothing less that giving to men the possibility of reach their full potential meanwhile they exercise an administrative function. Hence, schools should first deliver a deep vision of human problems and then teach management skills. You cannot sail a boat without expertise with the scoreboard. In the same sense, you cannot guide people without knowing who the human being is. If we train people with the wrong assumptions, then we won't help them in leading organizations.

Business organizations are integrated by people, therefore it's very difficult to control them and their destiny. Once we understand people, we learn that they won't always take the most logical and linear path. Hence, business schools should leave behind not such real theories, and teach future leaders instead what human nature is and the meaning of business activity.

The concept of human being in business schools

Business schools play a fundamental role in creating the concept of "business" that leaders have. This concept ends up as a determining factor of the behavior which is considered adequate for the development of business activity. This influence of business schools in the business world is not at all identical everywhere. Organizations themselves, of course, influence the understanding of the reality of business. However, business schools are the key players to foster values and ideas that enhance adequate behaviors in the people who might become leaders and executives.

The recent economic crises have stressed the concern regarding the role that businesses play inside their communities.[2] Their activity, besides the fact of

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[2]   M. O'Connell, L. Sweeney, "An action plan for implementing the principles for responsible management education in College of Business progamme learning outcomes", *DIT Teaching Fellowship Reports*, 2014-2015, 2015.

being exclusively private, has an enormous impact on the whole of the society. Businesses are not only places of creation of employment and offers of services, they have become the principal agent for the management of the world's resources, both natural and human. Therefore, any change in the way business schools approach education will not just impact business organizations but also all the stakeholders. At least in the short term, the bankruptcy of a business creates a much bigger effect than a wrong political decision.

All family and politics will depend to a large extent on how organizations run their internal life. This is a call to no longer miss the social character of any business organization. The social character of the firm cannot be avoided anymore. Recent financial crises exposed the consequences of companies, whose aims are not directed towards the common good. An irresponsible management style produces prejudice not only to the firm itself but also to many other stakeholders.[3] These visible consequences triggered a more fluid discussion on the significance of responsible management.

Business schools have been embedded with the predominant ideologies of the last century: individualism and utilitarianism – both are at the end two sides of the same coin.[4] Given that profit has been always positioned as the fundamental and primary goal of any firm, all other objectives have been subjected to that. Maximizing shareholder value has been always considered the single most important evaluation criteria for managers. All this clearly states that other initially fundamental duties such as the quality of service provided to the community and the development of the workforce have never been top criteria for measuring success in business. In this way, the human capital became a mean for the maximization of profits as any other resource. It's apparent that such an approach can generate serious problems. When there is no connection between the well-being of the person, of the community and of the business, the conflict of interest will just naturally emanate.

Obvious challenges arise: should business benefit fit shareholders or society? What is the goal of profit? Is it not clear that profit is purely an instrumental reality rather than an honorable aim serving a larger goal? How should those involved in business activities benefit from them in terms of personal development? Individualism, the loss of the notion of person and common good, ends up making human relations just a means for achieving material ends rather than personal growth.

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[3]   A. J. G. Sison, J. Fontrodona, "The Common Good of the Firm in the Aristotelian-Thomistic Tradition", *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 22 (2012), 211-246.

[4]   D. Melé, "Antecedents and current situation of humanistic management", *African Journal of Business Ethics*, 7/2 (2013), 10-19.

There are, though, trends towards the fostering of a more human vision of business. This "more human side" is justified mainly from a utilitarian perspective: if we want sustainable growth, we need quality in human relationships. The idea of "the firm" as a mean towards more fundamental objectives is shared neither in practice nor in theory. Many of the failures of the business community are connected with this misunderstanding of the role of business. We can observe even problems in social development as poverty and different forms of slavery.[5]

Besides utilitarianism, an individualistic vision of man prevails. Individualism stresses the satisfaction of the individual's own needs above the ones of the community. The community is "attached" to man and social relations are considered instrumental for achieving exclusively individual goals. The community becomes a "distribution system" of individual goods, and human relations are subjected to a system that excludes through individual possession. Holding something implies that someone else is excluded of it. Departing from here, citizens consider that their own achievement of a certain good implies others' exclusion of this good. The ideal of "shared value" is deemed as unviable. This deep split of goods is at the end the understanding of the social phenomenon as a result of a contract where the individual interest is the foundation stone. With all above said, it's clear that in this concept of business, other individuals are mainly instrument for the achievement of my own good.[6]

If we look at the reality of the firm, it all implies to decontextualize the business reality, narrowing it down to the production of profit just for profit. If there is not common good, there is no reason to subordinate one's own interest for the sake of others' interest. Why should I care about social well-being if it doesn't add to my financial wealth? The business or the individual will do what produces a benefit and only that.

Given these philosophical principles – utilitarianism and individualism – there is not room for doing things beyond our own interests. Given that we understand man as individual, other or others don't have relevance in the development and fulfillment of human nature. Only in understanding the human being as a person, and then as a relational being, does the quality of the human relations appear as an opportunity for growth and plenitude of human nature.

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[5]   *Íbid.*

[6]   A. J. G. Sison, J. Fontrodona. "The Common Good of Business: Addressing a Challenge Posed by «Caritas in Veritate»", *Journal of Business Ethics*, 100/1 (2011), 99-107.

An anthropological proposal

If our main objective is to shape an anthropological foundation of business, we should start from the most basic of the anthropological principles: *man is a person and, therefore, the author, center, and end of all social and economic life*.[7] Hence, we cannot speak about the anthropological foundation of business, without discussing first its main source: the person. For example, if we say that the businessman is the one who mobilizes the business world, "businessman" will firstly have a human meaning follow by a professional one. As a consequence, due to the fact that we talk about the "businessman" first as a person and then as a business-person, the ethical meaning of his work will have a renewed significance.

Man has plurality of dimensions. This plurality doesn't mean dualism but rather duality as these dimensions are different realities in terms of relevance but they don't oppose each other. Moreover, these realities need each other. [8]

Business activity is in itself a human dimension, a human dimension that complements itself with others. This dimension has a certain position in relationship to other dimensions and it needs others in order to gain understanding of its significance. It's clear then that an "homo economicus" vision of the human being –an underlying assumption in business education– where everything in man is directed towards the maximization of business profit is at least primitive as it forgets the vision of man as composed of a plurality of dimensions.

The most radical human dimension and the basis of all others is the distinction between *being and essence*. The act of being is the very same human person, his personal intimacy. The essence is composed of reason and will. The act of being is superior to the essence as we are capable of perfecting reason and will. Man is more than his reason and will. This distinction proves that it makes sense of the existence of order between different human dimensions. Understanding Leonardo Polo's dimension of the act of being will clarify the significance of the business dimension of man.

The act of being is conformed by four transcendentals: personal love, personal knowledge, personal freedom and personal coexistence. These are not things that the human being has in terms of possession, they are rather aspects of who the man is.

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[7]   Benedicto XVI, *Caritas in Veritate*, from: http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedictxvi/es/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate.html

[8]   J. F. Sellés, *Los tres agentes del cambio en la Sociedad civil*, Tribuna siglo XXI, Madrid 2013.

The first transcendental is personal love. This the first and the one, which describes the best the human person. All other trascendentals are subordinated to this one. We are not talking about a potency, we are talking about an act, the act of love, the love that overflows and whose most authentic manifestation is "to give" and to give something that is superior to everything else. [9]

Human love is constituted of accepting, giving, and gift. It's all about accepting/giving man as man in order to exercise any of the other human dimensions. Hence, we cannot accept/give the human dimension of business without first accepting man as a person. Furthermore, man cannot give if he is not welcomed first and if he doesn't accept to be welcomed first. Man can only give as long as he accepts to be welcomed. Lastly, we have "the gift", man can only offer gifts as long as he gives first himself to others. The gift is just a thing and therefore the last dimension of the transcendental of love.

The second transcendental is personal knowledge and it implies basically the awareness of our own personal meaning. There cannot be personal acceptance if there is not first personal knowledge. There cannot be acceptance by others if we are not first accepted by ourselves. We don't give to others what we don't know or we don't accept first. Without self-giving, gifts become scarce and therefore the natural order of man gets broken. Personal love falls short as it cannot plainly do what is proper of itself; that is "to give".[10]

The third trascendental is human freedom. This is the basis of ethics, as without freedom there would not be choice and without choice there would not be room to choose behavior. We would end up in determinism and the consequent negation of ethics. Furthermore, without capacity of choice there would not be human work as it would imply the denial of choosing a personal way of production of wealth. Without human work there would not be a business world.

The last trascendental is personal coexistence. This implies the opening of each human person to his own intimacy. This implies that every person is potentially open to his own intimacy, to his deepest meaning and being. However, no one can be alone; not even in his deepest intimacy. We need others to be. Analogically, an isolated person is not the unit of the business world, but rather the person who coexists with others, therefore an organization.

After outlining the four transcendentals, we can position business activity as a natural reality in each man. A man is in his very roots a being who acts *in* business - not a being who acts *for* business. As man is a being who gives, he

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[9]   *Ibid.*

[10]   *Ibid.*

has the capacity to offer gifts. If work would not exist, there would not be business world and without business world man could not continue "giving", as work means essentially "to give". Man gives because he is capable of more, he is not satisfy just receiving.

Summarizing and simplifying, managers should understand the human trascendentals as the business world is conformed by persons, who are essentially lovers, aware of themselves, free and need to coexist with others. Without understanding man, managers cannot develop their organizations fully.[11] The business-person should start understanding who is firstly himself and who are "the others". In a way, he needs to progressively know the proper personal meaning of each person of the organization. He should grasp as well the common nature of all men – the natural law – and how it could be perfected. [12]

Regarding freedom, a good leader knows that freedom and motivation – and ultimately productivity – correlate. The more free a business-person is, the more likely that he will manage to insert more meaning in his decisions. Further, the more free his workers are, the more he can guarantee personal initiative in the fulfillment of his decisions. If the person that manages, promotes his subordinates more, they will do things with more freedom and, therefore, with more responsibility. [13]

Finally, we want to call into consideration that, given that a person becomes fully himself "giving", the content and beneficiaries of the gifts are important. The more humanizing the content of the gift is and as more people can accept the gift, the more personal development will occur. A consequence is that a business activity, in order to become humanly enriching, cannot provide benefit to just a "few", to just the shareholders. Any business activity should create positive change in the whole society. Then, society as a beneficiary of the business activity becomes essential for making business meaningful.[14].

Wrapping up: business activity is a real dimension of man, and exists thanks to the pre-existence of him. Man can make business meaningful if he knows himself and knows his very nature. All this requires anthropological expertise, which allows leaders and employees to understand the very nature of business activity and work.

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[11]   Leonardo Polo, *Quién es el hombre*, *Obras Completas Volumen X*. Eunsa, Pamplona, 2016.

[12]   J. Fernando Sellés, *op. cit*.

[13]   *Ibid*.

[14]   *Ibid*.

Character education as an appropriate vehicle for introducing a more adequate anthropology

Observe the reality of man is a fascinating though arduous task. In the context of experimental sciences, things are much simpler as the material world is their object. Experimental sciences have a solid cornerstone: the principle of causality. Through the principle of causality, they can establish necessary and predictable natural laws. Human reality is different. How can we draw necessary and predictable laws of behavior of a being, whose fundamental characteristic is freedom? When studying human behavior either we avoid the ambition of controlling this object or we end up pretending results. [15]

If there is freedom, not everything can be determined by law. The act of being of man is radically different from the rest of the created universe.[16] Because he is free, he attributes meaning to everything he does. The direction of his life is ultimately the result of the accumulation of his decisions. These decisions sometimes may be driven partially by the trivial or unexpected, but freedom will give them always the dynamic of decision-action rather than cause-effect[17].

Therefore, the study of human behavior will be different than the study of nature. Needless to say, the different dimensions of the human being will require inputs from branches other than philosophy. So, our claim is not one of isolation of the humanistic sciences from experimental sciences. Rather, in order to understand the human being an interdisciplinary approach will be needed.

