A primary concern of practical contemporary philosophy is to discover an ethical rationality, which makes possible the justification of determined decisions in the context of a multicultural society. Bioethics is a field in which this necessity is perhaps especially pressing. However, the proposals that have come forth in this sense, along the lines of promoting a “minimalist ethics”– be it in principle (Beauchamp and Childress 1994) or in practice (Engelhard 1986), are open to criticism, and do not appear to be sufficient. In this article, I explore another path, more in tune with the ethics of virtue and the classical doctrine of Natural Law. Yet, before that, I expound the reasons that advise against tackling the question of multiculturalism merely from the perspective of minimalist ethics.
The main reason against taking minimalist ethics as the way to deal with cultural differences is that minimalist ethics involve a liberal understanding of the private and the public sphere, according to which cultural differences would be accepted as long as they do not conflict with a supposedly neutral rationality which reigns in the public sphere. Implicit therein is the idea that culture can be confined to the realm of the private. Yet, all culture, to the extent it is alive, fights to become present in public life. From this perspective, the insistence in a minimalist ethics is hardly compatible with respect to true cultural diversity. Indeed, the proposal, apparently impartial, of a formal morality for a multicultural society, i.e. a morality which should be superimposed upon the ethics of a particular community, is the proposal of a double morality, which contradicts the unity of practical reason, and eventually leads to cultural uniformity.
Accordingly, if we consider cultural diversity in the context of a single society with values worthy of being preserved, the path is not the imposition of a minimum ethics: the path to defend diversity follows, rather, by strengthening cultures from the inside. Now, the first step in this direction leads to respect the natural basis of each culture, because, just as Robert Spaemann observes, “culture is humanized nature, not abolished nature”. Now, if one can define culture as “humanized nature,” it is important to point out that the humanization of nature depends essentially on the development of habits. These, as Aristotle indicates, can be of three types: intellectual, ethical, and technical. Indeed, the consistency and perdurability of a culture depends, in a great measure, upon the solidity, not only of its institutions but also of the intellectual and moral habits developed by its people. Thus, the intellectual habits make possible the achievement of a vital synthesis between the new and the old, fostering the continuity between progress and tradition. The moral habits, in turn, make possible the integration of scientific and technical knowledge into the practical context of human life. From this perspective, protecting a culture cannot mean anything other than enabling or favoring the growth of the habits of its people. Now, while the development of habits is, for its most part, the work of the individual members of the community, politics can also help to this end by protecting the natural floor, upon which moral habits develop. At this point, the appeal to Natural Law becomes opportune. In this context, however, I depart from the usual –foundationalist- understanding of Natural Law, to regard it merely as the natural way of reasoning on practical matters, i.e., a way of reasoning based upon the very structure of our practical reason.