One of the most crucial distinctions between human being and the rest of the universe and that has a determinant consequence in social sciences, including business, is the following: the universe is a useful thing, man is absolutely useless. The universe is for man. Each element in nature has an assigned role and a function amidst the whole universe. The human being is completely different. The human being doesn't seek to adapt to the environment, he adapts the environment to his needs. [18] The existence of man is not conditioned by nature. He is an end in himself and his main concern is his own development. His own development is simply to seek his plenitude as man and all his behavior is in this sense ethical: it helps or restrains his own ultimate fulfillment.

Summing up: man seeks fundamentally and freely his own fulfilment. And he does it with full personal responsibility, deciding why and whom. Using

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[15] S. Ghoshal, "Bad Management Theories Are Destroying Good Management Practices", *Academy of Management Learning & Education*, 4/1 (2005), 75-91.

[16] L. Polo, *Presente y futuro del hombre*, *Obras Completas Volumen X*. Eunsa, Pamplona, 2016.

[17] Tomás de Aquino, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 1.

[18] L. Polo, *Quién es el hombre*, ed. cit.

plainly this responsibility makes the man full of life. Every man has a life which is expecting to be lived, not external causes will decide for him. This indetermination, in certain way, leaves man in a situation of risk. The life of every man, independent of the context, is essentially risky because it depends on the way how he exercises freedom. Hence, a learning process is not so much about understanding the context as how to "drive the context" according to our needs.[19]

Education is, then, primarily a gateway to our own world. Its relevance is not connected simply with its scientific-technical side. Its relevance is fundamentally connected with the heart of man, his capacity and clarity for decision, his character. The main object of education is man. All other objects are subordinated as they just constitute instruments for achieving the main goal: the fulfillment of man, the perfecting of his character.[20] The "value" of money is connected only and exclusively with its function of acquiring other goods and of bringing support for carrying out projects or activities. The end goal of these other goods and activities are decided by man and depend on the level of awareness of his own needs.

Given all that has been mentioned above, we can dig deeper on the content of education. If man is fundamentally free and he is not subjected to the determination of things, education should be the education of freedom. Then, education cannot be narrowed simply to "means" but it should reach the consideration of the aims. Choosing the right aims and how to achieve them demands learning and training. At the end, any person does what he knows and will.

If the objective of life is a good life, to be happy, accomplishing it requires understanding how to reach it. [21] In order to know how, we need first to know who. And here we come to one of the most challenged principles in modern history: if it is true that man sets his own objectives, man is not fully autonomous as he is in himself given. Humanity is given and this is the fundamental point of departure. Therefore, education is not so much about creating a destiny as discovering man to man. Education should help man to become adapted to himself, to do what is good for himself, and this should be appealing to reason and will, in a word to character.[22] Character is therefore the most determinant factor of our behavior.

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[19]   *Íbid.*

[20]   Benedicto XVI, *Caritas in Veritate*, 26.

[21]   Aristotle, *"Nicomachean Ethics"* in *The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume 2*, The Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1984.

[22]   Tomás de Aquino, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 49.

If character is educated, man will do what is good for him. Man will like what he should like and will have clarity on what is right. In education, it is important that man develops the right taste for what brings him to plenitude.

An education of character requires a holistic approach. A person exercises his character everywhere and in everything. The human life is not composed of a mosaic of disconnected realities. Instead, the life of man is one single project, which is comprehensive. Further, the different realities of the life of a person contributes or restrain his own development. His behavior in private will impact his behavior in public and vice versa. Man is always committed towards what he seeks; he identifies himself with his own aims. This is the reason that man acquires an identity with his own actions. All human behavior has a subjective consequence beyond the external consequences.

The will, even when has many concrete and small manifestations, owes its operation to the last willed end. [23] Man always and in everything acts according to his last will. If man wills a fulfilled life, his life will be a continuous acting towards reaching fulfillment. When education forgets that man is one and our life is only one, or that our behavior impacts our way of being, education misses the fundamentals of our person or mixes-up the order of our personal reality. All this has determinant consequences for business education. An education process of a business-person will be incomplete and even delusional if it avoids dealing with his private life and his personal development.[24]

Business education should primarily address character education as it approaches the development of each person in all its integrity and recognizes that man as a free being needs to be educated on understanding and willing what is good. Character education is more effective than ethical education. Ethics will teach what is good and will primarily appeal to reason. Character education will educate not only the reason but also the will. Man won't do good just because he knows that is good, he will because *knowing he will it*.[25]

Conclusions

The fact that character education starts to be heard in the business world, though still in a marginal way, is a good sign. It means at least that there is a higher awareness of the moral nature of business activity. In a firm, people don't only produce goods but there is a "human side", which cannot be avoided. The work of the business-person goes beyond the productive and physical lim-

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[23] Tomás de Aquino, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 10.

[24] Benedicto XVI, *Caritas in Veritate*, 51.

[25] D. Goleman, *Inteligencia emocional*, Kairos, Barcelona, 1996.

its: it impacts the whole society, the employees, the business-person himself. The firm is not, therefore, an isolated entity. On the contrary, it's an institution that, amidst the social net, fulfills a very important function: it's the place of the personal fulfillment of all its members and the principal provider and manager of wealth. [26]

A large part of the global population spends a substantial time of their lives in business organizations. They devote and invest most of their talents in the goals of these entities. It's obvious, then, that the need that these organizations become an opportunity for personal growth and fulfillment. The firm becomes then one of the most fundamental places for exercising of each person's vocation. The firm can help each person to find a meaning for his life if the firm's underlying philosophy – there is always one! - approaches decisively the development of each person from the development of his character. If a person can use business life as an opportunity to grow in character, then business life becomes *useful* for achieving fulfillment in life.

We need to underline here again that business life is a human activity and as such is subordinated to other more fundamental dimensions of man. Business life is useful as long as it serves the whole of man. Of course, there is an objective content in business but this is not exclusive. The subjective content of business and work is the impact that business and work has in the person who does it.

Hence, character education, it means the education of reason and will that allows people to exercise for his own good his freedom, should be a fundamental component of business education. In this way, business education will leave aside a vision of business-person, which presents him as fragmented. Only one is the person who lives in and out business. Only one is the ultimate objective of life in and out business. Therefore, there is not a basis to consider business an amoral activity, meaning an activity disconnected from man's last aim: personal happiness.

Many challenges are ahead of a proposal of full integration of character education in business education. One is to make the participants to understand the intertwined relationship of business and life. Understanding that we can and must be happy working in business is fundamental. Avoiding narrowed and fragmented views of business activity can help the students to understand the role of their business life in the context of their lives. This triggers the understanding that the firm can improve (or harm) our own life and the lives of others. This vision will foster the "sense of vocation", the sense of the call of being a business-person. To give, a constitutive element of personal being, finds in the

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[26]   A. J. G. Sison and J. Fontrodona, *op. cit.*

firm the institution through which we can give our talents in a privileged context. [27]

Being father, brother, member of a community is all perfectly compatible with being a business-person. To foster character education is a good strategy to grow on the understanding of an idea of the firm, which is integrated with the rest of the institutions where the person is. In large extent, to make work and business activity an opportunity to improve our humanity depends on the solidity of character education as nobody can exercise what he doesn't know. With character education will come along other currently popular ideas: social responsibility, broad vision, work-life balance, critical thinking, innovation. It's hard for a business-person to become a driver of the organization if he lacks the strength of will and reason, which strong character provides.

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[27] L. Polo, *Quién es el hombre*.

A CREATIVE INSIGHT INTO THE CONNECTION OF ST. JOHN PAUL II'S AND LEONARDO POLO'S PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY APPLIED TO THE FIELD OF ARTS EDUCATION

Agata Muszyńska

ABSTRACT: The paper is a creative insight into the connection of St. John Paul II's and Leonardo Polo's philosophical anthropology applied to the field of arts education. The practical part of this research involved, first, a teaching design of an academic course on drama and theatre for Education students who were enrolled in a degree in Early Childhood, Primary Education and/or Pedagogy. Then, as a consequence, the design was applied by means of action research during three years with a total number of more than two hundred students. As it was seen, drama education involves not only curricular content learning, but also a holistic approach that embraces competences, attitudes, feelings, emotions, habits and virtues, along with the psychomotor activity.

This action research focused on how a philosophical understanding of the human being and human interactions has a strong impact on educational practice. In contemporary use of theatre techniques in education there is a tendency towards a conflict-driven philosophy that stands up for the rights of the underprivileged and the oppressed. We contrasted it with another idea of drama and theatre education that remains socially committed, yet, inspired in the notions of relation, enthusiasm and love driven from St. John Paul II's "Letter to artists" and Polo's writings on education. This paper reveals how different theoretical notions from the field of anthropological philosophy, aesthetics and theatre studies lead to practical educational implications. The results were seen in such aspects as reflective approach towards personal identity, sense of community and global citizenship, with a key role of the notion of creative freedom. In the end, we will share examples of teaching experiences that embrace different ways of personal transformation.

Introduction[1]

For the means of the following paper selected ideas from the philosophical anthropology of St. John Paul II and Leonardo Polo were applied to the field of arts education for student teachers. To be more precise, the study embraced different fields of arts, yet, the part the author of this article was personally in charge of was drama and theatre education. Therefore, the results presented in this paper are based on the experience of an arts education module, but many ideas and observations refer to educational practice in drama and theatre.

This research focused on how a philosophical understanding of the human being and human interactions has a strong impact on educational practice. In contemporary use of theatre techniques in education there is a tendency towards a conflict-driven philosophy that stands up for the rights of the underprivileged and the oppressed. We contrasted it with another idea of drama and theatre education that remains socially committed, yet, inspired in the notions of relation, enthusiasm and love driven from St. John Paul II's "Letter to artists" and Polo's writings on education. The objective is to reveal how different theoretical notions from the field of anthropological philosophy, aesthetics and theatre studies lead to practical educational implications.

The research brings together the experience of some universities and training centres in Europe, since the course design is based on an observation of similar courses in UK, Spain and Poland (Warwick University, Oxford University, University of Birmingham, University of Warsaw, University of Seville, and last but not least University of Navarre). Therefore it is aimed to integrate recent research outcomes in teacher education for drama and stimulate the processes of transformation in the field of Higher Education.

The practical part of this research was an academic course that was launched in the year 2012/13 at the University of Navarra (Spain), taught throughout three following years until 2014/15 as an action research project. The participants of the course were all trainee teachers, that is, Education students who were enrolled in a degree in Early Childhood, Primary Education and/or Pedagogy. It was taught every year to a different group, which makes for an approximate total number of 240 students. As it was already mentioned, the action research was a part of another educational innovation project, which was in

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[1]   Parts of this article are excerpts and adaptations from a doctoral thesis of the same author which is to be published. Some data about the practical part and some conclusions mentioned in this article can be found and explored in more detail in another publication accepted to be published as A. Muszyńska, C. Urpí, A. Gałązka, "Teacher Education through Drama: CLIL Practice in the Spanish Context", *Estudios sobre Educación*, 32.

charge of three academic teachers, and embraced not only drama, but also visual arts and music. The research was carried out within three months' teaching period and repeated every year with different groups, along three academic courses with a previous experimental group observation phase. Apart from the final exam, both practical and theoretical, the students were also encouraged to put their skills and knowledge into practice during a qualifying phase in educational institutions.

As regards the personal background of the researcher, in a brief summary, it is worthwhile to ponder on how the connection between Polo and John Paul II was possible in this case. When it comes to St. John Paul II, it does not surprise that a Polish researcher would tend to study his works. The experience of drama was a source of personal transformation for the author. As a consequence, the observation of drama academic teaching in the Warwick University, above all, and recent research results in Spain[2] proved a need of teacher education in this field. Hence, the course design for trainee teachers for the University of Navarre. Throughout its implementation it became more and more clear that there is a problem caused by a confusion about the philosophical background of the teaching resources available in Spain. It was particularly seen in the microteaching practice. While searching for an alternative philosophical background based on notions such as relation, it was natural to come across the philosophical anthropology of Leonardo Polo. His teaching is well disseminated at the University of Navarre, as a result of his legacy and a fruit of his personality. It is in the merge of the ideas of Saint John Paul II and Leonardo Polo, where the solution to this problem lies, as this paper pretends to argue.

Drama: Etymology, history and definition

The term "drama" comes from the Greek word *drao*, that means "I do", "I try", "I act", and has been already applied in the origins of theatre, when tragedy was invented, in sixth century before Christ in Greece[3]. It is used also in the sense of "action", rather than "activity". It can be proved by the ancient sources, beginning with Aristotle[4] that *drao*, understood as "to act" and "to work", has the same etymological root as drama which meant "action" and "work". Alt-

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[2]   Navarro, *El valor pedagógico de la dramatización: su importancia en la formación inicial del Profesorado* (Doctoral dissertation). Universidad de Sevilla, 2005.

[3]   O. Brockett, *History of the theatre*, Allen and Bacon, Boston, 1991, 6th ed.; J. R. Brown (ed.), *The Oxford illustrated history of theatre*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997; Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992, 2nd ed.

[4]   Aristotle, *Poetics* III 1448a29 (V. García Yebra, *Αριστοτελους περι ποιητικησ = Aristotelis ars poetica = Poética de Aristóteles*, Gredos, Madrid, 1992, 252).

hough drama may be associated with theatre and stage performance, there is an essential difference in the core of the notion, which can be clearly seen on the basis of the etymology. "Theatre" comes from the Greek word *theaomai* that means "I look", "I see", which sets the subject in a passive role. Whereas the meaning of *drao* is active in its core, since it is not only "I see" but also "I participate" and "I act"[5].

For the purpose of this research we suggest the following definition: Drama is a psycho-pedagogically-related teaching and educational method based on spontaneous child activity; it is expressed through a system of gestures, facial expressions and words; an important component is the sense of satisfaction and pleasure one feels while identifying with a role; the method is based on the experiences of the participants and gives them a chance to learn more about themselves and the world, and stimulates personal engagement in the problems of one's own environment[6].

In order to bring us to the focus of this paper, we briefly refer to the core of the methodology. The essential elements of drama are six: conflict, theme, symbolism, role, fiction and tension. The essential elements we will focus on is the conflict. A fictional situation is based on a conflict. The notion of a conflict is at the heart of the drama method and belongs to its essential elements. The conflict stimulates interest and curiosity and motivates the participants to an attempt to find a way out. A conflict is understood as a situation in which the obligations, motives, intentions and actions of one or more people are contrary. But it may be called a conflict only since the moment at which that person or people become aware of this contradiction[7]. Due to this awareness one can try to find a solution, which is a very desirable situation from an educational and pedagogical perspective. During the applied part of this research, the researcher observed a confusion about the notion of conflict among the contemporary drama and theatre practitioners and researchers. By "confusion" what is meant is a distorted and misinterpreted notion of conflict applied to drama. Originally, conflict belongs to the essential elements of drama, however, in some contemporary practice conflict is introduced artificially for ideological, political or other reasons, thus the original nature of the notion is distorted.

There are different types of conflicts, among others mental, social and moral. Mental conflicts arise when at least two different needs occur in one person and

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[5]   K. Pankowska, *Pedagogika dramy. Teoria i praktyka*. Wydawnictwo Akademickie „Żak", Warszawa, 2000, 24.

[6]   E. Jezierska-Wiejak, *Możliwości i ograniczenia dramy jako metody kształtowania rozumienia pojęć moralnych*. Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń, 2004, 14.

[7]   W. Szewczuk (Ed.), *Słownik Psychologiczny*, Wiedza Powszechna, Warszawa, 1979, 121.

their satisfaction is not possible or very difficult. A social conflict affects individuals, groups, institutions or nations and happens when a simultaneous fulfilment of the wishes and interests of both sides is impossible. A certain type of conflict is a moral conflict that occurs in the field of moral values. While selecting a conflict situation for drama method classes, one should try to fulfil the following conditions: the problems should be understandable for the participants, the participants want to solve them, a solution is possible, it is likely that the problems may occur later on in the participants' life[8].

Practice-based research

As regards the methodology, action research method was applied in order to carry out the study and theme analysis for a qualitative data analysis. The full description of the study, methodology, data analysis, results and discussion will be available in the doctoral dissertation of the same author which is to be published.

As a consequence, we will focus on the aspects of the study that bear relation to the notions mentioned previously, namely, the conflict. One of the research questions we focused on was: "Can drama trigger transformation processes among initial teacher education students, with particular focus on reflexive practice? If so, what kind of transformation does it trigger?" As it was referred to in the introduction, during the three years of classroom-based research both the researcher and other collaborating teachers were faced with the problem of the students' worldview confronted with philosophy of education referred to by certain teacher resources from this field. Unexpectedly, they were driven to modify the initial teaching design and introduce elements of philosophical and anthropological analysis for drama teachers. The objective was to provide the students with reflexive tools to make their own judgement about the sources they use for their drama class. For instance, a selection of fragments of resources was offered as a material for analysis and the researcher provided the students with questions for analysis, then, collected their individual responses. As a consequence of this theoretical training, there was practical microteaching phase where we also contrasted two different kinds of philosophies, analysed and interpreted them.

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8   Jezierska-Wiejak, *op. cit.*, 17nn.

Practice-based research results and discussion.

As it was previously stated, a general frequent conflict-driven approach tendency was observed. The three-year action research brought an unexpected observation that opened further research perspectives, namely, that the way the students applied drama techniques was biased by a certain philosophical background in the teaching resources they used. That was not the case with the course study material[9], however, "it does apply to the general panorama of modern teaching trends on theatre education in Spain, inspired by and related with the socially and politically committed branch of theatre in Latin America that is based on a conflict-driven approach[10]". As it has been already defined, conflict in drama is rather understood as an encounter of intrapersonal and interpersonal differences and as such should leads to mutual understanding and problem-solving skills development[11], according to the British school of drama in education, the one most rooted in the drama tradition.

This drew us to a new research field in theory and in practice: What is the philosophy of education, particularly drama education, that we would like to offer to the student teachers? Since reflective practice was a major teaching objective of the course, we supposed the trained teachers should be challenged to reflect on different views of philosophical anthropology in relation with arts education, in order to fully exercise their freedom. As it was seen, there is a need for a socially-committed theatre practice which leads to deepen understanding and actions. We found that the reflection on personal identity found in Polo may be a key notion for this positive change, as well as the sense of community and global citizenship. Therefore, on the one hand, anthropology and philosophy of drama and theatre education in Spain may be subject to new research in order to shed a new light on it in view of recent valuable contributions to arts education[12]. On the other hand, there is a need to integrate activities

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[9]   M. R. Navarro, "Drama, creatividad y aprendizaje vivencial: Algunas aportaciones del drama a la Educación emocional". *Cuestiones Pedagógicas*, 18, 2007, 161-172; M. R. Navarro Solano, A. Mantovani, *La dramática creativa de 9 a 13 años*. Octaedro, Granada, 2013; L. Núñez Cubero, M. R. Navarro, Dramatización y educación: aspectos teóricos. *Teoría de la Educación*, *19*, 2007, 225-252; N. Mato, *El baúl mágico. Imaginación y creatividad con niños de 4 a 7 años*. Ñaque, Ciudad Real, 2006.

[10]   P. Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed: Chapter 2. In J. Arthur, & I. Davies, *Citizenship Education*, SAGE, Los Angeles/London/New Delhi/Singapore, 2008, vol. I, 68-78.

[11]   S. Hillyard, Drama and CLIL: the power of connection. In S. Nicolás, & J. J. Torres (Eds.) *Drama and CLIL: A new challenge for the teaching approaches in bilingual education*, Peter Lang, Bern, 2015, 25-46; 37.

[12]   M. Fleming, *The arts in education: an introduction to aesthetics, theory and pedagogy*. Routledge, London, 2012; Musaio, *Pedagogia della persona educabile: l'educazione tra interio-*

aimed at the exercise of the students critical judgment about drama in education bibliography they may use in their future practice. These issues led to the following theoretical research as a means to detect key issues from philosophical anthropology for this arts education project, that shall be subject to future research in this field.

Key issues for arts education in Polo's philosophical anthropology and related ideas

Regarding educational relationship, according to Leonardo Polo, it is a donation, and the donation should be one where no participant is impoverished. The giving without impoverishing is a concept that is a constitutive human characteristic. For only a spiritual being, like human, is capable of giving without impoverishing, according to Leonardo Polo[13]. Therefore, the educational relationship, perceived as communication of giving and receiving is a dimension of the human existence that cannot be rejected[14]. This view can be also found in the thought of contemporary philosophers from different traditions, such as K. Jaspers[15], G. Marcel[16], M. Scheler[17] and K. Wojtyła[18]. They contributed to the dynamic anthropology, which is a study of the human being from the perspective of their ethical actions rather than their metaphysical essence of being, though both of them are considered essential.

Moreover, the view of the concept of education presented above can be complemented by recent research that is contextualized in the contemporary world. It has referred to the modern challenges in education and, accordingly,

rità e relazione, V&P, Milano, 2010; J. Winston (Ed.), *Beauty and Education*. Routledge, New York, 2010.

[13]   L. Polo, *Ayudar a crecer: cuestiones de filosofía de educación*. Eunsa, Pamplona, 2006, 51.

[14]   *Íbid*, 52.

[15]   K. Jaspers, *Filosofía de la existencia: tres lecciones explicadas en la Freien Deutschen Hochstift de Frankfurt am Mein en septiembre 1937*. Aguilar, Madrid, 1958.

[16]   G. Marcel, *En camino ¿hacia qué despertar?: autobiografía*. Sígueme, Salamanca, 2012.

[17]   M. Scheler, *Esencia y formas de la simpatía*. Sígueme, Salamanca, 2005.

[18]   K. Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn*. PTT, Kraków, 1969.

rephrased the concept[19] and suggested new challenging areas to focus the educational activity[20].

Contemporary times, indeed, need to reconsider the concept of education, as it can be seen in another recent publication[21]. There is a need for new pedagogical approaches, since today's students are facing a new set of problems. Also the educators need to confront an unprecedented variety of cultural, religious and educational background of their students[22]. Therefore, the question arises about the philosophy of education in the era of globalization, in the changed circumstances of the last decades. Problems of the globalized world call for an educational response. There is a need of education for global citizenship, since "morally, we owe it to each other to discuss the way our actions impair each other's interests"[23] and settle norms to protect these interests in order to contribute to a just and sustainable world.

In this context, education is seen as fundamental way to learn to lead and govern oneself by means of defining limits of one's conduct. The self-limitation is not a natural capacity. It needs to be taught and trained, by means of reflexive competence. The person is limited by the use of their liberty in a responsible way. In fact, the word "responsibility" stems from the Latin *respondeo, respondere* which is "to answer". In consequence, to be responsible means to answer or correspond with one's actions to who they are, to their personal dignity[24]. For this reason, what education is meant for is to guide every person to correspond to who they are, to full use of their freedom being one's own master. This happens gradually so that the person is more and more able to govern himself or herself. And in the modern world the student is confronted with another pedagogical challenge: "the challenge of complexity: to embrace the pluralism without embracing the relativism"[25]. Both are attitudes that recognize that there are many ways to perceive the world. However, they face it differently; the pluralism aims to discuss the different worldviews, the relativism does not rec-

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[19]   G. Mari, *Personal Identity and Social Community: an Educational Perspective*. An unpublished paper presented at a seminar in the Faculty of Education and Psychology at University of Navarra (Pamplona, Spain) on 12th June 2014.

[20]   A. Rodríguez Sedano, A. Bernal, C. Urpí, *Retos de la educación social*. Eunate, Pamplona, 2005.

[21]   I. Raley, G. Preyer, *Philosophy of Education in the Era of Globalization*. Routledge, New York/Oxon, 2010.

[22]   *Íbid.*, 1.

[23]   *Íbid.*, 67.

[24]   Mari, *op. cit*. 1.

[25]   *Íbid.*, 5.

ognize any kind of dialogue. The truth, for relativists, is a reality which is dependant from every person and their times, hence, they claim, there is no objective truth, it is rather a matter of opinions[26]. Therefore, the challenge is to reconcile the unity and diversity in one pedagogical approach.

In order to achieve this challenge, we would like to draw attention, once again, to the ancient Greek philosopher and author of "Poetics". The Aristotelian doctrine of multiplicity can be considered useful in the contemporary context. In a nutshell, if everything happens for a reason, then it is possible to explore the reason by means of exploring different aspects in unity; these arguments were accompanied by a harsh criticism of scepticism and relativism[27]. Therefore, to contemplate the unity in multiplicity can be a solution for the contemporary pedagogy. In the history of the philosophical thought this approach can be found, for instance, in Socratic thought, in Aristotle's idea of dialectical reason; in the 20th century in Maritain and Gilson in France, Fabro in Italy; nowadays it gains actuality because of changes in epistemology and a new relationship between the analytic philosophy and metaphysics[28].

One of the implications of unity is the notion of community. There is a need to accept diversity and learn to live together[29]. Although there is a common feeling of detachment of an individual in the modernity, there is a quest for a sense of community[30]. All in all, the unity is derived from the fact that we are all members of the human kind. Our essential characteristics as human being is the relationship of being a son or a daughter, the "character of filiation"[31]. Not every person is a parent, yet, everyone is either son or daughter of their parents.

What is more, as regards the role of parent-son relationship in the concept of education, we follow the affirmation that parents are the first and foremost educators of their own children[32]: thus, formal and informal education is only a complimentary continuation of the parents' educational work. This is one of the

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[26]   R. Yepes, J. Aranguren, *Fundamentos de Antropología. Un ideal de la excelencia humana* (3rd ed.). Eunsa, Pamplona, 1998, 112-113.

[27]   Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1065b.

[28]   Mari, *op. cit.*, 3.

[29]   Fleming, *op. cit.*.

[30]   C. Urpí, S. Ward, M. Musaio, *Arts and Aesthetic Education in the Fostering of a Common Place*. In Y. Espiña (Ed.), *Images of Europe past, present, future: ISSEI 2014, Conference Proceedings, Porto, Portugal*. Universidade Católica Editora. Porto, 2016, 798-805. Retrieved from http://www.uceditora.ucp.pt/resources/Documentos/UCEditora/PDF%20Livros/Port   o/Images%20of%20Europe.pdf.

[31]   Polo, *op. cit.*, 41.

[32]   *Íbid.*, 99.

main ideas of Leonardo Polo, who was actually also an academic teacher[33]. Polo reaffirmed the definition of another contemporary philosopher, Tomás Álvira, that to educate is basically to help the students' in their growth[34], as everyone is capable and meant to grow, both physically and in their interior. As a result, the concept of education, in the light of the mentioned doctrine, should contemplate that to educate is to unify. That is to say that the role of teacher is to assist the student so that he or she creates their own unified worldview and grow in their interior and exterior in their unique way. In this sense the role of the teacher is essential. Regarding drama in education, both the concept of holistic education that leads to a coherent development of the students' independent judgement and the key-role of the teacher as a guide are to be found among the fundamental characteristics of the methodology.

The role of enthusiasm as a way to personal transformation in John Paul II

The notions developed by Polo may be complemented by the Platonic notion of enthusiasm, attributed to the aesthetic experience. Enthusiasm, according to Plato, is naturally "contagious"[35] and is a state of "coming out of oneself" and being possessed by something superior to oneself[36]. Beauty is able to awaken loving passion for it, *passio amorosa*, "love for the understandible" or in other words, attraction, as Heidegger understood the ethymology of the Greek terms used by Plato[37].

What is more, the notion of enthusiasm in aesthetics was deepened and consolidated by a modern philosopher and poet, Norwid, whose ideas were an inspiration for the "Letter to artists"[38] and such drama characteristics as experiential learning and transformation can be based on Norwid's notion of enthusiasm. Norwid is said to be one of the most prominent representatives of the Polish poetry in Romanticism, hence he is an important reference for the author of

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[33]   F. Altarejos, "Estudio introductorio. Leonardo Polo: Pensar la educación". In L. Polo, *Ayudar a crecer: cuestiones de filosofía de educación,* Eunsa, Pamplona, 2006, 13-39.

[34]   Polo, *op. cit.*, 41.

[35]   Plato, *Ion*, 533; M. A. Labrada, *Estética*. Eunsa, Pamplona, 1998, 90.

[36]   Labrada, *op. cit.*, 41.

[37]   M. Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, vol. I. Neske, Stuttgart, 1961, 228-229; Labrada, *op. cit.*, 40.

[38]   John Paul II (1999). *Letter of his holiness Pope John Paul II to artists*, point 3 (retrieved from vatican.va).

"Letter to artists". His poetry, above all, "Promethidion" is considered a treaty on beauty by literary scholars[39].

These words from "Promethidion" served as an inspiration for the "Letter to artists" and other research in the field of aesthetics: "beauty is to enthuse us for work, and work is to raise us up"[40]. The notion of enthusiasm, expressed in these words, involves eagerness to work, leading to transformation that brings new life. Work is the way a human being establishes a relationship with the truth, goodness and other beings[41], and artists have a vocation to seek beauty, not otherwise, but through work. All in all, creating a work of art has, essentially, character of a work, more than discovery, contemplation or communication, which are also characteristic of the creative process[42]. In this sense Norwid coined a notion of new Romanticism, that is based on work, as opposed to a Romanticism inspired by rebellion, the prevailing idea of his times. Work and effort in Norwid's theory of beauty is a natural consequence of the encounter of the spiritual intention to create and the tough material which is meant to sculpt this work of art[43]. The encounter of spirit and material leads to the idea of transformation, understood as a liberation of the spirit, by bringing life to inanimate material; this idea has its source in the Christian symbol of Fenix that raises up from the ashes and resurrection of Christ[44]. Therefore, art has the power to transform, and similar power, in the same work by Norwid, is attributed to love, quite intentionally[45], since enthusiasm and love are intrinsically connected, as it will be seen in the following paragraphs.

As regards drama in education, the notion of work in Norwid is synonymous with the notion of drama as action and learning by doing. Even the part of a drama class dedicated to analysis and thinking is aimed at converting the participants into active learners, not merely passive recipients[46], hence, thinking in

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[39]   B. Kuczera-Chachulska, B. *Norwida "przypowieść o pięknem" i inne szkice z pogranicza genelogii i estetyki.* Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego, Warszawa, 2008.

[40]   C. K. Norwid, Promethidion: Bogumił. In C.K. Norwid, *Pisma wybrane,* vol. 2: Poematy. PIW, Warszawa, 1968, 201-245, 216, vv. 185-186.

[41]   John Paul II, *op. cit.*, point 3.

[42]   P. Blanco, Dios, arte, trabajo. La concepción del arte en el pensamiento contemporáneo. In M. J. Soto-Bruna (Ed.), *Arte y estética en el contexto de la dignidad humana.* CEICID, Pamplona, 2010, 63-81, 65.

[43]   Kuczera-Chachulska, *op. cit.*, 18.

[44]   *Íbid.*, 20.

[45]   *Íbid.*, 24.

[46]   P. Baldwin, *With drama in mind: real learning in imagined worlds,* Continuum International Publishing Group, London/New York, 2012, 2nd ed. 69.

drama is a way of learning by doing. Not only experiential learning, but also the notion of personal transformation by means of drama can by nurtured by Norwid's ideas. This notion, with reference to the ancient Greek idea of *catharsis* will be referred to later on in this paper.

Enthusiasm is believed to be in direct connection with beauty in the thought of Heidegger: enthusiasm is an emotional basic state, *die Grundstimmung*, and beauty is what determines this state, *die Bestimmende*, so that the person who experiences beauty enters in a state of enthusiasm understood as ecstasy, which is "coming out of oneself"[47] and by that means undergoes a process of transformation. What is more, and what even transcends the previously mentioned ideas of Heidegger, is that beauty may be seen as a calling of the artist, a vocation that is meant to bring salvation to the world through enthusiasm: supposing life is a miracle and world is a wonder given to us, the only attitude a man shall adopt is precisely the wonder; the wonder will give birth to enthusiasm, and enthusiasm, eventually, to love[48]. Having approximated the notions of work and transformation, the Norwid's idea of enthusiasm may be summarized as follows: first comes the experience of an emotional state when one is faced with beauty, then this state is what transforms the person and, as a result, makes the person adopt what is perceived as beauty in order to form part of their own being[49]. Hence, enthusiasm is what attracts, transforms and gives new life to an inanimate part of one's interior.

Norwid's ideas are said to have made a substantial contribution to aesthetics, by means of a treaty or rather "parable about beauty" in "Promethidion" and other works[50]. Nevertheless, he was criticised by some literary scholars for the lack of clarity in his aesthetics[51]. It could be argued that poetry is a form of expression that generally lacks sufficient scientific clarity. On the other hand, one may beg to differ that poetry, along with other works of art, is actually the most appropriate way to interiorize beauty and express it rather than a philosophical treaty[52]. It may be driven from the supposition that poetry, and other works of art, require previous inner experience, is therefore always an authentic testimony, insofar as it is a fruit of authentic experience of beauty. As it was mentioned, enthusiasm is an inner experience which motivates to action; the role of

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[47]   Heidegger, *op. cit.*, 139-40.

[48]   John Paul II, *op. cit.*, point 16.

[49]   Kuczera-Chachulska, *op. cit.*, 26.

[50]   Kuczera-Chachulska, *op. cit.*

[51]   W. Borowy, *O Norwidzie. Rozprawy i notatki*. Polski Instytut Wydawniczy, Warszawa, 1960, 78.

[52]   Kuczera-Chachulska, *op. cit.*, 21.

experience and transformation through art is an essential part of the theoretical background of drama in education method, since experiential learning is one of its essential elements. All in all, if we assume that Artistotle's aesthetics is based on transformation understood as *catharsis* and Plato's aesthetics is based on enthusiasm[53], then it may well be concluded that the Aristotle's and Plato's idea of beauty have their unique encounter here in these words of Norwid: "beauty is to enthuse us for work, and work is to raise us up"[54].

Drama, as every educational methodology, is a pursuit of transformation, while transformation is understood as personal growth. To be more precise, transformation in drama is seen as a constant personal pursuit for the truth, by means of adopting different perspectives, understanding one another and, eventually, understanding oneself better. Norwid's aesthetics can nurture the notion of personal transformation in drama in so far as it offers an insight into the nature of enthusiasm in aesthetic experience and, as it was claimed previously, underlines the importance of work (similar to the notions of action and learning by doing in drama). What is more, the notion of enthusiasm shall not be separated from the notion of love, as it will be seen in the following paragraphs, since drama participants experience transformation by means of mutual understanding, whereas tolerance is not sufficient and requires being complimented by love in order to be complete.

The educational dimension of love as enthusiasm for wisdom and for persons

As regards the role of enthusiasm in education, to transmit enthusiasm to the students in the search of the truth is seen as an important aspect of the mission of educators[55]. Enthusiasm for wisdom needs to be inspired by love: "Understanding and love are not in separate compartments: love is rich in understanding and understanding is full of love"[56]. The author of this thought, having been a University professor for many years, claims that one can only come to know

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[53]   Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1449b 24-28; Labrada, 1998: 15).

[54]   Norwid, *op. cit.*, 216.

[55]   Benedict XVI (2011). *Meeting with young university professors. Address of His Holiness Benedict XVI*. Basilica of the Monastery of San Lorenzo de El Escorial. 19th August 2011. Retrieved from https://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2011/august/documents/-hf_ben-xvi_spe_20110819_docenti-el- escorial.html

[56]   Benedict XVI, (2009). *Caritas in veritate. Encyclical letter on integral human development in charity and truth*, point 30 (retrieved from vatican.va).

something, once one is moved by love; therefore, "if truth and goodness go together, so too do knowledge and love"[57].

As it was previously mentioned, beauty can awaken loving passion for it, *passio amorosa*, "el amor por lo inteligible"[58], and the same thing can be said about the truth. Thus, it can be seen that love is crucial and may shed a new light on education, not only love for wisdom, but in an even greater degree, love for persons is essential in education. It was previously referred to that every person in a certain way is labelled with their "character of filiation"[59], as they are either son or daughter of their parents. Once we assume that education is naturally, in the first place, right and duty of the parents, and, in the second place, by means of prolongation, is entrusted to the teachers[60], then, education is a relation of trust and love.

Seen this way, love is a fundamental requirement in education, since it is prolongation of the parents-child relationship and this relationship is a prolongation of the love between parents[61]. The same way as parents give birth to their child out of love, artist gives birth to their work. Similarly as the child is a reflection of their parents, a work of art is a reflection of its creator. We'd go even a step further to suppose that every creator is a reflection of the Creator[62], who gave birth to the world out of love. In drama methodology every participant is given a role, and the role is one of essential elements of the pedagogy of drama; moreover, in the light of the previous affirmations, when a participant is given a role it is not only because they are considered capable of it and worth of confidence, but also, essentially, because they are considered being worth of love. Consequently, the perspective we adopted in our drama university course is based not only on recognition of personal uniqueness, but also on considering that the others' uniqueness is worth of love and that only love can truly lead to understanding. Learning through drama, seen as understanding, therefore, needs loving, because "love is rich in understanding and understanding is full of love"[63].

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[57]   Benedict XVI, *Meeting with young university professors*, ed. cit.

[58]   Plato "Fedro" 246c, trans. 1993; Labrada, *Estética*, ed. cit., 33.

[59]   Polo, *op. cit.*, 41.

[60]   F. Altarejos, C. Naval, *Filosofía de la educación*. Eunsa, Pamplona, 2000.

[61]   Polo, *op. cit.*, 90.

[62]   John Paul II, *op. cit.*, point 1.

[63]   Benedict XVI, *Caritas in veritate*, 30.

Conclusions

As it was seen, drama education involves not only curricular content learning, but also a holistic approach that embraces competences, attitudes, feelings, emotions, habits and virtues, along with the psychomotor activity. In contemporary Higher Education in drama and theatre in Spain there is a tendency towards a conflict-driven philosophy that stands up for the rights of the underprivileged and the oppressed. Nevertheless, this philosophical trend may be given another alternative, namely, drama and theatre education that remains socially committed, yet, inspired in the notions of relation, enthusiasm and love driven from St. John Paul II's "Letter to artists", Polo's writings on education and other scholars such as G. Mari. As it was seen, the key notions that may be the pillars of this philosophical alternative are such aspects as reflective approach towards personal identity, sense of community and global citizenship, with a key role of the notions of filiation, giving without impoverishing, pluralism, enthusiasm love and work as a way to personal transformation. These notions shall be subjected to future research in order to form a solid teaching design, in order to respond to the need of arts education based on relationship and inside dimension of the person[64] for contemporary times.

Extra-bibliography

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[64] Musaio, *Pedagogia de la persona educabile*, ed. cit.

NOTES

MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS?

Aleksandra Mirkowicz

ABSTRACT: Mystical experience is relation between person and personal God, as a relation it is adequate subject of philosophical consideration. During this experience person goes through a specific mystical way which leads to union with God. As an example we may take „Interior castle" by Saint Teresa of Avila. She divided the mystical way into seven stages. Seventh is union with God. We may take two aspects of it. First is similarity of third mansion with St. Thomas's conception of virtues and natural law which reveals mystical experience as a part of moral experience. What is more mystical experience is not only part of moral experience but a source of oughtness. We find that in its affirmation of a person. Second aspect is freedom of a person in decision making process. Decisions made by a person are completely free only in seventh mansion. Before that stage their rightness is accidental. Moving on mystical way is growing of a person, it is s also growing in love. Those two aspects correspond with Wojtyla' conception of a person. However, more important seems relation with law. Those two aspects of mystical experience showed us that it is impossible to separate transcendence and law. Especially human rights. It shapes understanding of human rights with their source in human dignity and the importance of this category in law that is universal for the global society.

Mystical experience as a subject of philosophical consideration

Mystical experience is a part of mystics which is interdisciplinary field of research. For philosophy it is justified to take it into consideration thanks to its relative character. Mystical experience is a relation between person and personal Absolute. As relation it is a being and as an existing being it is a subject of philosophy, especially in classical philosophy. It is in our interest because we will focus on writings of mystics whose doctrine is possible to resist on Thomas of Aquinas doctrine.

Source of our knowledge of mystical experience are texts of people who experienced it. This experience does not depend on religion or culture. Difference is only on linguistic basis. We will take as an example Theresa of Avila's *Interior castle* as the main text and works of John of the Cross as supplementary. Both of the mystics are Catholic Saints that is why will use terms as in their works e.g. instead of Absolute - God. We choose this text because it clearly shows mystical way with its stages. We will briefly present it to focus on several aspects of it later.

Mystical way

In *Interior castle* Theresa compares soul to castle with seven mansions with many chambers. She says that most of people leaves outside this castle. They do not know themselves. To get inside there is a gate of prayer. Thanks to it, it is possible to get into first mansion. There soul is still far away from perfection. In second mansion soul hears God's voice through events, books, people and sometimes tries to answer it. Third mansion is time of perfecting and organization of live according to truth that God is the most important in live. It is time for prayer, lent, spiritual exercise to make only good actions. Those three mansions presents natural way. Natural because experiences are not so different from everyday life. Fourth mansion is time where begins specific kind of cognition - contemplation which source is in God. Theresa compares it to water going through a pipe - it is typical reasoning, contemplation is taking from the water source. Fifth mansion is time of extraordinary experiences, time of turning precisely to God to engagement in sixth mansion with beloved God. Seven mansion is the target. It is union with God.

Third Mansion

a) Mystical and moral experience

In third mansion we may see similarity of souls actions to Saint Thomas's conception of virtues. This seems to show relation between mystical and moral

experience. The clue of this relation is in its focus on good. Thomas differentiate behaviors into two kinds. First ones are abilities of intellect and second of will. If they take person to good we call them virtues. Thanks to choosing good repeatedly with use of adequate means intellect best virtue of will - prudence - and thanks to it, person easily choose right means. This may be easily compered to situation of soul in third mansion. In this point soul's main motive is to organize live to precisely answer God's callings. It is also time of working on oneself behaviour, moments of failing are a part of that. According to what we said it is possible to treat this part of soul' s growing as training in virtues. This means that mystical experience is a part of moral experience understood widely - as every human action that may be judged by right and wrong category.

b) Mystical experience and natural law

Until fourth mansion soul does not get any extra knowledge only reveals truths that are accessible for human cognition. That is a moment of posing a question about natural law. Natural law understood as in Thomas of Aquinas doctrine. We also need to say that as John Paul II wrote in *Veritatis Splendor* natural law is based on a norm that *bonus est faciendum malum set vitandum* and that means that its norms given in act of creation are universal, eternal and necessary. Its universality means that they express human dignity and they need to be respected by everybody. He also pointed out that rethinking them in new cultural context is necessary. However, they are same without difference in time and cultural context because human nature remains the same. It is also impossible to change them and to let somebody to stop obeying its rules. We also need to highlight that good as subject of human interest has its source in God, what is more it God itself[1].

In context of mystical way - Theresa says God is present in soul and soul discovers this presence. We may divide it into two kinds: presence that is permanent in living human being, this presence is a consequence of the creation and second kind is presence that depends on how advanced soul is on mystical way - it depends on grace and love. This presence may be revealed by God in his calling which starts on their intensity in second mansion. It seems that God uses rationality of human being to let a person know about his existence and to lead a person toward truth. God only uses natural predispositions of a man. Theory changes into action lead by rule: good is wanted, evil is avoided. Good which becomes target is God. This shows that we may accept natural law as a part of mystical way.

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[1]   John Paul II, *Veritatis splendor*, 51.

Normative character of mystical experience

Mystical experience according to what we said about natural law is a source of norms. However, we also know that mystical experience is a part of moral experience. That leads us to pose a crucial question is mystical experience a source of oughtness. According to R. Moń[2] we may find source of doughtiness in objective frame of reference and in it in perception and affirmation of a person. In mystical experience person and personal God are united thanks to faith. Faith in this case is, as Wojtyła wrote according to Saint John of the Cross's *Subida*[3], *medium proportionatum, proximum, accomodatum, adaequatum, legitimum* to unite *ratio* with God. The intensity of this union is in frames of possibility to „catch" reality into concepts. In psychological, natural aspect faith is a decision. During all mystical way soul needs to be ready to give herself completely to God. Mystic knows the necessity of this. Moment in which soul decides to answer to God's calls is first moment of affirmation Him. Consciousness of need of this affirmation is a source of oughtness. On mystical way there is constant affirmation of God thanks to faith.

Person and free will

We need to remember about the subject of mystical experience - a person. We used term soul but it refers to a person. Soul is not, according to Theresa completely free in its decision making process before seventh mansion - before it rightfulness of them is accidental and may be only according to decisions of small importance. This is as, E. Stein point out, an effect of that inner life goes under different rules than external life. Before seventh mansion soul is not free from determination of her external life. This means that accurate confrontation with world, with others may be only „from" seventh mansion when person fully owns itself[4].

This shows us specific condition of human being. Person through mystical way goes to perfection in virtues and it is a process of moral growth. But we may not stay only on point that it is self growing and relation between person ad God. It also has influence on relations with other people and law.

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[2]   R. Moń, R. Moń, *Warto czy należy? Studium na temat istoty i źródeł normatywności*, Wydawnictwo UKSW, Warszawa, 2011, 508.

[3]   K. Wojtyła, *Świetego Jana od Krzyża nauka o wierze*, Lublin 2010.

[4]   E. Stein, *The science of the Cross*, ICS Publications Institute of Carmelite Studies, Washington, D. C., 2002, 226.

Human rights and transcendence

Mystical way revealed itself as way to God, as a way of growing in self - determination of a person and also of it is growing in love. Its correlation with natural law as a part of it and the fact that it is source of moral oughtness revealed that it is a way of relating to world and other people and this relation is relation of love and affirmation. Presence of God thanks to creation is a basis of human dignity and as we said it is universal for everybody. This means that source and basis for law may be human dignity which can not be separated from transcendence. It means that whole law has its source in transcendental being and it shapes precisely understanding of human dignity. Category of human dignity is crucial to create positive law. Law that is universal as mystical experience is universal, and law with its basis in transcendental being to which only adequate relation is relation of love. This makes us to ask who is legitimated to create positive law if decisions are made rightfully only in seventh mansion. The answer seems to be in relation with natural law - rational nature of a person makes man able to reveal norms. We perceive need to confront it with human rights law especially in case law and we hope that this will be a subject of further research.

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EQUAL NATURAL DIGNITY OF DISABLE PERSON
IN THOUGHT OF ST. JOHN PAUL II

Bawer Aondo

ABSTRACT: St. John Paul II, speaking about people with disabilities, has always insisted that disability does not diminish their dignity. His teaching is based on a foundation of equal God's love for every human being, regardless of its origin, skills or non-disability.

The Pope strongly advocates against any practices directed against the human life, especially the lives of children, the elderly or the disabled, who do not themselves maw about their rights. The basis for this way of thinking is human dignity, which can be seen in two dimensions: philosophy (natural dignity) and theology (supernatural dignity). The aim of the paper is to look at this issue more broadly.

John Paul II, speaking about people with disabilities, has always insisted that disability does not diminish their dignity. His teaching based on a foundation of equal God's love for every human being, regardless of its origin, skills or efficiency.

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Speaking about the dignity of the human person philosophically, it is considered that this approach includes only the rational aspect and is limited to what we can experience. However, it has the advantage over the recognition of theology, because the arguments he uses, refer not only to faith as to the reason, which is, without exception, every human being[1].

K. Wojtyla attempts to build his ethics on a combination of ontology and phenomenology[2]. He created a significant project of reconstruction and renewal of philosophical thinking. It bases its system on the foundation of anthropology[3]. It recalls that every man has his nature[4].

Human nature is assigned to certain properties, thanks to which a particular person is a person, able to exist and operate. Real existence (individual) is only proper to man[5]. K. Wojtyla, presenting his philosophy of man, says about the person that is "being particularly good, ontological entity and at the same time surviving, substantially unity - spiritual being endowed center passenger constituted by consciousness, intellect and self-determination, being free, meets the in love"[6].

According to personalist human life has the highest value because it is endowed with a special dignity - personal dignity. Karol Wojtyla states that a person is self-existent and the substantial, which is the foundation of her condition. The rational nature allows her thinking, distinguishing right from wrong, to know the truth, and autonomous operation. Man in an appropriate manner, there is as a person[7]. It can not be reduced to the notion of genre, nor is it a clarifica-

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[1]   W. Chudy *Godność człowieka wartością ontyczno – wychowawczą* [w:] M. Kalinowski, *Wzrastanie człowieka w godności, miłości i miłosierdziu,* Lublin, 2005, 83.

[2]   R. Buttiglione *Myśl Karola Wojtyły*, Kraków, 1999, 129.

[3]   J. Galarowicz, *Blask godności*, Kęty, 2005, 111.

[4]   K. Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn,* [w:] T. Styczeń i in. [red.], *Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne,* Lublin, 1994, 126.

[5]   *Ibid.,* p 132.

[6]   Galarowicz, *Blask godności,* ed. cit., 123-124.

[7]   J. Galarowicz, *Człowiek jest osobą. Podstawy antropologii filozoficznej Karola Wojtyły*, Kęty, 2000, 50-51.

tion of its nature or one of the copies[8]. This is what distinguishes man from other beings, is his ability to transcendence the natural world, and himself, as well as its center - the personal "I"[9].

K. Wojtyla recognizes the man primarily as an entity of its existence and activities. This entity has a particular nature, manifested through the operation[10]. Necessary for human existence is to have his body that very closely complements person, which said the man is - is it about its concreteness. Through the matter comes to individualization man[11].

John Paul II points out that every human being is a person from the moment of conception, because it has human nature. Coming into the world, it has its fullness in ontological terms, although the structure of the psychological or biological are not fully formed. To achieve its full structures that time is needed. Every human being has the inherent right to development[12]. As a result caused damage to physical or mental person does not lose personal status, because they do not constitute a person[13]. Personal status can not be lost and even the embryo has personal dignity, although it is different than in adults. This method, although different, are characteristic for human beings[14]

According to K. Wojtyla "a person is a source of ethical values is the same efficient cause of his acts. The person [...] is not only the only competent body for phenomenological ethical values, but it is for them ontological entity"[15]. Wojtyla here creates a synthesis of the two philosophical currents - Aristotelian-Thomist and phenomenological. According to K. Wojtyla man it is a free, has the ability to self-determination, it is also associated with morality and has reference to the good[16]. The notion of a person has been created in order to establish that any man can not be reduced only to the concept of species, but it has in itself fullness and perfection of existence. This perfection can only be enhanced

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[8]   P. Duchliński, *Godność osoby w ujęciu Karola Wojtyły i jego uczniów*, [w:] *Ku rozumieniu godności człowieka. Studium z bioetyki*, red. G. Hołub, P. Duchliński, Kraków, 2008, 17.

[9]   *Íbid.*, 19

[10]   Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn*, 99.

[11]   *Íbid.*, 243-244.

[12]   J. Wolski, *Bioetyka w perspektywie personalizmu. Studium w myśli naukowej biskupa Elio Sgrecci*, Łódź, 2008, 167.

[13]   P. Duchliński, *Godność osoby*, 22.

[14]   R. Otowicz, *Etyka życia. Bioetyczny i teologiczny kontekst życia poczętego*, Kraków, 1998, 147.

[15]   K. Wojtyła, *Wykłady lubelskie*, Lublin, 1986, 67.

[16]   *Íbid.*, 143.

by the use of the word person[17]. The person is not possible to know itself and to implement appropriate only a good in a way other than in relation to the surrounding world[18].

In the thirteenth century St. Bonaventure spoke of dignity, as a trait that distinguishes man. St. Thomas Aquinas in the "Summa Theologica" named person "hypostatizes outstanding his dignity." He stated that every being that is the rational nature, you can call the person due to the high dignity of being. That dignity comes from metaphysical reality the same person, that is "subsistence in a rational nature." As John Paul II said, "metaphysics can justify the concept of dignity, pointing to her spiritual nature"[19].

We can say that dignity is a value that absolutely belongs to human nature[20]. It has every person, regardless of social status, economic or political or whatever their illness or disability. This is the absolute and inalienable[21].

The fundamental and central point of ethical considerations K. Wojtyla is the dignity of the person "<Dignity> man as a person is first and foremost a property or a basic quality - and in this sense" value "of a person as such: value, which belongs to the man for this reason that He is a person, and that a man with this very reason should strive[22]. What distinguishes man from other earthly beings and it rises above it is freedom and intelligence. The dignity of the person is not an extra quality, but flows from the very nature of man as a rational animal, capable to loving and thinking[23].

In everyday life, people deeply handicapped are not treated as "something", but as sick people. If they were anything other than "anyone" would have to have its own normality, and this means that would create separate species[24]. These people have their own nature in the same way as non-disabled people, but it is marked by having some damage, but it does not deprive them of their personal dignity[25].

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[17] R. Buttiglione, *Myśl Karola Wojtyły*, 136.

[18] *Íbid.*, 137.

[19] T. Williams, *Godność osoby ludzkiej*, [w:] *Młodzież nadzieją Kościoła i świata,* red. R. Balter, t. XVIII, Poznań, 2008, 70.

[20] A. Szostek, *Wokół godności, prawdy i miłości*, Lublin, 1995, 36.

[21] P. Duchliński, *Godność osoby*, 24.

[22] Galarowicz, *Blask godności*, ed. cit., 150.

[23] T. Williams, *Godność osoby ludzkiej*, 70.

[24] R. Speamann, *Osoby. O różnicy między kimś a czymś*, Warszawa, 2001, 299.

[25] *Íbid.*, 23.

The highest axiological criterion, as well as moral human life is personal dignity. Every human action related to uphold his values and relationships based on values, are built on the foundation of the dignity of the person. No value (eg. An existential - performance, moral - justice) can not stand in opposition to the axiological dignity[26].

Ontological dignity is a value that has only man because he is someone, not something. There are in the interior, which constitute the elements of the spiritual life and perfection. The nature of this value is quality[27]. It has its importance - is the highest value in the realm of created beings. The dignity is given to us, it is also something potential: through his actions man realizes his dignity. This value is sensitive to injury, fragile, delicate. It calls for continuous solidarity with her. Dignity is the task of every human being. K. Wojtyła justifies this saying: "Indeed, in wanting any good, the human" I "comes to value object, and when he wants to be good - then the same subjective" I "if a suitable value." Dignity is a value important, yet delicate, because man strives to her. This thought can be seen in the work of "Man in the field of responsibility (...) strive for dignity (fairness) proper to man as a person is a powerful and fundamental dynamism"[28]. Human actions cause that man becomes what he is and what it is[29].

K. Wojtyla understands dignity as the dynamic value. Its dynamism understands the power of love, that is, the ability to selfless act - "... love is the fullest realization of the possibilities that lie in man. (...) Love is an action, such an act, which most fully develops the existence of the person. Love is characterized by creative nature, it is a reality that becomes: (...) kind of love never "is", but still only "becomes" depending on the contribution of each person to his thorough commitment. (...) Man is a creature somehow doomed to work. This work is also valid in the field of love"[30].

The only foundation of the inviolable value of human being from conception to natural death is a personal dignity - that is ontic (metaphysical) - its value as the creation and existence. This value does not depend on intellect works, awareness, experience and merit of the individual. Equality of all people should be viewed through the prism of their ontological equality - that is, to have their dignity, as well as being people. The dignity that they have the same degree of both saints and criminals. The same ontological dignity of the unborn person

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[26] Chudy, *op. cit.*, 85.

[27] Galarowicz, *Blask godności*, ed. cit., 152.

[28] K. Wojtyła, *Wykłady lubelskie*, 153.

[29] Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn*, 146-147.

[30] Galarowicz, *Blask godności*, ed. cit., 153.

has a famous university professor, a disabled person or unconscious patient is connected to the support equipment life activities. The value of a person in no way be affected, nor by the man himself, or by others. St. Thomas Aquinas stated that "persona est ineffabile" ("person is inviolable")[31].

One of the properties held by the person is freedom. It involves the will, which includes the experience of "I can - I do not have"[32]. Essential for this freedom has its own dependence on the "I"[33]. Every man by his will and action has access to the knowledge of being, truth, goodness and beauty[34]. Dignity does not depend on properties assigned to man, but the very nature of a person. On this basis it can be concluded that dignity is common to all men[35]. Therefore, every person has an equal share in humanity, regardless of its properties, such as health, fitness, age or wealth.

Personal dignity of man is this value that categorically excludes the treatment of a man in an instrumental way by other people. K. Wojtyla presents it this way: "... no one may use a person as a means to an end, neither man, nor even God - the Creator." The most appropriate ratio for the dignity of the person is its affirmation. This act K. Wojtyla called love: "... a person is so good that proper and wholesome reference to it is only love." He believes that "... only love can rule out the use of one person by another"[36].

For society a person is a reference point and the center of society. Evil or good in a given culture can be evaluated through the prism of the impact of that culture in person[37]. T. Williams draws attention to the fact that many European nations in their constitutions link to human dignity, as anthropological evidence law. Great emphasis is also placed on it in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948[38].

K. Wojtyla agrees with the concept of Platonic moralism, which sees humanity in morality[39]. Commenting on the thought of Aristotle, he notes that he sees the specificity of the human being, as well as its superiority over other beings[40].

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[31] Chudy, *op. cit.*, 86-87.

[32] Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn,* 161.

[33] *Íbid.*, 163.

[34] *Íbid.*, 199.

[35] T. Williams, *Godność osoby ludzkiej*, 71.

[36] Galarowicz, *Blask godności*, ed. cit., 155.

[37] T. Williams, *Godność osoby ludzkiej*, 67.

[38] *Íbid.*, 68.

[39] Galarowicz, *Blask godności*, ed. cit., 129.

[40] *Íbid.*, 130.

Christianity along with his Gospel preaches the power of the moral good that is born in the heart of each man. Proclaims the greatness and dignity of the human person. That dignity is visible by serving our neighbor. Christianity shows every person the opportunity to free themselves from evil, especially moral[41]. Wojtyla considers morality as ontological reality. It is not our awareness[42]. Morality is for him to be objective and realistic, associated with being, and also something in awareness, experiential and subjectively-seater[43]. Therefore, it is inherent in every human being, even the most profoundly impaired.

K. Wojtyla appeals to ethics St. Augustine, who is doing a bridge between good and being. The nature of this entity is his good, which in turn constitutes the perfection of nature, depending on the extent to which it is present. Everything that exists is good, through its shareholding in the highest good[44]. The ethics of values, which is part of the current ethics K. Wojtyla, the man as being orients toward the values that are paramount for him. A secondary issue for the man here is his own "I", his happiness, goodness and perfection. However, in the dialogic ethics at the forefront of the responsibility for another human being[45].

K. Wojtyla says that man is a reference to the goods and values that are within its field of responsibility. A special position of man in this field highlights the personalistic norm. Ethics personalistic in the center of ethics affirmation, which applies to the realm of the personal[46]. The man, according to K. Wojtyla, by virtue of being a person has a special relationship with the goods and values. That relationship is based on freedom and truth: "If the order norms is somewhat completely recorded in the order of beings and nature - however, the law of nature becomes by reading from a man by raising almost at the level of the mind and spirit, at the level of individuals. In this way also the order shall cease to be only given as "the world of necessity", but is given to man in its proper world of freedom"[47].

The sovereignty of the people most fully manifested in the pursuit of the individual to the knowledge of good and also the fact that the person she directs their choices and actions. It is being free. This freedom is freedom transcendent because it exceeds the human nature is its property. Her character is absolute,

[41]   *Íbid.*, 132.

[42]   *Íbid.*, 143.

[43]   *Íbid.*, 144.

[44]   *Íbid.*, 133.

[45]   *Íbid.*, 150.

[46]   *Íbid.*, 154-5.

[47]   *Íbid.*, 154.

not subject to any restrictions, it does not affect the structure of human. The person has the ability to select good. Because of this ability, according to John Paul II, a man is at the center of human history and society[48]. In terms of the Pope human dignity is one of the basic criteria of humanity. He emphasizes and proclaims throughout his teaching that "The value of a man ultimately decides who he is, and not how much you have"[49].

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[48]   T. Borutka, *Nauczanie społeczne papieża Jana Pawła II*, Kraków, 1994, 52.

[49]   *Íbid.*, 57.

THE HARMONIZED PERSON:
A POSTMODERN RECONCILIATION OF IDENTITY AS AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL CONFLICT

Issa Cristina Hernández Herrera

ABSTACT: Drawing upon transcendental anthropology concepts by Leonardo Polo, this paper reexamines the conflict regarding postmodern human identity fragmentation caused by globalization, which leaves Classic and modern philosophy unable to answer who the person is today among cultural relativism and subjectivity. Along with the identity predicament itself, the reconciliation with God in the intimate sphere also may be resolved, since the modern paradox that befalls empirical experience lies within the juxtaposition of reason and freedom, and, as a consequence, human pride. This paradox is the main obstacle that prevents twenty-first century men from accepting a higher level of existence. Only by adapting the theory of knowledge and through the abandonment of mental limits, relieving the self from objectualism and voluntarism, the conflict that both human nature and progress have shaped over our existence becomes merely conceptual.

The concept of identity is fairly problematic, since many answers have been given across time. The problem starts by dividing it in any kind of perspectives, be it cultural, national, racial, gender, political, individual, collective, and so on; yet, this tendency to explain identity by dividing it into personal spheres has grown out to create a fragmented concept of the self, which started with modernism for then growing exponentially in our contemporary times, enhanced by postmodernity and postmodernism. As shown, the complexity starts by being aware of the multiplicity of levels of its study, which I would like to synthetize, for this paper, into anthropological and individual. The first studies who is the human person, and questions such as the meaning of existence, human nature and human essence can be placed here. The second level is about the uniqueness of each person, the combination of personal identification with social groups, ideas and behaviors. But here is where the first important observation arises: although a division has been made for explanatory means, the purpose of this paper is the exact opposite. To overcome both the idea and the practice of the divided, schizoid self (whose consequences will be discussed later), our concept of person needs to be redefined in such a way that the unitary answer for "Who am I?" in the anthropological level does not contradict the individual level, and vice versa. Also, in this conceptual progression towards human dissociation lies the most attacked sphere of all: faith, spirituality, and religion, as will be seen in the progression of human thought across this paper. Transcendental anthropology then enters the picture to harmonize flawed concepts, starting from a new discipline separated from metaphysics, to a satisfactory sketch of internal communication and equilibrium.

Modernism: Evolution through reason and pride

Joseph Ratzinger's *Introduction to Christianity* studies, among other things, the faith problem in modernity. He achieves to put into dialogue Aristotle's asseveration of real knowledge through proof, Giambattista Vico's "verum factum principle" and his own line of thought to enlighten the modern formula of veracity, being that "If part of real knowledge is the knowledge of causes, then we can truly know only what we have made ourselves, for it is only ourselves that we are familiar with"[1]. Truth goes from *verum est ens*, the scholastic equation of "being is truth", to *verum quia factum*: truth in modern times lies in what can be perceived with our senses. The way the person relates to the exterior and others is, unavoidably, through a series of biological and psychological processes that asses and judge, consciously and unconsciously.

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[1]   J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, Communio Books, 2004. Kindle Edition.

The "I" becomes the unit of measure for reality, and our perception dictates the margin for error and success, as long as it is quantifiable and verifiable. By only accepting rational courses of action, a feeling of superiority naturally arises because of the simplistic limitation, which goes hand in hand with pride and conceit. The difference between the human being and other living creatures and things rests in a supposed rationality that transcends and becomes more effective than physical force, for our way to encounter obstacles is transformation, manipulation, of the external world. Our process of biological adaptation, what Darwin would call evolution, is cut short by our favorite method of survival, transfiguration, the *verum quia facedum*.[2] Man gives sense to himself by his contributions to knowledge and progress. The superficiality in our survival based on malleability implies a constant, collective effort to maintain and improve the means. These modern demands that sciences and technology meet are handled as priorities, so humanities fall into the background for not contributing in a practical way to the life we have gotten used to, directly affecting the individual identity. Now that the idea of progress has been added up to social dynamics, man is now more than ever in control of his future, which looks clearer and safer, thus increasing yet again the sense of pride.[3]

Freedom appears in direct relation to the power of manipulation, unfolding around volition and autonomy, and side to side with dignity. Collectively, modern wars and struggles for freedom take place, sometimes meaning more than life itself. For increasing the will's field of action, modern efforts take place to dispose of the idea of person as substance, since it implies necessity and decreases freedom. Legitimizing extremes, the boundaries are those which man creates, not intrinsic, for he is too self-sufficient to follow teleological references. Freedom precludes the ability to calculate, since there are infinites of paths, combinations and choices. Ratzinger notes that it is also "necessary in the structure of the world, as it were, and this again means that one can only comprehend the world as incomprehensible, that it must be incomprehensibility"[4].

Here the paradox of what moderns understand as human essence (anthropological identity in this paper's terms) is introduced: reason with its progress and conceit, versus freedom with its volition and extremes, may be connected with one another in some cases, but in others they draw a line between them that separates the man from what he needs and what he desires. Things ought to be

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[2]   "The truth man is concerned with is not the truth of being or what he accomplishes, but the truth of changing the world, molding it, centered on future and action". *Ibid*.

[3]   For Leonardo Polo, the idea of progress appeared only in modern times, in the late 17th century, with Leibniz's Law of Temporal Existence. L. Polo, *Quién es el hombre. Un espíritu en el tiempo,* Rialp, Madrid, 2003, 27.

[4]   J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*. Communio Books, 2004. Kindle Edition.

either proven by reason or craved by will, so the first lacks acceptance by its rigor and the second comes up short of logic. In this picture, the human person resembles an elastic band trying to cover both extremes to breaking point, especially when encountering the individual identity: man is free, yet ought to contribute to progress; man needs certainty in basic needs, but dreams to -or does- live driven by passions and fantasies. Therefore, man is internal duality, two components that live together, yet two none the less. And if man is duality, we are constrained to say that the human person is fundamentally conflict: a puzzle with pieces that do not completely fit, a whole which cannot close entirely. Then again, integral knowledge of what is the person befalls impossible.

Faith and Modern Perplexity: Objectualism and Voluntarism

Modern identity has encountered a wall. In terms of Leonardo Polo, it has fallen into perplexity[5], a rather complex term thoroughly studied in the book *Acceso al ser*. In order to synthetize its definition in practical terms, it can be understood as the state of mind when intelligence has tried to solve a problem and has not found the answer, and comes from the attempt of philosophy to pretend there is a level of knowledge that can know and account itself, the *reflexio*[6].

To understand reflection we need to remember St. Thomas Aquinas' definition of truth, "conformity with the mind to the object"[7]. In a study by Carmen Segura Peraita, *La dimensión reflexiva de la verdad en Tomás de Aquino*[8], scholastic truth is said to have two dimensions according to the process it goes through: while truth is grasped by the senses (adequative dimension), it is known by the intellect (reflexive dimension). Only the last can understand the correspondence with the objects, which is why Aquinas affirms that knowledge is a consequence of truth: understanding reflects about the conformity *and* itself, its own act. Juan Fernando Sellés, a scholar in polian thought, summarizes Polo's position of *reflectio* as it being impossible[9], since pretending that human

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[5]   L. Polo, *El acceso al ser,* Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona, 1964, 25-192.

[6]   J. F. Sellés, "La capitulación filosófica ante la perplejidad y la superación poliana", *Miscelanea Poliana*, http://www.leonardopolo.net/congreso/glosacapuno.htm#_ftn5

[7]   "Veritas logica est adaequatio intellectus et rei"; *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 21, a. 2.

[8]   Universidad de Navarra, 2007. http://dadun.unav.edu/bitstream/10171/2147/1/13.%20CARMEN%20SEGURA,%20La%20dimensión%20reflexiva%20de%20la%20verdad%20en%20Tomás%20de%20Aquino.pdf

[9]   "Certainly, human knowledge is not a power of perfect reflection. What would be a perfect reflection? We do not know; but, at least, we can assure that that reflection is impossible in terms

knowledge can know itself aspires to identity, and only God is identical to himself (other creatures are a plurality of dimensions, given the real composition of *actus essendi-essentia*[10]). It is a confusion between human knowledge and divine knowledge.

Among the many dangers of perplexity, two of them are our main concern for glimpsing the consequences of modern identity. First, objectualism, which is considered the genesis of perplexity itself, and which I consider to be the conflict of modern reason. Objective thinking and the analytic method as a recurrent tool become obstacles when what we try to understand is not an object, when we try to abstract something non-abstractable. In the case of identity and the problem we are facing, it evolves into a mental limit[11] since we are trying to understand the subject as an object, objectivizing the subject, thus losing the foundation of the human person.

The second is voluntarism, which derives directly from objective thinking, and in our framework would translate into the problem of modern freedom. Since all the thought objects are at the same level, because analytically there is no hierarchy, the belief that everything is worth the same eventually arises, for everything is at the same level. There opens a path of having the will as protagonist when choosing which objects are more important (in order to have minimal organization), so there is no real or ontological distinction of relevancy, opening doors to subjectivity.

This panorama gives a clearer space to introduce the problem of faith. Following Ratzinger's definition, "Christian belief means opting for the view that what cannot be seen is more real than what can be seen. It is an avowal of the primacy of the invisible as the truly real, which upholds us and hence enables us to face the visible with calm composure, knowing that we are responsible before the invisible as the true ground of all things"[12], it results improbable, even impossible, for the modern man to accept faith as a new form of knowledge. There

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of foundation. The notion of *causa sui* is inadmissible". L. Polo, *El acceso al ser,* Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona, 2015, 39.

[10]   Important polian distinction of three parts for the creation of transcendental anthropology: human nature, human essence and act of being, which will be discussed further.

[11]   The mental presence is the consideration of the mental operation, and this is the mental limit, "The method by which one may speak of metaphysics and of anthropology without their mutual substitution or incompatibility is the abandonment of the mental limit. It is precisely the abandonment of the mental limit that is the method by which the being of man can be studied without it being incompatible with the being of the universe". L. Polo, *Why a Transcendental Anthropology*, Leonardo Polo Institute of Philosophy Press, 2015, 40.

[12]   J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*, Communio Books, 2004. Kindle Edition.

is a systematic disability to include the "I believe", because everything is closed to "I think" or "I want".

Postmodernity and Postmodernism

I'd like to start this section by clarifying that there is no real consensus between philosophers about the existence of postmodernism and what it is about; some accept but avoid talking and theorizing about it since it is something we are currently living, others accept critiques to modernism but do not consider them enough as to be an autonomous concept, and others defend post postmodernism –or metamodernism- as a critique for postmodernism. To simplify the notion in which this paper was based[13], first we need to study postmodernity as a social condition, since it is where bigger acceptance and an actual theoretical framework take place. Once sociology explains the postmodern condition and gives out its keystones, we can try to fit these notions into two main philosophies to start building up the subject of identity in postmodernism.

English sociologist David Lyon has studied surveillance, secularization and postmodernity across various works. In *Postmodernity (Concepts in Social Thought),* the postmodern condition is said to be dominated by processes of globalization, new media technologies and consumerism[14]. These realities generate a brand new, unknown level of social encounters with *the other*, far more concrete as international interactions take place in the individual level. Identity is used both as a differentiator and assimilator[15], meaning that contradictory attempts take place "to [first] differentiate and [then] integrate a sense of self along different social and personal dimensions such as gender, age, race, occupation, gangs, socio-economic status, ethnicity, class, nation states, or regional territory"[16]: man loses ground when unexpectedly faced with such a vast variety of ways and choices, demonstrating that his foundations (both anthropological and individual modern identities) were never that strong to begin with. In this crisis, he seeks to understand what he is by establishing *what he is not*, and this

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[13]   The methodological framework for this second section was originally made by Czech professor Ted Turnau in his podcast titled *Postmodernism and the Question of Identity*, available in http://www.bethinking.org/human-life/postmodernism-and-the-question-of-identity. Based in this, I have made several changes as to cut and expand several ideas.

[14]   University of Minnesota Press, 1994.

[15]   M. Hossein Kouhpaeenejad, R. Gholaminejad, "Identity and Language Learning from Post-structuralist Perspective", *Journal of Language Teaching and Research*, Vol. 5, No. 1, Academy Publisher in Finland, 2014, 199-204.

[16]   M. Bamberg, *Identity and Narration: the living handbook of narratology*. Hamburg University Press, 2010. hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/lhn/index.php?title=Identity and Narration&oldid=787

process of differentiation becomes alienation: for example, his sexual gender may be a man (integration), but not all men have the same socio-economic status (differentiation) and so on, therefore unable to satisfy every single sphere he possesses. This impossibility is due to misunderstanding how to deal with the uniqueness of each person when placed in dynamic interactions.

Also, a search for meaning takes place, as the labels we are heavily relying upon end up being as empty or full as what we propose the content to be. The meaning of these words (e.j. hispanic, woman, conservative, German, middle class) makes the first reference to language, which will be discussed further. Cultural relativism and subjectivity are a natural consequence of this forced quest. Since common and own meaning cannot be found, it results easier to look at the specific situation and act accordingly rather than rediscovering a satisfactory concept of identity that would overcome modern problems and fit postmodern times: "Social identity theory states that a person does not possess only one 'self', but rather several 'selves' each activated in a certain situation"[17] . And, even more than a fragmented self, a contradictory one, because "In a globalized, poststructuralist, postmodern world, identity is considered to be fluid, multiple, diverse, dynamic, varied, shifting, subject to change and contradictory. It is regarded to be socially organized, reorganized, constructed, co-constructed, and continually reconstructed through language and discourse. It is unstable, flexible, ongoing, negotiated, and multiple. It is indeed a collection of roles or subject positions and a mixture of individual agency and social influences"[18].

Post-modernization, or the transition to postmodernism in philosophy, is directly connected with the referral to language in everyday life. By the mid 20th century there are an important number of structural theories[19] in regard to human existence. Ferdinand de Saussure, Swiss linguist, semiotician and father of structuralism, suggested that to understand the signifier and signified[20] one needs to study the structure of the language to which the word in question be-

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[17]   H. Tajfel, J. Turner, "An integrative theory of intergroup conflict", *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, Brooks and Cole, Monterey, CA, 1979, 33-47.

[18]   T. Omoniyi, G. White, "The Sociolinguistics of Identity", *The Modern Language Journal,* 2008, 645-647.

[19]   The theoretical framework for this subject is originally conceived in the post-structuralism section by Roger Jones at http://www.philosopher.org.uk/poststr.htm

[20]   "Saussure's theory of the sign is it being made up of the matched pair of signifier and signified. The signifier is the pointing finger, the word, the sound-image. The signified is the concept, the meaning, the thing indicated by the signifier. It need not be a 'real object' but is some *referent* to which the signifier refers. The signifier and signified, whilst superficially simple, form a core element of semiotics." *Signifier and signified,* Changing Minds, 2016. http://changing-minds.org/explanations/critical_theory/concepts/signifier_signified.htm

longs to. The introduction of structure in the analytical method can be seen too in Marxist and Freudian theories, thus creating in the 60's the structuralist movement, based in France: "they disagreed that man is what he makes of himself. (...) [since] the structuralist individual is shaped by sociological, linguistic and psychological structures, over which he/she has no control, but which could be uncovered by using their methods of investigation."[21]. For structuralists, language structure precedes the speaker and closes his reality, so our identity is given by language. Now, being language a social construct to communicate, identity is fictional. There is no space for philosophical realism, no intrinsic elements nor ontological notions.

Post-structuralists doubt the stability of the system that their predecessors relied on, for they see that the postmodern man has lost his confidence in certainty and abides in relativism, inconveniencing the analysis of objective structures that cannot be judged by the subject because of his programming. Two main philosophers appear to exemplify post-structuralist line of thought concerning identity. Paul Ricoeur, a French philosopher and hermeneutic phenomenologist, agrees with Leonardo Polo about the impossibility of *reflectio*, when he states that "(...) the answer to the question "Who am I?" can never be fully explicated. This is because, in asking "Who am I?", "I" who pose the question necessarily fall within the domain of enquiry; I am both seeker and what is sought."[22]. He sees individual identity as a shifting construct for adding coherence to the idea of self, because of the status of the question; anthropological identity exists but its understanding results unreachable because of the hermeneutical limitation. Michel Foucault, our second representative, is more severe as he rejects completely both types of identity, considering them a discourse and a shifting construction used for social interactions, but not a fixed thing within a person; connected to the power doctrine as well, identity is a mean for exercising power in those interactions and surpassing the resistance of the other[23]. Both philosophers agree in the fact that it is merely fiction and ever changing.

Basically, the modern conflict is left unanswered and more complex in postmodernism. Identity gets divided into multiple identities, following the pattern of fragmentation, and absolutely deprived of a real human essence, introducing the notion of fiction. Perplexity still stands high among these doctrines not because objectualism or voluntarism, but because human thought has resorted into absurdity and has given up, for the question has proven to be impossible itself, let alone the reply.

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[21]   R. Jones, *Post-structuralism*. http://www.philosopher.org.uk/poststr.htm

[22]   Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/ricoeur/

[23]   D. Gaunlett, *Michel Foucault*. 2013. http://www.theory.org.uk/ctr-fou1.htm

Rediscovering the man with Transcendental Anthropology

At this point of the paper we are at a distinctive crossroads: the absurd of the fragmented self in its origin, whose happiness and purpose are painfully relative and shadowed by an unbearable solitude, or openness towards a new perspective that redesigns our concept of being. We can appeal to philosophical realism as the counterpart of relativism, which ensures that there are aspects of reality ontologically independent to man's conceptions, schemes, perceptions and such, consequently needed for our new proposal.

As explained in *Why a Transcendental Anthropology?*, Leonardo Polo's first key distinction is between anthropology and metaphysics, since there is an act of being of the physical universe, and an act of being of the human person. Metaphysics deals with first principles and necessity permeates in its structure, concerned with the transcendental as universal. The human person cannot be understood as such, because there would not be freedom, losing his foundation; anthropological transcendentals are open, apertured, not universal. The distinction and extension of anthropological transcendentals[24] is both methodic and thematic: coexistence, transcendental freedom, personal intellection and gift-love are open spheres with reciprocal communication that embrace man's components.

Transcendental anthropology is the doctrine about the act of being of man as coexistence. He is not limited to being or exist, he is *being with, co-existent,* since man is not just human nature, but also person[25]: the personal being is the "who", the "each of us", irreducible, what we have been calling "individual identity" all along. The early distinction between anthropological and individual identity in this essay finally closes, because transcendental anthropology means to study the man as a person, because we cannot talk about man without his individuality.

The human person includes 3 main spheres: human nature, human essence and act of being[26]. The first is the composition of biological inheritance, the physical aspects of man. The second is the combination of will and intelligence as immaterial potencies with the "I" as previous act that, when activated, start the process of essentialization; this *sinderesis* is openness to inferiority, a teleological program meant to be used for the external world. In essence reside dualities, results of man's observation of reality as complex, so it is studied partially

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[24] Metaphysical transcendentals are the following medieval cast of principles: *ens, unum, res, aliquid, veritas, bonum, pulchrum*.

[25] L. Polo, "El descubrimiento de Dios desde el hombre. Studia Poliana, Pamplona, n. 1, 1999. Pp. 5.

[26] Full dissertation by J. F. Sellés, *Un descubrimiento trascedental: La antropología trascendental de Leonardo Polo*. http://www.leonardopolo.net/textos/sellespolo.htm#_ftn47.

and casts a great variety of examples, such as *actus essendi-essentia*, body-soul, freedom-reason, interior-exterior[27]. This way of thinking has grown so strong that Polo considers duality a *cuasi-transcendental* value, for what is human is essentially organized in this duality structure. Finally, the act of being or personal life encompasses and surpasses nature and essence. Here is where transcendentals reside, thus greater to all intrinsic dualities: it is openness to the superior.

Coexistence solves otherness. There is no "I" or "me" without "you": no person can be understood alone. The universe, on the other hand, can exist alone, so coexistence is exclusively related to the human person. Unicity means mental presence, a mental limit that takes away freedom. To be one, to be a single person, would be tragic plus impossible. It means lack of reply, mere existence, no aperture, inferiority and less dignity.

Transcendental freedom solves will. It is not about having freedom but rather about being free. When God creates man, he does not determine him, playing along. In this game I coexist with God as well, therefore distinguishing between the metaphysical God and the anthropological God[28]; in coexistence with God identification takes place in a way that the person gets part of his identity, but still the person is free, an ongoing project with unrestricted growth. That is why all success is premature, and in here lies Christian hope.

Personal intellection solves reason; it is the *intelectus ut co actus* that makes things intelligible, *a priori* from knowledge as immanent operation, a transparent light that makes us able to know the truth (as a metaphysical transcendental), and includes openness to divine intellection, allowing in Ratzinger's definition of faith as a form of knowledge to enter the *logos*.

Gift-love is precisely the lack of necessity in our creation: we are being-additionally; we are excess before necessity. This gift ought to be accepted, because accepting is superior than giving. If creation is not accepted, the human person would be left paralyzed: there is no gift without acceptance. In metaphysics, St. Thomas Aquinas notes that man loves a thing because it is good (*bonum*), but in anthropology love is the element itself, there is no need of *bonum*. When man is coexistent and open to transcendence, he enters the game with God, and will never be abandoned.

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[27] L. Polo, *Antropología Trascendental. Tomo 1, La Persona Humana*, Eunsa, Pamplona, 2010, 157-158.

[28] "According to my proposal, God is by antonomasia the principal sense of being, for he is the original Identity. However, God is also a personal being that coexists with men. God created the human person, but in creation there is not necessarily determination"; L. Polo, "El descubrimiento de Dios desde el hombre*", Studia Poliana*, n. 1, 1999, 14.

Notes on harmonization

The act of being is the key concept to understand identity. The totalization and absoluteness of identity that I intend must not be confused with unicity or homogenization. Man is compelled to keep acknowledging duality, but its construction as dualism requires a shift: dualities are not to be understood as dichotomy or dissociation (proper dualism), but as hierarchical ascendants[29]. Moreover, fragmentation is caused precisely by misunderstanding duality.

To understand the organization of dualities in a hierarchical sense, we must recognize that each entity that conforms it, say A and B, are 1) different from each other, and 2) one is always superior. When A and B come together to build a duality, it creates C because of "being additionally" (*"además"*). This implies that duality does not get exhausted in dichotomy, but opens up to a new duality, because C will then encounter D and so on. Their encounter does not have a notion of complementarity (there is no cause-effect), and appeals to man's endless and unanalyzable pluralities of dimensions. The total does not imply unicity because of the transcendental characteristic of aperture.

The second high note is that the term "identity" in the human person abides in incompleteness itself. Strict identity is lack of duality, God's indistinction between essence and act of being. We can round up human identity for avoiding contradiction and exponential fragmentation, but that is not permission for sustaining that body and soul are the same, or internal and external configuration are not fundamentally independent. Rounding up, or harmonizing, is accepting incompleteness within, that gets completed in coexistence with God and in life itself as ongoing project with unrestricted growth. To pay too much attention in the particular aspects of identity, the minor details, "impoverishes fullness" because our cognitive configuration places the limit itself[30].

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[29] L. Polo, *El acceso al ser,* Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona, 2015, 161-164.

[30] L. Polo, *El ser I: La existencia extramental*, Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona, 1965, 292-298.

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